Perceived risk, risk tolerance and trust in debt decisions : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Finance at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand by Phung, Trang Thai Minh
Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis.  Permission is given for 
a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and 
private study only.  The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without 








A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in Finance 
 













The perceived risk of stock investment, risk tolerance and trust play important roles in the stock 
market and in use of debt for stock investment, yet the relationship between these has received 
little attention. This thesis examines these direct and indirect relationships using three 
independent essays using structural equation modelling as the main technique. Vietnam is used 
as an illustrative example, as the use of informal borrowing is common. This thesis surveyed 
420 Vietnamese individual investors and found the following results.  
Essay One finds that the perceived risk is positively associated with borrowing sources and the 
use of informal debt. Leverage risk and opportunity risk also directly relate to borrowing 
sources. Borrowing sources is positively related to perceived risk and debt decisions. Perceived 
risk is a mediator between borrowing sources and informal debt, and borrowing sources act as 
a mediator between perceived risk and debt decisions.  
The results of Essay Two show that risk tolerance has a direct relationship to the use of financial 
leverage, while investment horizons are related to the use of informal debt. Risk tolerance 
positively relates to the use of informal debt and mediates between investment horizons and 
debt decisions among stockbrokers. 
In Essay Three, the results reveal that there is a significantly positive relationship between trust 
in the stock market, and trading frequency and the use of informal debt. Trust in stockbrokers 
and brokerage firms are directly related to the use of informal debt. Trading frequency is also 
positively associated with trust in the stock market and the use of financial leverage. Trust is a 
mediator between trading frequency and informal debt, and trading frequency acts as a 
mediator between trust and financial leverage. 
Findings from this thesis will help provide useful insights into investors’ behaviour and its 
impact on debt decisions for stock investment amongst individual investors, users and non-
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users of informal and formal borrowing, stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers, male and female 
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Chapter 1 Overview 
1.1 The importance of informal and formal debt in stock investment 
The use of debt for stock investment is common and often regarded as an essential part of the 
growth of stock markets. This debt can be from both formal and informal borrowing sources. 
Formal borrowing sources include bankers, credit institutions, and brokerage firms. Informal 
borrowing sources encompass family (e.g. parents, brothers, sisters) and non-family (e.g. 
friends, colleagues, managers). Chandavarkar (1985) argues that instead of considering these 
two sectors as discrete financial enclaves, informal and formal financial sectors should be seen 
as forming a continuum, with many sub-markets within each sector, and many connections 
between the two.  
Informal finance sources can be more accessible than the formal sector due to its type of loan 
transactions and flexibility of operations (e.g. Germidis, Kessler, & Meghir, 1991; Ghate, 
1992). The loan transactions are personalised in the informal sector, while the loan transactions 
are arms-length in the formal sector. Formal loan terms are standardised, whereas informal loan 
terms are outside the purview of the regulations. Borrowers from informal lenders also have 
flexibility in terms of loan purpose, interest rate, collateral requirements, maturity periods, and 
debt rescheduling, whereas borrowers from formal lenders do not (Ghate, 1992).  
The role of the informal debt sector increasingly plays an important role in economic 
development for both enterprises and individuals. At the enterprise level, informal debt exerts 
a strong influence on innovation performance. This debt becomes more important as new 
enterprises have constrained access to formal sources. Informal capital is a unique source for 
them in accessing financing (Wu, Si, & Wu, 2016).  
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The relationship between formal and informal debt changes with increased business activity, 
as indicated in Figure 1.1. That is, at high levels of business activity, the use of informal debt 
increases, while the use of formal debt decreases. 
Figure 1.1: Formal debt, informal debt and innovation performance1 of enterprises 
 
Wu et al. (2016, p. 267) 
At the household level, informal debt is mostly used for production and consumption (Barslund 
& Tarp, 2008; Guirkinger, 2008; Mohieldin & Wright, 2000), indicating that informal debt 
contributes to the growth of the economy. Households use informal debt due to their limited 
access to formal sources. Low rates of interest, low transaction costs, and uncomplicated 
procedures are also the primary reasons for the use of informal debt (Barslund & Tarp, 2008; 
Guirkinger, 2008; Mohieldin & Wright, 2000).  
Most households in developing countries have used informal debt, as shown in Figure 1.2. The 
informal debt levels used are around 62.5% in Madagascar  (Zeller, 1994), 42.5% in Egypt 
 
1 Innovation is defined as “the development and implementation of new ideas by people who over time engage 
in transactions with others within an institutional order.” (Van de Ven, 1986; Wu et al. 2016). Innovation 




(Mohieldin & Wright, 2000), 48% in Vietnam (Barslund & Tarp, 2008), 26% in Peru 
(Guirkinger, 2008), 19% in China  (Turvey & Kong, 2010), 72% in India  (Guérin, d'Espallier, 
& Venkatasubramanian, 2013), and 75% in Thailand (Tanomchat & Sampattavanija, 2018). 
Figure 1.2: Informal debt used by households in developing countries 
 
 
While there are numerous studies on the use of informal debt, there has been no publicised 
research on the use of informal debt by individual investors for stock investment to the author’s 
knowledge. This thesis examines the use of informal debt in addition to formal debt by 
Vietnamese individual investors for stock investment, and that this choice can influence their 
investment decisions. Based on trial interviews and a pilot test of 20 individual investors, most 
of them (19 investors) use debt for stock investment.  Among these, 9 investors use both 
informal and formal debt, 2 investors use only informal debt, and 8 investors use only formal 









Madagascar Egypt Vietnam Peru China India Thailand Bangladesh
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Figure 1.3: Informal and formal debt used by investors for stock investment 
 
Use of debt (known as debt decisions) is a risky decision regardless of whether it is informal 
or formal debt because users of debt (i.e. investors) face problems personally and legally if 
investment outcomes result in investors being unable to cover their debt obligations. The 
literature finds that behavioural factors like perceived risk, risk tolerance, and trust play a vital 
role in decision-making under risk (e.g. Grable, 2000, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Stout, 2009; Zak & Knack, 2001). Based on this evidence, this thesis investigates whether the 
perceived risk of stock investment, risk tolerance, or trust in the stock market are key drivers 
of debt decisions. 
1.2 Factors driving debt decisions and the primary research questions 
The “perceived risk” of stock investment is defined by Peter and Tarpey Sr (1975) as the level 
of potential loss concerns and level of importance of this potential loss. Many finance studies, 
(e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nofsinger, 2008; Thaler & Johnson, 1990), have suggested 
that investors are only concerned about financial risk. However, this thesis argues that, when 
investing in stocks, investors may have additional risk concerns rather than just financial risk. 
These additional concerns are information safety (safety risk), time waste (time risk), social 
standing (social risk), wrong choices among stocks (choice risk), missing out on other financial 
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opportunities (opportunity risk), and debt problems (leverage risk) (Peter & Tarpey Sr, 1975; 
Hoyer et al., 2016). These concepts of perceived risk are derived from consumer theory and 
potentially provides valuable insights into investors’ perceived risk and its relationship with 
debt decisions. 
“Risk tolerance” is defined by Grable (2000) as the maximum amount of uncertainty that a 
person is willing to accept when making a decision. Risk tolerance is sometimes used to 
describe risk preference (e.g. Grable, 2000, 2008). Since risk tolerance affects a broad range of 
personal financial choices, for example, (Grable & Roszkowski, 2008), this thesis argues that 
risk tolerance is strongly associated with debt decisions. 
“Trust” in the stock market is defined by Shapiro (2012) as the asymmetric agency, through 
which individuals or organisations (known as agents – those trusted) act on behalf of others 
(known as principals - trustors). In the case of A trusts B, B holds the position of trust regardless 
of whether A considers B trustworthy, feels confident about B, or whether B encapsulates the 
interest of A that B serves. B here acts with disinterestedness, full and honest disclosure, 
diligence, duties of care or performance that is consistent with A’s expectations under the 
circumstances (Shapiro, 2012). This thesis argues that trust in the stock market is related to 
debt decisions.  
This thesis, in short, argues that the perceived risk of stock investment, risk tolerance and trust 
in the stock market strongly relate to debt decisions, using both roles: a predictor and mediator 
in debt decision. The following general research questions are: 
1/ What roles does the perceived risk of stock investment play in debt decisions? 
2/ What roles does risk tolerance play in debt decisions? 
3/ What roles does trust in the stock market play in debt decisions? 
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1.3 Vietnam stock market and individual investors 
1.3.1 The Vietnam stock market 
This thesis focuses on Vietnamese individual investors as they provide a useful example due 
to their distinctive characteristics, which will be discussed in Section 1.3.2. Vietnamese 
investors have experience of several crises since the stock market was founded in 2000. As was 
the case with the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, the Vietnam stock market turned into a 
bubble market reaching its highest point, 1100 points, in 2007 before dropping to its lowest 
point, 245 points, in March 2009, as shown in Figure 1.4. Over the past decade, the Vietnam 
stock market has rebounded sharply. The factors which have driven this recovery are a decrease 
in interest rates, an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), and the growth of credit and 
stock prices starting from a low base. Reaching over 1000 on the VN-index, the Vietnam stock 
market continues to hold the top stock market spot in terms of performance in Asia (Ngo, 
2018). 




1.3.2 Vietnamese individual investors 
The Vietnam stock market has useful characteristics. Firstly, individual investors dominate the 
Vietnam stock market, making up 99% of participants. This differs from the developed 
markets, where institutional investors rather than individual investors are the primary 
participants. Most investors are young (approximately 50% age 26-35) and do not have much 
experience in stock investment (around 50% have less than 3 years of experience) (Trang & 
Khuong, 2017). For these reasons, the research on the behaviour of Vietnamese individual 
investors applied in this thesis is of significant interest as they are generally new to the market 
and are still learning.  
Secondly, investors typically use high levels of financial leverage. While Vietnamese law 
imposes a maximum lending ratio of 1:1, in some instances, individual investors use higher 
levels of debt, with a leverage ratio of even up to 1:4.2 This increases the risk of substantial 
losses when stock prices fall. It is almost certain, therefore, that investors have currently used 
financial leverage for stock investment. 
Lastly, informal borrowing is common in Vietnamese culture. Many Vietnamese websites 
discuss issues around borrowing and give some advice on how to deal with people who ask 
“you” to borrow money. A list of typical borrowers is often quite wide, including 
acquaintances, friends, colleagues (co-workers), best friends, and relatives. 3  Informal 
borrowing is also a unique source for Vietnamese households as they have limited access to 
formal lenders (e.g. Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Nguyen, 2008; Nguyen & Berg, 2014). These 
 
2 According to the website of Vnexpress (2010): http://kinhdoanh.vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/chung-khoan/thi-truong-
truot-doc-vi-don-bay-tai-chinh-2705286.html 






characteristics will help explain why Vietnamese investors use informal debt for the stock 
market. 
Based on these characteristics, this thesis provides useful insights into investors’ behaviour and 
its impact on the use of formal and informal debt for stock investment in the Vietnam stock 
market. 
1.4 Family and borrowing culture in Vietnam 
1.4.1 Family culture 
Vietnam is an emerging economy, being the world’s most 15th populous country in the world. 
Vietnam has strong economic growth due to the expansion of networks and reform policies. 
GDP per capita has sharply increased by 123% within 10 years (2008-2018), USD 1149 (2008) 
compared to USD 2566 (2018), according to the data of the world bank4. The culture of 
Vietnam is one of the oldest in Southeast Asian, approximately 4000 years ago, and strongly 
influenced by Chinese culture  (Confucian social ).  
In a Vietnamese family, multiple generations have been living together, including 
grandparents, parents, children, single aunts or uncles. Children have been in a family until 
they get married, regardless of what their ages are. However, married sons, especially the oldest 
or youngest sons (including his wife and children) have still lived with their parents because of 
being in charge of taking care of their parents. Grandparents can get involved in many 
activities, for example, nurturing their grandchildren. 
Men overall have more influence on family decisions than women in a family. The older man 
is usually the household head, who has more influence in financial and non-financial decision-





also responsible for housework and raising children. Wives often sacrifice for her husband and 
children, and importantly, tolerate unfair treatment to keep the family in peace. 
1.4.2 Borrowing and lending money culture 
“Blood is thicker than water” 
Borrowing from parents is common in Vietnamese culture. Good and loyal relationships 
between members in a family are more important than others, which conforms to the proverb 
“blood is thicker than water”5. The elders show their care for the younger, and the younger 
express their respect to the seniors. They, therefore, willingly help each other when members 
have difficulties. The following reasons explain why parents willingly lend their children 
money. (i) They do this with the hope that their money may help their children solve these 
problems and then have better lives. (ii) Parents’ money may create opportunities for their 
children to fulfil their dream for entrepreneurship or investment. (iii)  As being household 
heads, lending money to children may increase their influence in a family and hold children’s 
respect.  
Cash holding preference 
Eighty per cent (80%) of Vietnamese prefer using cash for daily buying and selling 
transactions6, explaining why they also borrow cash from parents or friends.  According to Dr 
Nguyen Tri Hieu - a specialist of finance - banking, cash is the main means of payment in 










First, there is not any Vietnamese law on the use of non-cash payment. For payees, payment 
by cash is faster and safer, preventing their personal information being hacked by hackers or 
virus attacks online. For sellers, cash receipt may avoid the burden of taxes obligations. In 
practice, Vietnamese laws on bankruptcy or enterprise protection in terms of bankruptcy remain 
unclear and require a time-consuming process, even though they have fulfilled their tax 
obligations, causing a consequence that every business itself protects and survives according 
to their own ways.  
Second, there are no official community education programs on the use of e-banking for 
payment, resulting in most people being uncomfortable and unfamiliar with this instrument. 
Currently, several workshops or seminars on the use of e-banking have been taking place. 
However, the focus of participants is on undergraduates or higher, meaning that students in 
high schools (age of 15-18) or secondary schools (age of 12-14) have no ideas about e-banking 
payment. 
Finally, frauds in the finance-banking system and cheating payments online are common in 
Vietnam, becoming a serve problem without appropriate solutions because the origin of these 
problems emanates from false understandings of information. These causes people to lose trust 
in the banking system in Vietnam, and as a consequence, households are more likely to keep 
cash at home than in a bank.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis is based on a three-essay format. Essay one (presented in Chapter 
4) examines the inter-relationships between perceived risk of stock investment, borrowing 
sources, and debt decisions. Essay two (presented in Chapter 5) investigates the inter-
relationships between risk tolerance, investment horizons, and debt decisions. Essay three 
(presented in Chapter 6) examines the inter-relationships between trust in the stock market, 
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trading frequency, and debt decisions. These relationships are tested after controlling for six 
demographics; gender, age, marital status, education, income, and financial literacy. Early 
versions of these essays have been presented at academic conferences.7 
The key technique for the three essays is “structural equation modelling” (SEM), utilising 
cross-sectional data of 420 Vietnamese individual investors. This thesis also analyses the 
differences in the relationship between perceived risk, risk tolerance, and trust to debt decisions 
between subgroups; stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers, male and female investors, and users 
and non-users of borrowing sources (informal and formal). Other techniques are also applied 
to carry out robustness checks of the findings by SEMs, including multiple regression, stepwise 
regression, Hayes and Preacher’s approach, a t-test method, propensity score matching (PSM) 
method, and the instrumental variables (IVs) approach.  
The remainder of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background of this 
thesis. The methodology is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 serves as Essay 1, Chapter 5 as 
Essay 2, and Chapter 6 as Essay 3.  Chapter 7 ends by presenting the conclusions, including 
significant findings, contributions, implications and recommendations, and suggestions for 
further areas of research. 
 
7 The early version of Study 1 (Chapter 4) of this thesis was presented at the 2nd Asia Conference on Business 
and Economic Studies (ACBES 2019), University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, September 2019 
https://acbes.ueh.edu.vn/, and at the 3rd Sydney Banking and Financial Stability Conference 2019 (SBFC 2019), 
University of Sydney Business School, Australia, December 2019 https://sbfc.sydney.edu.au/. 
 
The early version of Study 2 (Chapter 5) of this thesis was presented at the 23rd International Congress on 
Modeling and Simulation (MODSIM2019), Modeling and Simulation Society of Australia and New Zealand Inc., 
Australia, December 2019 https://mssanz.org.au/modsim2019/index.html., and at the 23rd New Zealand Finance 
Colloquium – NZFC, Lincoln University, New Zealand, February 2019 https://nzfc.ac.nz/cfp/. 
 
The early version of Study 3 (Chapter 6) of this thesis was presented at International Conference on Business and 
Finance 2019, University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, August 2019 
https://vietnam2019.sciencesconf.org/, and at the 24rd New Zealand Finance Colloquium – NZFC, Auckland 




Chapter 2 Theoretical Background 
Introduction to this chapter 
Behavioural decision theory includes traditional finance and behavioural finance. Scholars of 
behavioural finance and consumer behaviour argue the assumptions used in traditional finance. 
This chapter begins with the behavioural decision theory and expected utility theory (EUT). 
The following sections are the concept of perceived risk, investors’ rationality and risk 
aversion, a risk-return trade-off, and trust in decision-making. This chapter ends with the 
behavioural finance framework and a summary. 
2.1 Behavioural decision theory 
Behavioural decision theory developed by Edwards (1954, 1961) focuses on a restricted range 
of human activity, especially how people choose between options (Hansson, 1994).  
Behavioural decision theory has two facets; normative and descriptive (Edwards, 1954, 1961; 
Hansson, 1994; Hickson & Khemka, 2014; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977). A 
normative theory provides prescriptive functions or uses decision rules to help decision-makers 
maximise their expected utility of outcomes. The focus of the normative theory is, therefore, 
on how people should make decisions. In contrast, the descriptive theory is a description of 
decision-makers’ beliefs and values, and the way they incorporate these beliefs and values into 
their decisions. Hence, the descriptive theory focuses on how people actually make decisions.    
In personal financial decisions, there are different perspectives among traditional finance, 
behavioural finance, and consumer behaviour. Traditional finance originates from normative 
theory, and behavioural finance and consumer behaviour are derived from descriptive theory, 
as shown in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual background of the thesis 
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Collected by this thesis 
The assumptions made under the traditional finance framework have been much debated by 
scholars of behavioural finance and consumer behaviour. This begins with the debates on the 
assumptions of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) that are presented below. 
2.2 Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
One of the basic concepts underlying traditional theory is expected utility theory (EUT) 
developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). EUT assumes that people choose 
between any two alternatives based on their preferences and that these preferences are always 
consistent. For example, if he/she prefers A to B, A is always chosen. Noticeably, the 
preferences between any two choices are independent of the presence of a third option, for 
example, C. This means that a person always prefers A to B regardless of the existence of C. 
Also, if he/she prefers A to B and B to C, he/she will prefer A to C.  
This assumption has been argued against by scholars of behavioural finance, where investors’ 
preferences may change and be inconsistent over time (e.g. Grable & Roszkowski, 2008; 
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Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nofsinger, 2008; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 
2002). Moreover, a decision maker’s perception of choice may change according to the 
presentation of information referred to as “decision frame”. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) argue that a decision to be made is based on the “frame”.  
“Decision frame”  is described as “the decision-maker’s conception of acts, outcomes, and 
contingencies associated with a particular choice” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). In 
other words, it relates to how a decision-maker takes a problem into account, with “frame” 
referring to the description or presentation of a problem (Ackert, 2014; Shefrin, 2002).  
In traditional finance, the frame is independent of behaviour or irrelevant to behaviour (known 
as frame independence) due to a decision-maker having consistent preferences in decision-
making and information always being available (Shefrin, 2002). By contrast, scholars of 
behavioural finance, for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981), debate that the frame is 
relevant to behaviour and affects decision-making (known as frame dependence), and that 
because a decision-maker has limited resources and ability, they make a decision based on both 
the presentation of this problem and their personal characteristics.  
This thesis also argues that individual investors’ preferences are inconsistent. Investors may 
prefer stock A to stock B at present, but B to A in the future. Likewise, between formal and 
informal debt for stock investment, individual investors may choose both formal and informal 
debt in varying proportions. Traditional finance would suggest that one would be preferred to 
the other and investors would only borrow from both sources if their preferred source was 
exhausted.  
Moreover, a decision to be made should not be focused only on two alternatives. Rather, other 
factors should be considered; for example, personal characteristics, emotions, risk attitudes, 
and prior outcomes; due to their impacts on choice decisions (Grable & Roszkowski, 2008; 
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Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nofsinger, 2008; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Weber et al., 2002). 
It is also essential to examine whether these additional factors dampen the impact of the 
preferences on choice decisions. 
2.3 Perceived risk 
2.3.1 Concepts of perceived risk 
Scholars of both finance and consumer behaviour also have different perspectives around the 
concept of perceived risk. Perceived risk plays a vital role in decision-making (Bélanger & 
Carter, 2008; Cunningham, 1967; Weber et al., 2002). In consumer behaviour theory, Bauer 
(1960) defines perceived risk as “the sense that any action of a consumer will produce 
consequences which he cannot anticipate with anything approximating certainty, and some of 
which at least are likely to be unpleasant” (p.24). Perceived risk is also characterised as a 
person’s subjective feelings of certainty to act in an uncertain environment (Cunningham, 
1967), or a subjective expectation of suffering a loss to pursue the desired outcome (Bélanger 
& Carter, 2008). In finance, perceived risk may be described as “a person’s standing on the 
continuum from risk aversion to risk-seeking” (Weber et al., 2002, p. 264). 
Perceived risk differs from actual risk. The way that risk is perceived can be more or less severe 
than actual risk. Established research shows that people do not always have a realistic or 
accurate view of actual risk (e.g. Gilbert, 2009; Schneier, 2006). For example, Gilbert (2009) 
argues that individuals are likely to over-react or under-react to actual risks. They worry more 
about anthrax (intentional action) than influenza (a natural accident) although an annual death 
toll of anthrax may be zero, while an annual death toll of influenza may be a half-million 
people. Schneier (2006) also reveals that people underestimate risks they voluntarily take, and 
overestimate risks they cannot control. In stock investment, perceived risk may lead to adverse 
results. For example, investors tend to be overly optimistic about the potential for good 
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performance or be excessively confident about their ability in predicting the possible good 
outcomes of the investments they make (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2001; Kim and Nofsinger, 
2003). As a result, these optimism or overconfidence biases lead to suboptimal returns. 
Behavioural biases will be examined in Section 2.6. 
Perceived risk also varies based on personal characteristics or a country’s culture. Namely, 
males are more overconfident or less risk-averse than females  (Barber & Odean, 2001; Weber 
et al., 2002). Kim and Nofsinger (2003) also find that people in Asian culture tend to be more 
overconfident than people in other cultures. Products in less-developed countries are perceived 
as riskier due to the high likelihood of poor quality (Alden, Stayman, & Hoyer, 1994).  
2.3.2 Investors’ perceived risk  
The concept of perceived risk differs between finance and consumer behaviour frameworks. 
As shown in Figure 2.2, in traditional finance theory, objective risk is normally measured 
through beta or standard deviation, while in behavioural finance or consumer behaviour 
frameworks, the subjective risk is measured through investors’ perspectives.  
Within the finance framework, investors are seen as being only concerned about financial risk 
(gain or loss) when investing in stocks. This may lead to an inaccurate assessment of the 
perceived risk of an investment because investors miss some critical facets of the risk. Within 
a consumer behaviour framework, consumers are concerned with a wide variety of risk 
including financial risk (potential to suffer financial harm); performance risk (perform more 
poorly than expected); safety risk (create harm to their safety); psychological risk (harm their 
sense of self and, thus, create negative emotions); social risk (do harm to their social standing); 
and time risk (lead to loss of time).   
Given that both investors and consumers make decisions under uncertainty, it could be posited 
that investors may, in addition to financial risk, be concerned about the other facets of risk used 
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in consumer theory. This thesis thus explores this and finds that, as well as financial risk, 
investors are concerned about additional six kinds of risk, namely information safety, social 
standing, investment opportunities, investment time, investment choice, and the use of leverage 
for investment. The findings of this thesis provide novel insights into investor behaviour. 
Figure 2.2: A summary of concepts of perceived risk 
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Collected by this thesis 
In summary, based on the consumer behaviour framework in terms of perceived risk, this thesis 
finds that investors are concerned with seven facets of risk, namely financial risk, safety risk, 
social risk, opportunity risk, time risk, choice risk, and leverage risk. These facets of risk form 
investors’ perceived risk of stock investment.  
The three fields of traditional finance, behavioural finance and consumer theory have differing 
perspectives of the relationship between risk and return in terms of investor behaviour. The 
traditional finance framework assumes that investors are always rational and risk-averse, and 
the relationship between risk and return is positive. These assumptions have been the focus of 




2.3.3 Investors’ rationality and risk aversion  
Within traditional finance framework, for example, modern portfolio theory (MPT) by 
Markowitz (1952) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965) and Mossin (1966) assume that investors are rational and risk-averse in terms of their 
expected returns.  This means that for a specific level of return, investors prefer a less risky 
portfolio to a riskier one. In general, scholars of traditional finance ignore all behavioural 
factors, which often play a part in human decision-making. These assumptions have been 
debated by scholars of behavioural finance and consumer behaviour and are outlined in Figure 
2.3.  
Figure 2.3: A summary of investors’ behaviour in investment decision-making 
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Within the behavioural finance framework, many scholars argue that investors are not always 
rational because inadequate information, cognitive limitations, mental short-cuts, heuristics, or 
emotions can influence decision-making processes away from what may seem strictly rational, 
for example (Bikas, Jurevičienė, Dubinskas, & Novickytė, 2013; Bloomfield, 2010; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Ricciardi, 2008) . Investors are risk-averse in winning situations 
and risk-seeking in losing situations (Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Rau, 2014). Importantly, investors also have a range of needs apart from 
maximising monetary outcomes and, thus, they may choose a course of action to satisfy these 
needs, e.g. loss avoidance instead of optimising the financial result (Barber & Odean, 2013; 
Barberis & Huang, 2001; Berkelaar & Kouwenberg, 2009; Easley & Yang, 2015; Rau, 2014).  
There are three cases to assess whether investors are risk-averse or risk-taking. First, investors 
may be risk-seeking in winning situations and risk-averse in losing situations (Chen, Kim, 
Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rau, 2014). Investors are averse to loss 
(known as loss aversion) (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2013; Barberis & Huang, 2001; Berkelaar & 
Kouwenberg, 2009; Easley & Yang, 2015; Rau, 2014) and feel more pain for a loss than 
pleasure for gains. This leads them to hold a losing investment longer to avoid the loss and to 
sell a gaining investment soon because they think their profit will erode. This is referred to as 
a disposition effect (Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rau, 
2014). These behaviours will be discussed in Section 2.5. 
Second, investors may become risk-takers after gains and risk-averters after losses (Nofsinger, 
2008; Ricciardi, 2008; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Winners (who gained early) may take more 
risk because they think their gains are not their own money (known as a house-money effect). 
Losers (who lost early) may take less risk because they feel they will continue to be unlucky 
(referred to as a risk-aversion effect) (Nofsinger, 2008; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). 
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Finally, some investors may be risk-taking no matter what their prior results are. That is, either 
winners or losers take on more risk for the next investment. This is because losers will engage 
in riskier activities in an attempt to regain losses (known as the break-even effect) so are willing 
to accept a double-or-nothing toss of the coin, even when they have less than a 50% chance of 
winning (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nofsinger, 2008). As a result, in most circumstances, 
investors are risk-taking, regardless of whether they have prior gains or losses.  
Bauer (1960) states that consumer behaviour framework has approached buying choices from 
a different angle, arguing that consumers are not perfectly rational because, as human beings, 
consumers are often constrained from accessing data sources and limit the ability to calculate 
the risks involved correctly. As a result of this assumption, consumers tend to assess risk 
through their less than perfect judgement (Bauer, 1960; Peter & Tarpey Sr, 1975; Sedgwick & 
Pokorny, 2010).  
Most consumers are risk-taking in the sense that they are facing many kinds of risk when 
buying a product (Bauer, 1960; Sedgwick & Pokorny, 2010).  For example, consumers are 
facing safety risk where their personal information may be leaked by hackers or viruses when 
they buy online.  
This thesis is open to the view about investors being irrational in decision-making to that found 
by scholars of behaviour finance and consumer behaviour (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2013; 
Barberis & Huang, 2001; Berkelaar & Kouwenberg, 2009; Easley & Yang, 2015; Rau, 2014; 
Sedgwick & Pokorny, 2010). Moreover, this thesis argues that investors who use debt for stock 
investment are prone to be more risk-tolerant than those who do not, no matter what kinds of 
debt are used (formal or informal). This is because more debt, particularly higher levels of debt 
means more leverage and therefore, more risk and a greater chance of insolvency if stock 
investments go bad. 
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Not only do scholars of behavioural finance and consumer behaviour debate investors’ 
rationality and risk aversion, but they also argue the positive relationship between risk and 
return inherent in the models of traditional finance.  
2.3.4 The trade-off between risk and returns  
Models of traditional finance assume that risk-averse investors must be compensated for taking 
on more risk with higher expected returns, meaning a positive association between risk and 
return (e.g. the Capital Asset Pricing Model – CAPM).  
The risk-return trade-off is briefly outlined in Figure 2.4. The behavioural framework argues 
that the relationship between risk and return is not always positive; instead, this relationship 
may be positive or negative dependent on the decision-makers’ perspectives or the specific 
features of a product (e.g. Byrne, 2005; Diacon and Ennew, 2001; Ganzach, 2000; Shefrin, 
2001; Trang and Tho, 2017).  
MacGregor, Slovic, Berry, and Evensky (1999), for example, find an inverse relationship 
between perceived risk and perceived returns. Shefrin (2001) argues that perceived risk is 
negatively associated with perceived returns on account of the representativeness bias of 
decision-makers. Investors thus believe that stocks from companies that are well run and 
financially sound are representative of good stocks, leading them to expect high returns from 
these stocks, as well as leading them to expect a comparatively lower risk. By contrast, Trang 
and Tho (2017) argue that perceived risk can be positively associated with perceived returns 
(perceived investment performance). That is, once investors perceive their stock investment as 
being high risk, this investment is also perceived to have high returns. Ganzach (2000) argues 
that the association between perceived risk and returns can be negative or positive dependent 
on the characteristics of the financial product. Ganzach (2000) classifies the assets into familiar 
and unfamiliar. For unfamiliar financial assets, the risk-return relationship is inverse because 
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the judgments pertain to the global preference, while for the familiar financial assets, the risk-
return association is positive because the actual values of risk and expected returns determine 
this trade-off. 
Figure 2.4: A summary of the perspectives of the risk-return trade-off 
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Collected by this thesis 
Peter and Tarpey Sr (1975) also argue that there is a negative relationship between perceived 
risk and perceived returns among consumers. Peter and Tarpey Sr (1975) examine three models 
of making decisions on brand preference. Model 1 pertains to choices of brands that minimise 
loss (perceived risk). Model 2 focuses on options of the brand that maximises gain (perceived 
return), and model 3 is where consumers select the brand that maximises net gains (net 
perceived returns = gain minus loss). Of those, they argue that the net perceived return model 
(model 3) accounts for more variance in brand preference than model 1 and 2, indicating that 
consumers expect both high returns and low risk. Alhakami and Slovic (1994) investigate 40 
different activities and find an inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived 
benefits. Diacon and Ennew (2001) argue that, for investments with below-average levels of 
consumer distrust (e.g. banks and building society accounts), a decrease in risk (distrust) leads 
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to an increase in perceived return (benefit), showing a negative relationship between perceived 
risk and returns. However, for investments with higher-than-average distrust levels (e.g., an 
endowment policy or personal pension), perceived risk is positively associated with the 
perceived return (benefit). Agarwal and Teas (2001) find that consumers’ performance risk and 
financial risk negatively influence the perceived value of products. Byrne (2005) explores that 
the relationship between perceived risk and returns is positive and that the positive risk-return 
trade-off only occurs to experts, but not to novices.  
As a result, some scholars (e.g. Byrne, 2005; Ganzach, 2000; Trang & Tho, 2017) find a 
positive risk-return relationship, while others (e.g., Diacon & Ennew, 2001; MacGregor et al., 
1999; Shefrin, 2001) argue that the relationship between risk and return is inverse.  
This thesis does not address the relationship between risk and return. Instead, it applies this 
positive risk-return relationship. It is a fact that using debt effectively enhances returns through 
leverage, and so, the link between debt levels and expected return is positive. This thesis 
examines the relationship between perceived risk and debt decisions and finds a positive link 
between perceived risk and the use of informal debt.  
2.4 Trust in decision-making  
2.4.1 Concepts of trust 
Trust plays an important role in investor decision-making. Hardin (2006) define trust as 
cognitive, not as an action or choice because “our trust in another is essentially a matter of 
relevant knowledge about that other, in particular, knowledge of reasons the other has to be 
trustworthy” (p. 38). Trust pertains to an encapsulated interest that refers to a notion that A 
trusts B due to X.  That is, A believes B has some reason to act in A’s best interest (Cook, 
2001; Hardin, 2001).  Cook (2001) argues that this model does not make much sense because 
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A might trust B due to X, Y but not Z. Also, it is hard to say who the B is and what the X is in 
the relation “A trusts B to do X”.  
Barbalet (2009) also argues that trust is often emotional rather than cognitive or rational. The 
basis of trust “is the feeling of confidence in another's future actions and also confidence 
concerning one’s judgment of another” (Barbalet, 2009, p. 375). Also, trust is non-transitive; 
that is, when A trusts B and B trusts C, it does not mean that A trusts C; and since trust has a 
central emotional factor it cannot be transitive (Barbalet, 2009). Like Barbalet (2009), Pixley 
(2004) states that the future is unknowable and implications of its unknowability seem 
terrifying. Thus, trust surrounding uncertainty enables decisions to be made. 
Shapiro (2012) has a different view of trust. Shapiro conceptualises trust as the asymmetric 
agency in which individuals or organisations (known as agents – those trusted) act on behalf 
of others (known as principals - trustors). Shapiro argues that in a case of A trusts B, B holds 
the position of trust regardless of whether A considers B trustworthy, feels confident about B, 
or whether B encapsulates the interest of A that B serves. B here acts with disinterestedness, 
full and honest disclosure, diligence, duties of care, or performance that is consistent with A’s 
expectations under the circumstances.  
This thesis follows Shapiro’s perspectives and investigates the extent to which investors trust 
their advisors, friends (who work for securities companies), brokerage firms, and stock 
exchanges when investing in stocks. 
2.4.2 Trust in finance  
Trust plays a vital role in social capital, for example, (Barbalet, 2009). Social capital is viewed 
as “an investment that persons make in social relationships that enhance or enrich their social 
resources” (Barbalet, 2009, p. 377). Trust is an essential ingredient for the success of a 
securities market (Stout, 2009).  
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Within the behavioural finance framework, for example, Stout (2009) argues that investors do 
not always behave in a cool, calculating, or a purely self-interested manner. Statman (2005) 
also states that investors are never rational and that they are not “rational expectations 
investors”. Instead, they are “trusting investors”, who readily believe that at least some people 
and some organisations are trustworthy (Stout, 2009, p. 5). That is, trusting investors think that 
trustees desist from exploiting their trust, even though they do not know what precludes this 
exploitation (Stout, 2009). 
Trust is found to be positively associated with risk-taking behaviour, for example, stock market 
participation (Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008). As with these 
scholars, this thesis assumes that the relationship between trust and risk-taking behaviour is 
positive, meaning a positive trust-debt association. Prospect theory and heuristics are the 
foundation of behavioural finance.  
2.5 Behavioural finance framework 
2.5.1 Prospect theory and its concepts 
Behavioural finance is descriptive and underscores why investors make decisions (Ackert, 
2014). Proponents of behavioural finance (Bikas, Jurevičienė, Dubinskas, & Novickytė, 2013; 
Bloomfield, 2010; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Ricciardi, 2008) debate that traditional 
models cannot delineate investors’ actual behaviour, and that the assumptions about investors 
appear unrealistic; Investors may be irrational (not always rational) or risk-taking (not always 
risk-averse). They may also have inconsistent preferences, seek satisfactory choices, have 
opportunities to earn abnormal returns or expect high returns with low risk; For example, 
Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman (2012) find that investors make abnormal returns throughout the 
periods of earnings announcements. One of the well-known theories related to behavioural 
finance is the prospect theory. 
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Prospect theory developed by (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
highlights that people inconsistently make decisions; they are risk-averse in terms of gains, but 
risk-taking in terms of losses. The S-shaped value function also indicates convexity in the 
domain of losses and concavity in the area of gains. Importantly, the value function is steeper 
for losses than for gains, meaning that pain from losses is much greater than pleasure from 
gains. This behaviour is known as loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 279); Loss 
aversion also shows that people who make a loss after prior gains are less loss-averse than 
those making a loss after previous losses.  
2.5.2 Key concepts of prospect theory 
As shown in Figure 2.5, the key concepts of prospect theory are the disposition effect, regret 
aversion, mental accounting, and self-control (Brabazon, 2000; Strahilevitz, Odean, & Barber, 
2011; Waweru, Munyoki, & Uliana, 2008). 
Figure 2.5: A summary of the key concepts of Prospect theory 
  Key concepts of Prospect 
theory 
 





         
Disposition 
effect 
 Regret aversion  Mental accounting  Self-control 
Collected by this thesis 
The disposition effect defined by Shefrin & Statman (1985) as situations where investors tend 
to sell winning stocks (winners) too soon and hold onto losing stocks (losers) too long.  Odean 
(1998) states that investors are reluctant to realise losses but quick to realise gains. Winning 
stocks sold too soon implies that these stocks continue to perform well after being sold. Losing 
stocks held too long suggests that these stocks continue to perform poorly, for example, (Chen, 
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Kim, Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nofsinger, 2008; Rau, 2014; 
Shefrin & Statman, 1985). Nofsinger (2008) states that one of the reasons to explain the 
disposition effect is tax issues in countries where there is a capital gains tax on equities. If 
stocks are sold for a profit, tax on the capital gains must be paid, thus decreasing the amount 
of the gain. In contrast, if stocks are sold for losses, these losses give opportunities to reduce 
taxes, hence decreasing the amount of the loss. 
The regret aversion effect is defined as “an emotional feeling associated with the ex-post 
knowledge that a different past decision would have fared better than the one chosen” (Shefrin 
& Statman, 1985, p. 781). Regret aversion is described as a “painful cognitive and emotional 
state of feeling sorry for misfortunes, limitations, losses, transgressions, shortcomings or 
mistakes” (Landman, 1993, p. 36). Regret differs from pride: regret is the pain of realising that 
prior decisions become bad ones, whereas pride is the joy of realising that prior decisions 
become good ones. People often seek actions that bring pride for them and avoid actions that 
bring them regret (Nofsinger, 2008). Investors fear regret and seek pride results in the 
disposition effect; they sell winning stocks too soon and hold onto losing stocks too long (Chen, 
Kim, Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rau, 2014).  Also, investors face 
greater regret about holding onto a losing stock too long than about selling a winning stock too 
soon (Fogel & Berry, 2006; Shefrin & Statman, 1985); As a result, regret is an element in the 
disposition effect because the pain associated with the realisation of loss is greater than the 
pride associated with the realisation of gains. The third behaviour with respect to prospect 
theory is mental accounting.  
Mental accounting is defined as “the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and 
households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities” (Thaler, 1999, p. 183). 
Mental accounting is also viewed as a process by which people code, classify, and evaluate 
outcomes by gathering their money into non-interchangeable mental accounts (Pompian, 
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2012a). Mental accounting provides a better understanding of the psychology of choice because 
“mental accounting rules are not neutral” (Thaler, 1999, p. 185).  According to the expected 
utility theory, money is fungible, while researchers of behavioural finance contend that money 
is non-fungible in one mental account and is not well replaced by money in another account 
(Barberis, & Huang, 2001; Pompian, 2012a; Thaler, 1999); for example, money for a vacation 
is not a good substitute for money for bills (Pompian, 2012a).  The potentially serious problem 
is that mental accounting may predispose investors to treat stocks in a portfolio separately, or 
they construct portfolios regardless of the correlations among these stocks, leading to 
suboptimal overall outcomes (Pompian, 2012b). Mental accounts, e.g. retirement accounts, are 
useful for investors who have good self-control because self-control reminds them to avoid 
overspending at the point of payment (Nofsinger, 2008). 
Lastly, self-control is defined as “the human behavioural tendency that causes people to 
consume today at the expense of saving for tomorrow” (Pompian, 2012b, p. 211). Everyone is 
assumed to be “both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer”, which leads to internal conflict 
as the planner suggests saving money for the future while the doer would like to consume 
money today (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981, p. 392). The conflict is that one is concerned with long-
term goals, e.g. saving for retirement (the planner), and the other is interested in short-term 
satisfaction, e.g. shopping (the doer) (Barberis & Huang, 2001; Pompian, 2012b; Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981). This phenomenon contradicts the traditional finance of optimal saving decision 
under risk, whereby income risk (uncertainty about future non-capital income) increases 
current saving (Barberis & Huang, 2001; Menezes & Auten, 1978). This conflict is similar to 
the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm.  Both individuals and firms 
attempt to preclude these conflicts. People often fail to pursue their long-term goals because 
they prefer spending today over saving for tomorrow, or they have a strong desire and weak 
willpower, indicating a lack of planning or lack of self-control (Heidhues & Kőszegi, 2010; 
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Lusardi, 1999). Investors who are biased against self-control often prefer investing in stocks to 
investing in bonds, or they lack basic financial knowledge such as compounding of interest. 
For instance, the majority wish to have $50 immediately instead of receiving $100 in two-year 
time, even given the 41% annual return (Nofsinger, 2008, p. 98). 
2.5.3 Heuristic and its concepts    
Scholars of behavioural finance also argue that not only is a decision to be made based on the 
key concepts of prospect theory, but investors also make decisions based on rules of thumb, 
which is known as heuristics. 
Simon (1978), a founder of the theory of bounded rationality, argues that people would like to 
make rational decisions, but they are restricted by available information and by limited ability. 
This means that, in many circumstances, people make decisions which are satisfactory rather 
than optimal. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argue that, when faced with risky or uncertain 
situations, decision-makers use rules of thumb known as heuristics to solve problems. 
Heuristics are useful for decision-makers, attaining good outcomes (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003), 
but sometimes resulting in suboptimal outcomes or systematic errors (Huberman, 2001;  
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
2.5.4 The concepts of heuristics 
Five key heuristics concepts; representativeness, overconfidence, gambler’s fallacy, anchoring, 
and availability are summarised in Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.6: A summary of the key concepts of heuristics 
   Key concepts of 
heuristics 
   
        
 
  
          
 
    
Representativeness 
 
 Overconfidence  Gambler’s fallacy  Anchoring  Availability 
Collected by this thesis 
Representativeness is defined by Kahneman & Tversky (1972) as an assessment of an uncertain 
event by inferring from (i) the similarity of this event to its parent population and (ii) the 
outcomes of this event generated at random. People assess a sample according to the degree to 
which this sample is similar to the entire sample (standard); e.g., a librarian is assessed based 
on the degree to which they resemble the prototypical librarian (Gilovich, 1991). This 
judgement is helpful because it shares a resemblance. However, if we over-apply this judgment, 
we encounter difficulty because all things are not always equal; e.g., not all librarians are 
always the prototypical librarian (Gilovich, 1991). Moreover, people evaluate uncertain action 
by generating the random outcomes of this action (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). A key feature 
of apparent randomness is the lack of systematic patterns; therefore, irregularity and local 
representativeness are considered as two general properties for randomness (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972). Irregularity indicates that an uncertain event fails to reflect the randomness. 
For example, consider the sequence outcomes in a fair coin flipping (heads and tails). If the 
outcomes are H T H T H T H T or T T H H T T H H, these outcomes are not viewed as 
representative of a random generating process because their order is too perfect (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972). Local representativeness assumes that small samples are representative of 
large samples (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). This assumption causes people to display bias in 
decision-making because short-term behaviour is taken to be indicative of long-term trends. 
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For instance, when equity returns have been high for many years (from 1982 to 2000 in the US 
and Western Europe), investors believe high equity returns are common (e.g. Chen, Kim, 
Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007; Ritter, 2003). Investors also buy only hot shares and avoid shares with 
poor performance, or define good shares as the shares whose firms have good past earnings 
growth (e.g. Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007; De Bondt & Thaler, 1995; Phung, 2015).  
Overconfidence is defined as “overestimation of one’s actual performance, over-placement of 
one’s performance relative to others, and excessive precision in one’s beliefs” (Moore & Healy, 
2008, p. 502). Overconfident people believe their knowledge is greater than it actually is, or 
their information is more precise than it is (Barber & Odean, 2001; Merkle, 2017; Odean, 
1998). Overconfident investors believe their knowledge or investment skills are above average 
(Dorn & Huberman, 2005; Glaser & Weber, 2007; Odean, 1999). They trade excessively; 
importantly, men tend to be more overconfident and, consequently, are more likely to trade 
than women and earn lower returns than women (Barber & Odean, 2000). They also 
underestimate risks, overestimate expected returns, hold undiversified stock portfolios 
(Pompian, 2012a), and have suboptimal outcomes (Barber & Odean, 2013) or poor investment 
results (Pompian, 2012a). This behaviour appears difficult to correct because people find it 
hard to “revise self-perception of their knowledge and abilities” (Pompian, 2012a, p. 45).  
Gambler’s fallacy (also known as Monte Carlo fallacy or the fallacy of the maturity of chances) 
is defined by  Lepley (1963) as the belief that, if a random event repeatedly occurs on one 
direction during a certain period, then the event will subsequently move repeatedly in the 
opposite direction in the future to ensure that randomness is evened out. The law of small 
numbers boasts the belief in gambler’s fallacy; for example, if a fair coin has five heads in a 
row, people believe that tails will come up because more tails might arise to offset against a 
large number of heads (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). This belief is false because they have a 
misperception of the fairness of the law of chances, in which the probability of random events 
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is independent (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). Investors affected by 
gambler’s fallacy incorrectly predict a reverse trend of stock prices (Brabazon, 2000). They 
believe that, if shares have traded a large number of times, these shares will trade less in the 
next time period; if shares have not been traded for a long time, these shares will trade in this 
time period; if they have not earned returns for several trades, they will gain for the next trades 
(Luong & Ha, 2011; Ngoc, 2014; Phung, 2015). 
Anchoring is defined as people relying too heavily on initial pieces of information to make 
subsequent decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). People often “anchor too much on the 
initial value” (Barberis & Thaler, 2003, p. 1068). People often take account of a reference point 
as the anchor, then predict the outcomes according to this adjusted anchor. Investors make 
decisions based on their purchase prices as reference points (Kahneman & Riepe, 1998). This 
phenomenon causes investors to expect changes in current stock prices to be consistent with 
their historical trends, and to anticipate future share prices to relate closely to the initial values 
(the anchor); as a result, suboptimal outcomes ensue (Brabazon, 2000; Kahneman & Riepe, 
1998; Pompian, 2012a).  
Finally, availability is defined as arising in situations in which “people assess the frequency of 
a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975, p. 1127). People are often biased by 
availability because they find it easy to recall frequent situations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Pompian (2006) classified availability into four facets: (a) Retrievability, where people tend to 
select investments with available information; (b) categorisation, where investors attempt to 
categorise information that suits a specific reference; (c) the narrow range of experience, where 
investors select investments that match their narrow range of life experiences, the regions they 
live in, and the people they contact; and (d) resonance, where investors choose investments that 
are similar to their personality or have characteristics related to their behaviour.  
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Vietnamese investors are the respondents of this thesis. It is essential, therefore, to review 
current studies on the effect of behavioural finance on investment decisions in Vietnam. 
2.6 Recent research on investors’ behavioural biases in Vietnam 
The literature on investor behaviour in Vietnam is small in volume. Phan and Zhou (2014) 
interview 20 retail investors to find that 4 behaviour biases affect investment intentions; 
overconfidence, excessive optimism, the psychology of risk, and herd behaviour. The results 
indicate 4 key investor attributes. 
First, overconfidence: 60% of informants exhibit overconfidence. They strongly believe in their 
abilities in regard to investment regardless of their participation in any training courses on stock 
investment. They also believe that they have better abilities in investment than others, that they 
are in full control of their investment, and that their successful investment emanates from their 
knowledge. Interestingly, 100% of informants believe that they genuinely understand the 
Vietnamese stock market. Second, excessive optimism: 70% of informants reveal excessive 
optimism about; (a) continuing to purchase stocks, even when the market has a downward 
trend, (b) increasing their investment capital in the next year, and (c) that the Vietnamese stock 
market would rebound in the next year. Third, the psychology of risk: 45% of investors prefer 
a period of price fluctuations because they believe that they will earn high returns from these 
fluctuations. Sixty per cent of them readily hold the losing stocks longer until their prices go 
up and invest in firms that are familiar to them or firms that pay cash dividends. Lastly, herd 
behaviour:  Sixty per cent of investors make decisions based on the ideas of others, the crowd, 
or the movements of the digital stock board.  
Ngoc (2014) surveys 188 individual investors and discovers that investors are biased in 
decision-making. The behaviour biases include herding, overconfidence-gamblers’ fallacy, and 
anchoring-ability biases affecting investment decisions. Ton and Dao (2014) survey 422 
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investors and find that excessive optimism, risk psychology, and excessive pessimism 
positively influence long-term investments. In contrast, overconfidence and herd behaviour 
negatively impact on long-term investments. Cuong and Jian (2014) survey 472 retail investors, 
40.5% of which were female, and find that overconfidence, excessive optimism, the 
psychology of risk, and herd behaviour have a significant impact on the individuals’ attitude 
towards investment. The authors, interestingly, do not observe higher overconfidence among 
male investors than among female investors. Phung (2015) conducts in-depth interviews and a 
survey of 220 individual investors, and finds that representativeness and over/under-reaction 
positively, and gambler’s fallacy negatively, affected investment decisions.  
Nguyen and Pham (2018) investigate the relationship between search-based sentiment and 
stock market reactions in the Vietnam stock market. The sentiment index is established from 
the Google Trends’ Search Volume Index of financial and economic terms Vietnamese search 
from January 2011 to January 2018. The authors find that the sentiment-induced impact is 
mostly driven by pessimism, and optimistic investors appear to postpone investment until the 
market corrects. Tho, Trang, and Van Hoa (2018) construct research scales to distinguish risk 
avoidance, ambiguity avoidance and uncertainty avoidance and then survey 400 investors. The 
results show that investors are most likely to avoid; ranked in descending order; uncertainty, 
ambiguity and risk, and female investors are more likely to avoid these situations than men. 
An increase in participation in investment courses leads to a rise in avoidance of risk, ambiguity 
and uncertainty, and to choosing safer investments.  
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has examined the theoretical background of this thesis relating to finance theory 
and to consumer behaviour. Scholars have, however, opposing views amongst the framework 
of traditional finance, behavioural finance, and consumer behaviour. This thesis largely focuses 
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on investors’ decision-making in the context of traditional finance, behavioural finance, 
consumer behaviour. This thesis presents current literature on investors’ perceived risk, the 
relationship between risk and return, investors’ rationality and risk aversion, the trade-off 
between risk and return, and investors’ trust in decision-making. This thesis also focuses on 
prospect theory, heuristics and current research of investors’ behavioural biases in Vietnam.  
The main tenets of this thesis are summarised as follows. First, investors can choose both 
informal and formal debt for stock investment. Second, a decision to be made is affected by 
many facets of risk, including financial risk, safety risk, social risk opportunity risk, time risk, 
choice risk, and leverage risk. Third, investors who use debt are more prone to risk-tolerant 
than those who do not. Lastly, the relationship between risk and debt is positive.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
Introduction to this chapter 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) is the main method applied to this thesis because SEM is 
the most useful technique for examining the direct and indirect relationships of multiple 
variables in a model concurrently. This chapter starts with an introduction to the structural 
equation modelling technique. The focus of SEM is on the importance of SEM, SEM structure, 
estimated relationship values, measurement error, and model fit. The following sections discuss 
the sample size, survey process, and the robustness checks. Additional techniques employed to 
examine the robustness of the results by SEMs are multiple and stepwise regression, Hayes and 
Preacher’s approach, a t-test method, the propensity score matching method, and the 
instrumental variables (IVs) approach. Solutions to locations selection bias and response bias 
are also presented in the robustness check section. This chapter also presents investors’ 
characteristics, debt decisions, control variables, and ends with a summary.  
3.1 Structural equation model (SEM) 
3.1.1 The importance of SEM in testing the relationships between variables 
As defined by Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2014), structural equation modelling is “a 
family of statistical models that seek to explain the relationships among multiple variables” 
(p.546).  
The SEM technique can examine mediating relationships between variables. “Mediating 
variables” are “prominent in psychological theory and research”, and their role is to transmit 
the impact of an independent variable on a dependent variable (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 
2007, p. 593). The mediating variable is also referred to as the mediator variable, intermediary 
variable, or intervening variable.  
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SEM is useful in testing theories that have multiple equations, with the multiple variables acting 
as independent and dependent variables, as shown in Figure 3.1. These theories are based on 
the perspectives arising from prior empirical studies, experience, and observations of actual 
behaviour or attitudes. In other words, an SEM model is a representation of a theory that 
provides a consistent and comprehensive explanation of phenomena, benefiting both academia 
and industry. The notable point is that SEM can be used for all kinds of variants such as 
nonmetric, categorical variables, and even a MONOVA model (Hair et al., 2014).  
Hair et al. (2014) illustrate an example where SEM can examine the variable of satisfaction 
acting as both independent and dependent variables in a model including the image, 
satisfaction, and loyalty of customers: 
If we believe that image creates satisfaction and satisfaction creates loyalty, then 
satisfaction is both a dependent and an independent variable in the same theory 
(p.542). 
SEM has two distinctive advantages compared to other techniques, such as multiple regression. 
First, SEM can assist researchers in testing the covariance among factors and, in particular, the 
factors operating as both a(n) independent and dependent variable. Second, SEM directly 
accommodates measurement errors in predicting the impacts of the independent variables in 
any particular dependence association.  
MacKinnon et al. (2007) state that “mediating variables” are “prominent in psychological 
theory and research” (p.593). Their role is to transmit the impact of an independent variable on 
a dependent variable; the mediating variable also has other names such as mediator variable, 




Figure 3.1: Structural equations modelling overview  
 
Source: (Hair et al., 2014) 
3.1.2 SEM structure  
SEM overall has three advantages, for example, (Hair et al., 2014). These are; (i) an ability to 
estimate multiple and interrelated dependence relationships, (ii) an ability to represent 
unobserved concepts in these relationships and account for measurement errors in the 
estimation process, and (iii) an ability to define a model to explain the entire set of relationships.  
SEM consists of two essential components; the measurement model, and the structural model. 
The former indicates how measured variables come together to represent constructs. The latter 
reveals how constructs are associated with each other, often with multiple dependence 
relationships. Note that multiple regression is not applicable in this model on account of a 
separate analysis in a model.  
A single SEM model mostly contains both correlational (or covariance) relationships and 
dependence relationships among exogenous and endogenous variables. Exogenous constructs 
are seen as independent variables and determined by factors outside of the model. Endogenous 
constructs are dependent variables and affected by elements within the model. 
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As exhibited in Figure 3.2, an exogenous variable represents an independent variable, and an 
endogenous variable represents a dependent variable. A dependence relationship between two 
variables, e.g., constructs 1 and 2, is represented with single-headed directional arrows. 
Covariance relationships between construct 1 and 2 are described with two-headed arrows. 
Ovals or circles symbolise the latent constructs, and squares or rectangles denote the measured 
variables (e.g. X1 to X3). A structural equation model (SEM) can be represented visually with 
a path diagram. 
Figure 3.2: Covariance relationships between constructs 
Cov exogenous construct 1 and 2 
 
Note: Cov: covariance, X1 to X8: measured variables; Lx1 to Lx8: coefficient between the constructs and 
the measured variables; ex1 to ex8: errors. 
Source: (Hair et al., 2014) 
3.1.3 Estimated relationship values 
SEM differs from other multivariate techniques, in which SEM is a covariance structure 
analysis rather than a variance analysis technique used in multiple regression. SEM can be 
estimated with covariances or correlations. The first example of calculating the coefficient 
relationship between X1, X2, and Y1 is shown below, according to Hair et al. (2014, pp. 592-
593). Note that there is no mediating variable.  





The estimated covariance matrix between X1, X2, and Y1 is indicated below: 
Direct paths: Indirect paths: Total path: The estimated correlation 
X1->X2   = A  X1 -> X2  = A CorrX1,X2 = A  
X1 -> Y1 = B X1 ->X2 -> Y1 = AC X1 -> Y1  = B + AC CorrX1,Y1 = B + AC  
X2 -> Y1 = C X2 -> X1-> Y1 = AB X2 -> Y1  = C + AB CorrX2,Y1 = C + AB 
 
The table of Bivariate Correlations also shows the correlation value of 0.5 for X1 and X2, 0.6 
for X1 and Y1, and 0.7 for X2 and Y1. This means that:  
0.5 = A 
0.6 = B + AC 
0.7 = C + AB 
 
Substituting A = 0.5: 
0.6 = B + 0.5C 
0.7 = C + 0.5 B 
 
Solving for B and C: 
B = 0.33  
C = 0.53 
 
As a consequence, the equation indicates the coefficient regression relationship between X1, 
X2 and Y1:   
Y1̂ = 0.33 X1 + 0.53 X2  
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The second example is illustrated for the estimated values for direct and indirect impact (Hair 
et al., 2014, p. 563). Note that Job Satisfaction is a mediating variable. 
 
There are three equations. Equation 1 shows a direct impact of Supervision, Work 
Environment, and Co-workers on Job Satisfaction. Equation 2 indicates a direct influence of 
Job Satisfaction on Job Search. Equation 3 inhibits an indirect effect of Supervision, Work 
Environment, and Co-workers on Job Search through Job Satisfaction. 
?̂?Job Satisfaction = β1 (Supervision) + β1 (Work Environment) + β1 (Co-workers)   (1) 
?̂?Job Search = π1 (Job Satisfaction)         (2) 
?̂?𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ = α1 (Supervision) + ∞2 (Work Environment) + α3 (Co-workers)   (3) 
 
First, an equation indicates a direct impact of supervision, work environment and co-workers 
on job satisfaction: 
?̂?Job Satisfaction = 0.065 (Supervision) + 0.219 (Work Environment) + 0.454 (Co-workers)  (1’) 
Second, an equation reveals a direct effect of job satisfaction on job search:  
?̂?Job Search = 0.5 (Job Satisfaction)         (2’) 
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Replacing equation (1’) into equation (2’), we get equation (3’), showing an impact of 
supervision, work environment, and co-workers on job search through job satisfaction: 
?̂?Job Search = 0.5 [0.065 (Supervision) + 0.219 (Work Environment) + 0.454 (Co-workers)] 
?̂?Job Search = 0.0325 (Supervision) + 0.1095 (Work Environment) + 0.227 (Co-workers)  (3’) 
3.1.4 Measurement error 
One of the problems with multiple regression is that although measurement errors can emanate 
from many sources, there are “no direct means of correcting for known levels of measurement 
error for the dependent or independent variables” (Hair et al., 2014, p. 168). In contrast, SEM 
(or summated scales) can address measurement errors.  
Measurement error is defined as the extent to which the observed values are not representative 
of the true values (Hair et al., 2014, p. 7). Measurement error is inversely related to reliability 
- a measure of the degree to which a set of the measured variables of a latent construct is 
internally consistent based on how highly interrelated the items are with each other. The greater 
the relationship between a construct and the measured variables, the lower the measurement 
errors are.  The effect of measurement error can be written as: 
y,x = t * x 
where: y,x: the observed regression coefficient, t: the true structural coefficient, x: the reliability of the predictor 
variable.  
 
SEM makes an estimate of the actual structural coefficient (t) rather than the observed 
regression coefficient (y,x). The reliability value (x) is in the range of -1 through +1, reaching 
1 when it is perfect, meaning that there is no measurement error. If x  < |1|, y,x < t, it is 
indicated that the relationships estimated with typical multivariate procedures will understate 
the actual links. Therefore, the coefficient regression relationship predicted by SEM exceeds 
those by regression techniques with single equations.  
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3.1.5 A model fit 
SPSS, AMOS and STATA software were applied to test the direct and indirect relationship 
between variables. Unlike the regression analysis or other dependence techniques that seek to 
explain relationships in a single equation, an SEM model tests a set of relationships 
representing multiple relationships. As SEM focuses on the entire model, a measure of fit 
reflects the overall model, not any single relationship. As a result, measures of fit, e.g., R2 for 
multiple regression, are not well suited for SEM. SEM uses a series of measures that describe 
how well a theory explains the input data. Model fit is determined by the correspondence 
between the observed covariance matrix and an estimated covariance matrix that results from 
the proposed model.  
A model is assessed as fit if it fulfils the following criteria by Hair et al. (2014, p. 584), as 
shown in Figure 3.3. For example, Chi-square # 0, degree of freedom #0, Goodness-of-fit index 
(GFI), Comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) >0.95, RMSEA<0.07. 
Figure 3.3: Fit Indices Demonstrating Goodness-of-Fit Across Different Model Situations 
No. of Stat. 
vars. (m) 
N<250 N>250 






















CFI or TLI 0.97 or better 0.95 or 
better 
Above 0.92 0.95 or 
better 
Above 0.92 Above 
0.90 






Above 0.92 0.95 or 
better, not 
used with 








N > 1,000 
SRMR Biased upward, 
use other 
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0.08 or less 
(with CFI 










0.08 or less 
(with CFI 
above 0.92) 
0.08 or less 
(with CFI 
above 0.92) 
RMSEA Values < 0.08 




















CFI of 0.90 
or higher 
Note m = number of observed variables; N applies to a number of observations.  
X2: Chi-square, CFI: Comparative fit index, TLI: Tucker-Lewis index, RNI: Relative non-centrality index, 
SRMR: Standardised root mean residual, RMSEA: Root mean square error of approximation. 
Source: (Hair et al., 2014) 
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3.2 Sample size 
The sample size of this study is computed based on the following studies. First, according to 
Hair et al. (2014), the minimum ratio of observations to variables is 5:1, but the preferred ratio 
is 15:1 or 20:1 (p.177). With 10 variables in a model, the sample size required is 200 (20:1).  
Second, Krejcie and Morgan (1970) propose the sample size computed via the formula:  
s = X2 NP (1 – P) ÷ d2 (N −1) + X2 P (1 – P) 
where:  
s = required sample size.  
X2 = the table value of chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired confidence level (3.841).  
N = the population size.  
P = the population proportion (assumed to be .50 since this would provide the maximum sample size); and 
d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05).  
 
The number of individual investors trading on the Vietnamese stock market is approximately 
1.5 million (Baomoi, 2016). The sample size required is s = (3.841 x 1,500,000 x 0.5(1-0.5)/ 
{0.05x0.05(1,500, 000 -1) + 3.841x0.5(1-0.5) = 384 respondents. 
Third, Zikmund, Babin, Carr, and Griffin (2013) recommend the sample size calculated with 
the formula:  
 
where:  
n: number of items in the sample.  
Zc.l.2: square of the confidence level in standard error units.  
p: the estimated proportion of success.  
q: (q= 1-p), or estimated proportion of failures; and 
E2: square of the maximum allowance for error between the true proportion and the sample proportion, Zc.l.Sp 
squared. 
 
At the 95% confidence level (Zc.l.
2 = 95%), the 85% estimated proportion of success, the sample 
size required is: n= (1.96)2 *0.85*0.15/ (0.035)2 = 400 respondents. 
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Overall, the sample size of this thesis (420 observation) fulfils the guidelines of these studies. 
3.3 Survey process 
This research was undertaken through five phases over two years (9/2017 - 9/2019), as shown 
in Figure 3.4.  






(10/2017 - 8/2018) 
3 months 
(9 - 11/2018) 
4 months 
(12/2018 - 3/2019) 
5 months 
(4 - 8/2019) 
Collected by this thesis 
3.3.1 Trial interviews 
For the first stage, this thesis conducts trial interviews with ten investors, with half having less 
than three years, and half having three years or more, experience. This is because the majority 
are young and have less than three years of investment experience, which is consistent with 
prior studies (e.g. Tho et al., 2018; Trang & Khuong, 2017). This phase lasts one month; 
September 2017. For example, investors were asked the following questions: 
1/ Do you often borrow money to invest in stocks? 
2/ If yes, what kinds of debt do you generally use for stock investment? 
3/ Could you give me some reasons why you use this kind of debt? 
4/ What facets of risk are you generally concerned with as investing in stocks? 
5/ Do you often invest in stocks for the short term (less than 1 year)? 
6/ Do you trust the stock market in general? 
7/ Who and what do you often trust regarding stock investment? 
The trial interviews aim to discover whether they often borrow money from informal lenders 
















3.6.3. Interviewees were found to be mainly concerned about financial loss, personal 
information safety due to trading online, time wastage, social standing, opportunity loss, debt 
problems, and making the wrong decisions.  They also invest in stocks for the short term (less 
than one year) and highly trust the stock market in general. 
3.3.2 Questionnaire design 
The second stage relates to the questionnaire design. Based on the trial interviews and 
literature, the scales were developed, including perceived risk, borrowing sources, trust, trading 
frequency, risk tolerance, investment horizons, and debt decisions.  This thesis also invited 
New Zealanders (native English speakers) to assess how understandable and straightforward 
the questionnaire was with the aim of ensuring the quality of questions in terms of readability 
and understandability. After receiving feedback from these readers, the questionnaire was 
translated into Vietnamese and re-examined by a senior lecturer at Massey University, whose 
nationality is Vietnamese. This phase spanned 11 months, from October 2017 through August 
2018.  
3.3.3 A pilot test 
The third stage is the pilot test undertaken in Vietnam. Five Vietnamese individual investors 
first re-examined the questionnaire to ensure that questions were readable and understandable. 
Then the questionnaire was sent to 25 Vietnamese individual investors. The main feedback was 
that mutual funds do not apply to the Vietnam stock market. Alternatively, mutual funds should 
be changed to fund certificates. This phase was finished in three months, from September 
through November 2018.  
3.3.4 Human ethics approval 
The fourth stage pertains to the Human Ethics approval for the questionnaire. After corrections 
were made based on the feedback, the questionnaire was submitted to the Massey University 
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Human Ethics Committee in order to ensure the project met the University’s standards on 
research ethics. The assessment process lasted four months (from December 2018 through 
March 2019). The human ethics approval was granted with notification SOB 19/07 on 21 
March 2019.  
3.3.5 A final survey  
Finally, after receiving the ethics approval, the questionnaire was distributed to 600 individual 
investors through many instruments: Qualtrics Massey survey; social media, Facebook and 
Zalo; emails; workshops; and paper-based survey. This elicited 420 responses, being a 70% 
response rate. The data collection was carried out in two stages; first, the questionnaire was 
sent to 200 investors from which were collected 145 responses. After that, the questionnaire 
was distributed to a further 400 investors from which were received 275 responses. The survey 
process lasted 5 months. Due to the fact that participants must be individual investors, the 
sample should be defined as a snowball sample. Data collection was supported by friends, 
colleagues, acquaintances, and workshops on stock investment8 through recommendations 
from brokerage firms. These brokerage firms are RongViet, Maybank, Military Bank (MB), 
VnDirect, Asia Commercial Bank (ACB), Sacombank, Vietcombank, and DongA Securities 
Corporation. The survey lasted 5 months from April through August 2019. Respondents’ 
locations are presented in the robustness check in Sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. 
3.4 Robustness check   
This thesis applies other techniques to test the robustness of the results found by SEM models. 
First, alternative measures for the main variables strengthen the significant relationship by 
SEMs. Second, multiple regression and stepwise regression are applied to re-test the direct 
 




relationships, and Hayes and Preacher’s approach used to re-examine the indirect relationships 
using SEMs. Third, a t-test and then the propensity matching score are applied to reduce the 
selection bias. Fourth, the instrumental variables (IVs) approach is applied to deal with the 
endogeneity issue. Lastly, solutions are suggested for locations and response biases. This 
chapter outlines the Hayes and Preacher’s approach, the causality analysis in the SEM method, 
propensity matching score, the IVs approach, and solutions to the locations and response 
biases.  
3.4.1 The Hayes and Preacher’s approach 
This approach is developed by Hayes (2017) and Hayes and Preacher (2010) to examine the 
direct and indirect relationships between variables. This approach is widely used and cited by 
many scholars of marketing. However, this approach only tests a relationship between one 
independent and one dependent variable in a model. This differs from the SEM technique, in 
which multiple independent and dependent variables can be tested in a model.  
Hayes and Preacher’s approach presents a cause-effect relationship with the lower-level 
confidence interval (LLCI) and upper-level confidence interval (ULCI). The smaller 
confidence intervals indicate “greater predictive accuracy” (Hair et al., 2014, p. 161). A 
relationship is assessed as significant (p<0.1) if zero is not included between LLCI and ULCI 
(Hair et al., 2014, p. 189). A typical model illustrated below includes an independent variable 




3.4.2 Causality analysis in the SEM method 
Causation refers to the cause and effect between two variables, in which one variable must 
arise before the other and be the outcome of the other. A causal relationship can be created 
through strong theoretical support. 
Causal research designs traditionally comprise an experiment with some controlled 
manipulation. SEM, however, is often used in non-experimental conditions, leading to some 
limitations on drawing causal inferences. It is noted that SEM alone cannot generate causality, 
but can make a causal relationship if it conforms to the following conditions (Hair et al., 2014; 
Hunt, 2002; Pearl, 1998):  
(i) Covariation: As presented above, SEM can determine systematically and statistically 
significant covariation between constructs. Estimated paths in the structure SEM model 
provide evidence that covariance is present.  
(ii) Sequence: A sequence in the causation of two variables indicates that one variable must 
occur before the other. For example, entertain the idea that many dominos are standing in a 
row and a ball hitting the first domino makes the other dominos fall. As a result, if this ball is 
the cause of this effect, the ball must hit the first domino before the others drop. An experiment 
or longitudinal data can provide the evidence of sequence because they can account for the 
time period in which events arise. However, with the cross-sectional survey, since all variables 
are measured at the same point in time, they cannot explain the time sequence. Consequently, 
theoretical arguments must be used to contend that the sequence of an impact is from one 
construct to another. 
(iii) Nonspurious covariance: A spurious relationship refers to a connection between two 
factors that seem causal but is actually not. This spuriousness is affected by another factor that 
is not included in a model. For instance, although a correlation between ice cream consumption 
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and the levels of drowning is statistically significant, it is implausible to say that eating ice-
cream causes drowning. Another factor may be the temperature, e.g., high temperatures cause 
high levels of consumption of ice-cream or more swimming. A structural relationship is 
deemed as nonspurious if; (i) this relationship remains significant no matter how many other 
constructs are added in the model, and (ii) the construct’s error is independent of the causal 
construct (Hair et al., 2014, p. 557).  
(iv) Theoretical support: SEM can test and analyse the correlations between variables but 
cannot decide which variable is a cause or an effect. This is because, as shown above, all factors 
in an SEM model are measured in the same period. Theoretical support, therefore, plays a vital 
role with cross-sectional data, establishing a causal ordering and a rationale for the observed 
covariance.  
In summary, SEM can provide evidence of systematic covariation and help in understanding 
that a relationship is not spurious. However, SEM cannot establish a causal inference alone and 
can only do so if SEM meets the four conditions already mentioned. 
3.4.3 T-test, propensity score matching and instrumental variable methods 
Methods for dealing with problems of causal relationships suggested by scholars (e.g. Diamond 
& Sekhon, 2013; Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007; Papies, Ebbes, & Van Heerde, 2017) are a 
T-test, Propensity Score Matching (PSM), and the Instrumental Variables (IVs) approach. 
These methods are applied in this thesis.  
A t-test is performed to determine the statistical significance of the difference in the variable’s 
mean between the two groups. The t-test assumes a null hypothesis that the means between the 
two groups are equal. This thesis will use a t-test method to examine “the two samples with 
equal variance” of six control variables between two groups, for example, of perceived risk. If 
the null hypothesis is rejected, this means that the means of these control variables between the 
51 
 
two groups are different, possibly leading to the confounding effect in which these six control 
variables may influence both perceived risk and debt decisions. Thus, propensity score 
matching should be applied to deal with these issues.  
As stated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the propensity score method plays a central role in 
observational studies for a causal effect. This method may reduce bias if the selection on 
observables assumption holds (Diamond & Sekhon, 2013). The PSM relates to creating an 
artificial control group by matching each treated variable with a non-treated variable that has 
similar characteristics. PSM matches treated factors to untreated factors based on the 
propensity score. In general, PSM finds similar randomisation to solve problems of selection 
bias that often occurs in non-experimental methods.    
Endogenous problems are also a threat to inferring causal relationships (Papies et al., 2017). 
The standard method to solve endogeneity is to employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach. 
IVs are used as an explanatory variable is related to the error term. A valid instrument relates 
to the changes in the explanatory variable but does not relate to the dependent variable. In other 
words, using an IV to identify the unobserved correlation allows a researcher to explore the 
causal impact of a predictor on the outcome variable.9   
3.4.4 Locations selection bias 
Vietnam has four main areas; Ho Chi Minh City (HCM City) in the South, Ha Noi Capital in 
the North, Da Nang City in the Middle of the country, and Mekong Delta in the Western region. 
The respondents of this thesis live in all these areas, which will reduce sampling bias.  
 
9 According to Instrumental variables estimation: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumental_variables_estimation  
and Statistics How to: https://www.statisticshowto.datasciencecentral.com/instrumental-variable/ 
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As shown in Table 3.1, approximately 58% of individual investors live in Ho Chi Minh City, 
which is the biggest city in Vietnam, followed by Ha Noi Capital (24.1%), Da Nang City 
(7.1%), Mekong Delta (6.4%), and other locations (4.3%).   
Respondents who are living in Ho Chi Minh City dominate the sample. This is because Ho Chi 
Minh City (HCM City) is the biggest city in terms of population and economy. HCM City is 
the economic centre of Vietnam, with a GDP per capita much higher than the country’s 
average.10  







Frequency % Locations 
I 200 145 72.5% 
86 59.3% HCM City 
35 24.2% Ha Noi Capital 
10 6.9% Da Nang City 
6 4.1% Mekong Delta 
8 5.5% Others 
145 100%  
II 400 275 68.8% 
158 57.5% HCM City 
66 24.0% Ha Noi Capital 
20 7.3% Da Nang City 
21 7.6% Mekong Delta 
10 3.6% Others 
275 100%  
I+II 600 420 70% 
244 58.1% HCM City 
101 24.1% Ha Noi Capital 
30 7.1% Da Nang City 
27 6.4% Mekong Delta 
18 4.3% Others 
Total 420 100%  
Collected by this thesis 
 





As exhibited in Table 3.2, 244 respondents live in all suburbs in Ho Chi Minh City. Of these, 
respondents living in District 1, which is the central district of Ho Chi Minh City (HCM City), 
make up around 11%, followed by Tan Binh District (6.4%), Binh Thanh District and Go Vap 
District (5.2% each).  This sample can, therefore, be seen as proxying the location of 
Vietnamese investors. 
Table 3.2: A summary of suburbs in Ho Chi Minh City 
Suburbs in HCM City Frequency Proportion 
District 1 48 11.4% 
Tan Binh District 27 6.4% 
Binh Thanh District  22 5.2% 
Go Vap District 22 5.2% 
District 10 14 3.3% 
Thu Duc District 12 2.9% 
District  2 11 2.6% 
District  5 11 2.6% 
District  9 10 2.4% 
District 7 9 2.1% 
Binh Tan District 9 2.1% 
District 8 8 1.9% 
District 6 7 1.7% 
Phu Nhuan District 7 1.7% 
District 3 6 1.4% 
Tan Phu District 5 1.2% 
Binh Chanh District 4 1.0% 
District 4 3 0.7% 
District 11 3 0.7% 
District 12 3 0.7% 
Nha Be District 2 0.5% 
Hoc Mon District 1 0.2% 
Total 244 100% 
Collected by this thesis 
54 
 
This thesis also examines whether respondents’ locations dampen the relationships of 
perceived risk, risk tolerance or trust to debt decisions after controlling for seven 
demographics; gender, age, marital status, education, income, financial literacy, and locations. 
This analysis is presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Response bias is also a concern in this thesis 
because this bias may skew the results.  
3.4.5 Response bias 
Response bias is defined by Furnham (1986) as a tendency that respondents have to respond to 
the questions inaccurately or falsely. The causes of this bias are derived from the measurement 
process, including leading questions and social desirability (Furnham, 1986; Krumpal, 2013). 
Leading questions refer to problems with the wording of the questions. For example, questions 
are not understandable or readable, leading respondents to be confused and then answer falsely. 
Social desirability is defined by Krumpal (2013) as the tendency of respondents to respond to 
the questions in a way that will be viewed favourably by others. This bias leads to a severe 
problem with research related to self-reports.  
To minimise the risk of response bias, first, as already presented above, this thesis designed the 
questionnaire carefully, then asked New Zealanders (native English speakers who neither know 
about economics nor finance) to examine how understandable and readable the questions are. 
In Vietnam, Vietnamese individual investors were also asked to re-examine the wording of the 
questions before the final survey was distributed. 
Second, this thesis includes some questions to check respondents’ consistency in responding 
to the questions. For example, considering questions 3, 5 and 9 below, if a respondent chooses 
both “9”: I do not borrow money from any family sources in question 3, and I do not borrow 
money from any non-family sources in question 5, the respondent should write down 0% (zero) 
of informal borrowing in question 9 for consistency.  
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Question 3: Thinking about borrowing from family sources such as parents, a spouse, sisters, brothers, relatives, 
to invest in shares (you can choose more than 1 answer): 
□ 1. Parents.        
□ 2. Grandparents.      
□ 3. Brothers/sisters.      
□ 4. Parents in law. 
□ 5. Brothers/sisters in law.  
□ 6. Cousins/nieces/nephews. 
□ 7. Husband/wife. 
□ 8. Other family sources: ………. 
□ 9. I do not borrow from any family sources.  
Question 5: Borrowing from non-family sources such as friends, teachers, co-workers, … (you can choose more 
than 1 answer): 
□ 1. Friends 
□ 2. Girlfriends/boyfriends/partners 
□ 3. Teachers/lecturers 
□ 4. Colleagues/co-workers 
□ 5. Bosses/managers 
□ 6. Business partners 
□ 7. Neighbours 
□ 8. Other non-family sources: ………. 
□ 9. I do not borrow from any non-family sources.  
 
Question 9: Thinking about the total money for share investment, how would you divide this amount between 
the borrowing and your own money?  
The total money for share investment: % 
Borrowing from informal sources (family and/or non-family)  
Borrowing from formal sources  
My equity  
Total 100%  
  
This thesis also has an additional check of respondents’ consistency between question 8 and 
12 in relation to personal information. Namely, the income level selected in question 8 should 
be inconsistent with their choice of the main field of occupation.  
Question 8: On average, how much income (VND) per month do you receive from your work?  
□ 0 
□ less than 10 million   
□ 10 million – 50 million 
□ more than 50 million – 100 million 
□ more than 100 million   
Question 12:  What is your main field of occupation?  
□ 1. Fund manager 
□ 2. Broker-dealer 
□ 3. Brokerage manager/director 
□ 4. Financial advisor 
□ 5. Banking officer 
□ 6. Business owner 
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□ 7. CEO (Chief executive officer) 
□ 8. CFO (Chief financial officer)/ Chief Accountant 
□ 9. Investment officer 
□ 10. Accountant 
□ 11. Administrative officer/manager 
□ 12. Sale/Marketing officer/manager 
□ 13. Teacher/lecturer 
□ 14. Other: ……. 
 
Finally, regarding an issue of non-response bias, it is, of course, impossible to access the 
personal information of non-participants. This thesis, consequently, cannot compare between 
participants and non-participants in terms of gender, age, education, etc. According to 
Armstrong and Overton (1977), it is best for the non-response rate to be kept under 30% of the 
sample. The non-response rate to the thesis questionnaire is 30%, thereby reducing the non-
response bias.  
3.5 Investor characteristics 
This thesis presents the personal characteristics of 420 individual investors. Male investors 
dominate the sample, making up around 61%, as summarised in Table 3.3. Sixty-two per cent 
(62%) single investors compares with 38% married investors. Most investors have a university 
degree (around 86%), higher levels of financial literacy than the average (around 59%), and 
less than 5 years (about 77%) of stock investment experience. The majority of investors have 
income of either up to VND 10 million, or VND 10-50 million per month (up to USD 500, or 
USD 500-2500 per month). Over half of the investors (around 53%) invest in stocks worth 
between VND 200 to 500 million per year (USD 10,000-25,000 per year). These investor 
characteristics are arguably typical of the Vietnamese investor population and are consistent 
with the samples used in prior studies in Vietnam (e.g., Tho et al., 2018; Trang & Tho, 2017).  
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Table 3.3: Results of investor characteristics 
This table shows the following predominant investor characteristics: male investors, investors aged 25-35, single 
investors, investors having a university degree, less than 5 years of investment experience, income between VND 
10 million to 50 million (USD 500 – 2500 per month), trading frequency between 1 time per week and 3 times 
per month, investment amount less than 200 million (USD 10000) per year, and having higher levels of financial 
literacy than the average.  
  Characteristics Freq. %   Characteristics Freq. % 
I. Gender   VI. Investment experience   
 Male  258 61.4   < 3 years 239 56.9 
 Female 162 38.6   3-5 years 86 20.5 
     >5-10 years 51 12.1 
II. Age     > 10- 20 years 44 10.5 
 <25 98 23.3  VII. Income (VND)/ month   
 25-35 238 56.7   No income 22 5.2 
 36-45 68 16.2   Up to 10 million  151 36.1 
 46-55 7 1.7  10-50 million 224 53.3 
 >55 9 2.1  > 50 - 100 million 17 4.0 
III. Marital status    > 100 million 6 1.4 
 Single 259 61.7 VIII. Trading frequency   
 Married 155 36.8  At least once a day 48 11.4 
 Divorced/widow (or)  6 1.5  1 - 6 times/week 113 26.9 
IV. Education levels:     1-3 times/month 158 37.6 
 Up to secondary school 4 1.0 IX. 1-2 times/quarter 55 13.1 
 High school 13 3.0  1-3 times/year 20 4.8 
 University 362 86.2   Less than once a year 26 6.2 
 Master or more 41 9.8  X. Investment amount: VND/year 
V. Financial literacy     <200 million 263 62.6 
 Mean: 9.57    200-500 million 88 21.0 
 Less than Mean 164 39.0  501-1 billion 33 7.9 
 More than Mean 247 58.8  >1-3 billion 21 5.0 
 Not answered 9 2.1  >3 billion 15 3.6 




3.6 Debt decisions and reasons for this use of debt 
3.6.1 Debt decisions definition 
“Debt decisions” is defined as the level of debt which investors use for stock investment. This 
debt decision has two measures; “financial leverage”, and “informal debt”.  For this thesis, 
financial leverage is defined as the credit investors obtain only through brokerage firms, while 
informal debt is the credit investors obtain through family and non-family sources. This 
definition of financial leverage is used, as it is a common term in Vietnam. Debt decisions are 
risky decisions no matter what kinds of debt is involved, informal or formal, because users of 
debt may face possible insolvency if they do not manage debt well. The following question 
relates to the use of informal debt (question 9 in Appendix 1 and 2). 
Thinking about the total money for stock investment, how would you divide this amount between the borrowing 
and your own money?  
The total money for stock investment: % 
Borrowing from informal sources (informal debt)  
Borrowing from formal sources    (formal debt)  
My equity  
Total 100%  
 
Financial leverage differs from formal debt. Financial leverage is the debt that investors only 
borrow from brokerage firms, while formal debt is borrowed from a variety of sources such as 
banks, credit institutions, brokerage firms, and other formal lenders.  The following question 
pertains to financial leverage (question 10 in Appendix 1 and 2). 
Supposing that a stock (a share) has the highest financial leverage in accordance with the brokerage firms’ rules 
if you would like to buy this share, what financial leverage ratios do you often use? 
□ do not leverage 
□ less than 20%  
□ 20% to less than 30%  
□ 30% to less than 50%  
□ Use the highest lending ratio 
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3.6.2 Findings of debt decisions 
The findings on debt decisions of the 420 respondents are presented in Table 3.4. For the use 
of informal debt, approximately 55% of investors use informal debt for stock investment. The 
rest (45%) of investors do not use informal debt for stock investment. That is, 45% of investors 
may use formal debt or their own equity for stock investment.   
Looking at the use of formal debt, 65% of investors use formal debt for stock investment. The 
rest (35%) of investors do not use formal debt. This means that 35% may use informal debt or 
their own equity for stock investment. Looking at total debt, about 82% of investors use debt 
(informal or/and formal) for stock investment. Only around 18% of investors do not use any 
debt for stock investment. This means that 18% of them only use their own equity for stock 
investment.  
For financial leverage, 78% of investors use leverage through brokerage firms for stock 
investment. It is also worth noting that on average, the debt ratio over the total money for stock 
investment is 38% (informal debt: 17% and formal debt: 21%). 
Table 3.4: A summary of debt decisions 
This table indicates that about 55% of investors use informal debt (the rest of them do not), 65% of them use 
formal debt (the rest of them do not). About 82% of investors use debt (informal or/and formal debt) for their 
stock investment. Most investors (about 78%) use financial leverage through brokerage firms. On average, 38% 
of debt used for a stock investment portfolio is divided into informal debt (17%) and formal debt (21%).  
Debt ratios 
(%) 
Informal debt Formal debt Total debt Financial leverage 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Levels Freq. % 
No debt 188 44.8 147 35.0 75 17.9 No leverage 94 22.4 
Less than 50 180 42.8 208 49.5 161 38.3 Less than 20% 63 15.0 
50 26 6.2 49 11.7 112 26.7 20% - < 30% 64 15.2 
>50 - <100 21 5.0 10 2.4 56 13.2 30% - <50% 106 25.2 
100 5 1.2 6 1.4 16 3.8 Maximum levels 93 22.1 
N 420 100 420 100 420 100  N 420 100 




3.6.3  Reasons for the use of debt by investors  
The thesis examined the reasons why investors use informal debt and financial leverage for 
stock investment, based on the investor interviews, the literature review, and anecdotes. 
Investors use informal debt for stock investment, possibly because first, informal borrowing is 
common in Vietnamese culture. So, both borrowers and lenders may feel comfortable with this 
form of borrowing. Lenders feel this because they think they help their borrowers. Borrowers 
believe they help lenders by contributing extra income from their returns from the stock 
investment to informal lenders if their stock investment succeeds. Second, investors have 
limited access to formal lenders, and informal borrowing becomes a unique source of funds for 
investors. This is consistent with the findings of prior studies (e.g. Guirkinger, 2008; Mohieldin 
& Wright, 2000; Nguyen & Berg, 2014). Finally, investors may also feel less pressured, and 
may even avoid legal problems, if they cannot return the money to the informal lenders.   
Investors using just financial leverage for stock investment may have sufficient access to 
borrowings through brokerage firms. This is in line with previous studies (e.g. Guirkinger, 
2008; Mohieldin & Wright, 2000; Nguyen & Berg, 2014). Also, it is possible that people whom 
investors know have a low or average income will, as a result, have insufficient money to lend 
to investors. Investors may wish to borrow a large amount of money to invest in stocks, and 
only brokerage firms meet this borrowing. 
3.7 Control variables  
Literature finds a number of variables related to demographics have an effect on investment 
decisions, including gender, age, education, marital status, income, and financial literacy. 
Women are often more risk-averse than men (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2001; Frijns et al., 2008; 
Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2003; Kannadhasan, 2015; Lucarelli & Brighetti, 2011; Tho et 
al., 2018; Yao et al., 2011). Risk-taking levels increase when age increases (Frijns et al., 2008; 
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Grable, 2000; Pålsson, 1996; Wang & Hanna, 1997). Single people are more likely to take risk 
than married people (e.g. Grable, 2000), and higher-income investors tend to take more risk 
(Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2003; Hallahan, Faff, & McKenzie, 2004; Morin & Suarez, 
1983; Riley Jr & Chow, 1992; Yao et al., 2011). Higher education levels or financial knowledge 
is associated with higher risk-taking behaviour (Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2004; 
Kannadhasan, 2015; Riley Jr & Chow, 1992; Yao et al., 2011). Based on this evidence, this 
thesis considers these factors as control variables. 
These six control variables, with the exception of financial literacy, are measured through 
simple questions, for example, “what is your age?” Financial literacy is measured through 16 
questions as for a number of existing studies (Balloch, Nicolae, & Philip, 2014; Van Rooij, 
Lusardi, & Alessie, 2011). All questions are attached in Appendix 1 and 2. All of these control 
variables are evaluated through a t-test to deal with the possible selection bias, which is 
presented in the robustness checks of Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
This thesis also examines whether other demographics, such as work experience, investment 
experience, or investment amount, significantly affect debt decisions. The results find that most 
of these have no significant relationship with debt decisions. These demographic variables are, 
therefore, are not included in a model.   
3.8 Summary 
This chapter first presented the structural equation modelling (SEM) that is the primary method 
of this thesis. The importance of SEM is that SEM can test the direct and indirect relationships 
in a model concurrently and directly accommodates measurement errors in predicting the 
relationships between variables, while other techniques such as multiple regression or stepwise 
regression cannot. In terms of assessment of a model fit, R squared is the main measure to 
assess a model fit when using the multiple regression or stepwise regression. By contrast, SEM 
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uses a series of measures that describe how well a theory explains the input data.  For example, 
Chi-square # 0, degrees of freedom #0, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), Goodness-of-fit index 
(GFI), Comparative fit index (CFI) > 0.95, and Root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) < 0.7. Second, this chapter presents details of the sample. Using the sample size of 
420 respondents conforms to the criteria suggested by Hair et al. (2014), Krejcie and Morgan 
(1970) and Zikmund et al. (2013). Third, the thesis has 5 phases of the survey process, through 
trial interviews, questionnaire design, a pilot test, Human ethics approval of the questionnaire 
and a 5-month survey. Fourth, the robustness checks applied to test the relationships by SEMs 
is presented. Fifth, the personal characteristics of 420 investors are presented. Sixth, this 
chapter presents the reasons for the use of debt by investors, and lastly, ends with a description 
of the control variables.  
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Chapter 4 Essay One: Perceived Risk, Borrowing 
Sources, and Debt Decisions11 
4.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which perceived risk directly 
relates to borrowing sources and debt decisions and mediates between borrowing sources and 
debt decisions. 
The use of debt by investors to increase the rate of return is common in many countries and 
often regarded as an essential part of the growth of financial markets. Recent research has, 
however, little paid attention to investors’ use of debt and what factors relate to this use of debt. 
Also, while there has been significant research on formal and informal debt, to the best of the 
author’s knowledge, there has been no academic research examining the use of informal debt 
by individual investors for stock investment. This chapter will examine whether the perceived 
risk of stock investment and available borrowing sources predict the use of debt for stock 
investment, as well as the impact of perceived risk on the use of informal debt.  
The importance of debt decisions and their definitions were presented in Chapters 1 and 3. 
“Debt decisions” are defined as the level of debt which investors use for stock investment. 
“Informal debt” is defined as the credit investors obtain through informal lenders for stock 
investment. “Financial leverage” is defined as the credit investors obtain only through 
brokerage firms for stock investment. A debt decision is a risky decision no matter what kinds 
 
11 The early version of this chapter was presented at the 3rd Sydney Banking and Financial Stability Conference 
2019 (SBFC 2019), University of Sydney Business School, Australia, December 2019. 
https://sbfc.sydney.edu.au/  
The first version of this chapter (N = 145) was presented at the 2nd Asia Conference on Business and Economic 




of debt are utilised, informal or formal, because users of debt may face possible insolvency if 
they do not manage debt well. 
Based on Peter and Tarpey Sr (1975), this chapter defines “perceived risk” as the subjective 
levels of an investor’s concern about the risks of their stock investment. This is different from 
the actual objective risk. It is a fact that investors typically find it hard to make the right decision 
under risk or uncertainty because they cannot precisely predict possible outcomes (Statman, 
2005). A risky decision to be made is thus often based on the judgment on how hazardous an 
event is (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Shefrin, 2002). As investment decisions are made based 
on perceived risk rather than objective risk, there is significant literature on risk perception. 
This chapter examines risk within consumer behaviour framework and argues that, when 
making a buying decision, investors perceive multiple aspects of risk instead of only financial 
risk. This differs from both traditional and behavioural finance in which investors are assumed 
to be only concerned about financial gains or loss (financial risk) when making a purchase 
decision.  This chapter introduces ideas from consumer theory and argues that investors may 
have additional risk concerns; such as information safety (safety risk), social standing (social 
risk), time waste (time risk), missing out on other opportunities (opportunity risk), wrong 
choices (choice risk), or debt problems (leverage risk). Taking these additional facets of risk 
into account provides a better understanding of investors’ perceived risk and its impact on debt 
decisions.  
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents a literature review and 
hypothesis development. The methodology is described in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 outlines the 
main results, and Section 4.5 presents the results of additional analysis. The robustness check 
is in Section 4.6, and demographics are discussed in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 presents the 
conclusions, contributions, implications, limitations and further research. 
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4.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.2.1 Facets of perceived risk 
The literature for this section was presented in Section 2.3. This chapter thus focuses only on 
the definition of the perceived risk of stock investment and its facets.   
“Perceived risk” includes two components; uncertainty and consequences (Bauer, 1960; 
Cunningham, 1967), or probability of loss and importance of loss (Peter & Ryan, 1976; Peter 
& Tarpey Sr, 1975). Following Peter and Tarpey Sr (1975), perceived risk of stock investment 
is described as the level of potential loss concerns and the level of importance of this potential 
loss.  
The exploratory investor interviews found that the perceived risk of stock investment consisted 
of seven facets. These facets are summarised below. Among them, four facets of risk (financial 
risk, safety risk, social risk, time risk) are consistent with consumer behavioural framework. 
Three aspects of risk; opportunity risk, choice risk, and leverage risk; were discovered through 
the interviews.  
Financial risk The possibility that investors make a loss in their stock investment portfolio.  
Safety risk The possibility that investors’ information is leaked by hackers or attacked by viruses. 
Social risk The possibility that investors are held in low esteem by a certain group because they make 
a large loss in stock investment.   
Time risk The possibility that investors spend much time on stock investment and the results are not 
what they expect. 
Opportunity risk The possibility that investors miss out on other financial investment opportunities if they 
use all the money for stock investments. 
Choice risk The possibility that investors make a wrong decision on choosing stocks for their portfolio. 
Leverage risk The possibility that investors’ investment returns are inadequate to cover their loan interest 
and principal at maturity.  
 
The existing literature, as a result, has paid much attention to the relationship between 
perceived risk and returns, but little attention to the relationship between perceived risk and 
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debt decisions. This leads this chapter to examine this risk-debt link through the following 
hypotheses.  
4.2.2 Hypothesis development 
Traditional finance and some scholars of behaviour finance argue that the relationship between 
risk and return is positive (e.g. Byrne, 2005; Diacon & Ennew, 2001; Ganzach, 2000; Trang & 
Tho, 2017). This means that investors will only accept higher risk if they are compensated with 
higher expected returns. This chapter argues that a higher level of the perceived risk of stock 
investment equates to higher expected returns, and this may lead to the use of more borrowing 
sources and higher debt. This chapter thus examines the following hypotheses. 
 H4.1: The higher the level of the perceived risk of stock investment, the higher the number of 
borrowing sources used. 
H4.2: The higher the level of the perceived risk of stock investment, the higher the level of 
informal debt used. 
H4.3: The higher the level of the perceived risk of stock investment, the higher the level of 
financial leverage used. 
Winning or losing situations are found to affect investors’ risk perception. Investors are risk-
averse to gain situations and risk-taking to loss situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Past 
outcomes also influence investors’ current risk perception. Investors tend to take more risk 
after gains and take less risk after losses (Nofsinger, 2008; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). This 
chapter argues that an increase in the number of borrowing sources may cause current risk 
concerns about stock investment.  
H4.4: The higher the number of borrowing sources, the higher the level of the perceived risk 
of stock investment. 
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Recent studies also uncover that households in developing countries borrow money from many 
informal and formal lenders for production and consumption (Diagne, 1999; Zeller, 1994), 
(Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Guirkinger, 2008; Mohieldin & Wright, 2000; Nguyen, 2008; Nguyen 
& Berg, 2014). This chapter argues that investors also borrow money from informal and formal 
lenders and that more available sources will lead to the use of higher debt.  
H4.5: The higher the number of borrowing sources, the higher the level of informal debt used. 
H4.6: The higher the number of borrowing sources, the higher the level of financial leverage 
used. 
Perceived risk is found to be a mediator between perceived quality and perceived value 
(Sweeney, Soutar, & Johnson, 1999). Performance risk mediates between quality and value 
(Agarwal & Teas, 2001), meaning that performance risk can account for why a higher quality 
leads to a higher value for money. This chapter thus argues that perceived risk may mediate 
between borrowing sources and debt decisions, with the following hypotheses:  
H4.7: Perceived risk of stock investment mediates between borrowing sources and informal 
debt. 
H4.8: Perceived risk of stock investment mediates between borrowing sources and financial 
leverage. 
This chapter also argues that perceived risk relates to borrowing sources, and borrowing 
sources pertain to debt decisions. This reveals that borrowing sources may mediate between 
perceived risk and debt decisions, with the following hypotheses: 




H4.10: Borrowing sources mediates between perceived risk of stock investment and financial 
leverage. 
4.3 Methodology 
This main methodology was outlined in Chapter 3. This chapter only presents the measures of 
perceived risk, borrowing sources, and debt decisions, as shown in Figure 4.1. Perceived risk 
is measured based on Peter and Tarpey Sr (1975)’s formula. Mitchell (1999) assesses the model 
of  Peter and Tarpey Sr (1975) as one of the best models in comparison with other models (such 
as Deering & Jacoby, 1972; Dowling & Staelin, 1994; Horton, 1976; Stone & Winter, 1987). 
Each facet of risk is computed by multiplying the probability of loss (PL) by the importance of 
loss (IL). There are seven facets of risk, and the sum of these seven facets together form the 
overall perceived risk of stock investment (coded as PERI). Borrowing sources are described 
as the number of sources investors borrow money from for stock investment.  
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Figure 4.1: A summary of measures of perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions 
I. Perceived risk of stock investment 
PERI = ∑ (𝐧𝐢=𝟏 SAFRi + SOCRi + OPPRi + TIMRi + CHOIRi + LEVRi + FINRi
 ) 
 
SAFR : Safety risk; = ln (SAF1i * SAF2i) CHOIR : Choice risk; = ln (CHO1i * CHO2i) 
SAF1 : the probability of safety loss; CHO1 : the probability of choice loss; 
SAF2 : the importance of safety loss; CHO2 : the importance of choice loss; 
SOCR : Social risk; = ln (SOC1i * SOC2i) LEVR : Leverage risk; = ln (LEL1i * LEL2i) 
SOC1 : the probability of social loss; LEL1 : the probability of leverage loss; 
SOC2 : the importance of social loss; LEL2 : the importance of leverage loss; 
OPPR : Opportunity risk; = ln (OPP1i * OPP2i) FINR : Financial risk; = ln (FIN1i * FIN2i) 
OPP1 : the probability of opportunity loss; FIN1 : the probability of financial loss; 
OPP2 : the importance of opportunity loss; FIN2 : the importance of financial loss; 
TIMR : Time risk; = ln (TIM1i * TIM2i) PERI : Perceived risk of stock investment; 
TIM1 : the probability of time loss;  i: ith investor; n= 420. 
TIM2 : the importance of time loss;   
 
II. Borrowing sources 
FINFS =∑ (𝐈𝐍𝐁𝐎 +  𝐅𝐁𝐎)𝐧𝐢  
where:  
INBO: borrowing from the informal lenders  
FBO: borrowing from the formal lender  
FINFS: borrowing sources;  
i: ith investors, n=420. 
III. Debt decisions 
INFD = ∑ (𝐈𝐍𝐅𝐃)𝐧𝐢 i 
LEVE = ∑ (𝐋𝐄𝐕𝐄)𝐧𝐢 i 
where:  
INFD: informal debt ratios (%) 
LEVE: levels of financial leverage (1: no leverage to 5: maximum leverage ratios).  
i: ith investors, n=420. 
 
Borrowing sources are a categorical variable with 0 as no borrowing, 1 as borrowing from one 
informal or formal lender, and 2 as borrowing from both informal and formal lenders. In 
Vietnamese culture, a family is often an extended family, including spouses, parents (in-law), 
single brothers or sisters (in-law), single aunts or uncles, nieces, nephews. Also, non-family 
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lenders involve many kinds of people as friends, colleagues, managers, neighbours. This thesis, 
therefore, divides informal lenders into two groups: family and non-family. This categorization 
helps achieve a better understanding of whom investors borrow money from for stock 
investment. Debt decisions and six control variables were presented in Section 3.6. 
4.4 Results 
The investor characteristics were presented in Section 3.5. This chapter describes investors’ 
perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions, followed by the reliability of the scale 
of perceived risk, the correlations between variables and the main results of this chapter.     
4.4.1 Levels of perceived risk 
Investors’ overall perceived risk is composed of seven facets; financial risk, safety risk, social 
risk, time risk, opportunity risk, choice risk, and leverage risk, as revealed in Table 4.1. On 
average, investors are most concerned about leverage risk, followed by choice risk, safety risk, 
opportunity risk, social risk, and financial risk. For financial risk, most investors are highly 
concerned about their loss being over 10% of their equity.   
Table 4.1: Description of overall perceived risk and its seven facets 
This table shows investors’ overall perceived risk and its facets. The majority of investors have higher levels of 
overall perceived risk than the average (53%). On average, investors are most concerned about leverage risk, 

















Mean 13.80 10.75 11.93 13.12 14.20 16.21 8.69 88.71 
Median 12 9 12 12 15 16 6 87 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 
Maximum 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 162 
Standard deviation 6.46 6.46 6.00 5.91 6.06 7.20 6.24 25.89 
Below mean (%) 51 60 46 54 48 61 53 53 
Over mean (%) 49 40 54 46 52 39 47 47 




Levels of perceived risk, in general, differ among groups, as indicated in Table 4.2. Users of 
debt have a higher level of risk concern than non-users of debt. This supports the debate of this 
study that investors are not always risk-averse. Besides this, non-stockbrokers are also more 
concerned about investment risk than stockbrokers. The risk of stock investment perceived by 
female investors is higher than that by male investors. This result is consistent with prior studies 
in which males are more risk-taking than females, for example (Barber & Odean, 2001; Frijns, 
Koellen, & Lehnert, 2008; Grable, 2000; Hallahan, Faff, & McKenzie, 2003; Kannadhasan, 
2015; Lucarelli & Brighetti, 2011; Tho et al., 2018; Yao, Sharpe, & Wang, 2011). 
Table 4.2: Perceived risk among groups 
This table shows investors’ overall perceived risk and its facets. Users of debt have a higher level of risk concern 
than non-users of debt. Besides this, non-stockbrokers and female investors are more concerned about investment 

















Mean 15.69 16.49 16.41 16.24 16.02 16.87 16.35 
Median 16.18 16.87 16.97 16.70 16.57 17.21 16.80 
Minimum 7.97 5.93 5.93 6.58 5.93 6.64 5.93 
Maximum 21.2 21.8 21.80 21.80 21.80 21.80 21.8 
Std. dev. 0.29 0.15 0.175 0.21 2.80 0.20 2.74 
N 75 345 251 169 258 162 420 
Note: Std. dev.: standard deviation 
4.4.2 Borrowing sources and debt decisions 
Debt decisions were presented in Section 3.6.1. This chapter only presents borrowing sources 
that are briefly in Table 4.3. Investors have no borrowing from family (around 30%), non-
family (about 44%), and formal sources (around 19%). Approximately 93% of investors 
borrow from at least one source. Among them, 26% of them borrow from one informal or 
formal source, and nearly 67% of them borrow from both informal and formal sources. Overall, 
the number of investors who use both informal and formal sources for stock investors 
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dominates the sample. The primary lenders are parents (36%), friends (34%), and brokerage 




Table 4.3: A summary of the borrowing sources 
Investors have no borrowing from informal sources; family (around 30%), and non-family (about 44%), and formal sources (around 19%). Remarkably, only about 7% of 
investors borrow neither from informal nor formal sources. That is, most investors borrow money from at least one source for stock investment. The primary lenders are parents, 
friends, and brokerage firms.  
Family sources Freq. % Non-family sources Freq. % Formal sources Freq. % Borrowing sources Freq. % 
No borrowing 124 29.5 No borrowing 184 43.8 No borrowing 79 18.8 No borrowing 31 7.4 
Parents (in-law) 151 36 Friends 144 34.3 Brokerage firms 163 38.8 Informal or formal  109 26.0 
Husband/wife 77 18.3 Other 30 7.1 Banks 152 36.2    
Brothers 
/sisters (in-law)  
47 11.3 Colleagues/co-
workers 
18 4.3 Credit 
institutions 
13 3.1 Both informal and 
formal 
280 66.6 
Other 18 4.2 Girlfriend/boyfriend 
/partner 
18 4.3 Other 13 3.1    
Cousins/nieces 
/nephews 
3 0.7 Business partners 16 3.8       
   Neighbours 6 1.4       
   Bosses/managers 4 1.0       
N 420 100 N 420 100 N 420 100  420 100 
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4.4.3 Test of reliability  
The reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) of seven facets of risk are shown in Table 4.4. 
All Cronbach’s alphas of each facet of risk are more than 0.612; for example, 0.612 (choice 
risk), and 0.882 (leverage risk). Perceived risk has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.679, although some 
inter-correlation is less than 0.3. In general, each facet of risk and overall perceived risk fulfils 
acceptable or high internal consistency, which enables them to be variants in a model. 
4.4.4 Test of correlations between variables 
This study tests Pearson’s correlation coefficients between variables. As shown in Table 4.5, 
most facets of risk variables have a positive inter-correlation at a significant level (p<0.05). 
For example, safety risk has a positive correlation with social risk, opportunity risk, time risk, 
choice risk, leverage risk, and perceived risk. Perceived risk positively correlates with choices 
among borrowing sources and informal debt. 
Overall perceived risk has correlations with its seven facets at significant levels which are, 
ranked in descending order, time risk, leverage risk, choice risk, opportunity risk, social risk, 
safety risk, and financial risk. 
 
 
12According to Hair et al. (2014)’s guidelines, to ensure that a variable has sufficient reliability, Cronbach’s 
alpha of each variable should exceed a threshold of 0.6. Internal consistency (the item-to-total correlations) 




Table 4.4: Results of the reliability of perceived risk and its facets 
This table examines the reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) of each facet of risk and overall perceived risk. 
All variables have Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.6; safety risk (0.684), social risk (0.833), opportunity risk 
(0.802), time risk (0.798), choice risk (0.705), leverage risk (0.861), financial risk (0.835), and perceived risk 
(0.629). The results show that all these variables have sufficient reliability. 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 








if item deleted 
Safety risk     0.684 
SAF1 3.97 0.972 0.521 0.272  
SAF2 3.36 1.151 0.521 0.272  
Social risk     0.833 
SOC1 3.14 1.118 0.714 0.510  
SOC2 3.16 1.265 0.714 0.510  
Opportunity risk    0.802 
OPP1 3.36 0.921 0.671 0.450  
OPP2 3.39 1.047 0.671 0.450  
Time risk     0.798 
TIM1 3.59 0.855 0.664 0.441  
TIM2 3.51 0.877 0.664 0.441  
Choice risk    0.705 
CHO1 3.87 0.859 0.545 0.297  
CHO2 3.59 0.876 0.545 0.297  
Leverage risk    0.861 
LEV1 4.00 1.111 0.756 0.572  
LEV2 3.88 1.139 0.756 0.572  
Financial risk    0.835 
FIN1 2.90 1.368 0.718 0.516  
FIN2 2.68 1.226 0.718 0.516  
Perceived risk (PERI)    0.629 
SAFR 13.8752 6.114 0.315 0.109 0.600 
SOCR 14.2139 5.426 0.390 0.192 0.575 
OPPR 14.0422 5.782 0.389 0.232 0.577 
TIMR 13.9028 5.654 0.561 0.425 0.534 
CHOIR 13.8181 5.863 0.466 0.334 0.559 
LEVR 13.7318 5.715 0.376 0.202 0.580 
FINR 14.4890 6.593 0.046 0.006 0.702 
SAF1: probability of safety loss, SAF2: importance of safety loss, SOC1: probability of social loss, SOC2: 
importance of social loss, OPP1: probability of opportunity loss, OPP2: importance of opportunity loss,  TIM1: 
probability of time loss,  TIM2: importance of time loss, CHO1: probability of choice loss, CHO2: importance of 
choice loss, LEV1:  probability of leverage loss, LEV2:  importance of leverage loss,  FIN1: probability of 
financial loss, FIN2: importance of financial loss, SAFR: safety risk, SOCR: social risk, OPPR: opportunity risk, 





Table 4.5: A summary of the correlations between variables 
This table tests the correlation between variables. Most variables have inter-correlation at a significant level. For example, safety risk correlates with social risk, opportunity 
risk, time risk, choice risk, leverage risk, and perceived risk. Perceived risk also positively correlates with borrowing sources and informal debt. 
 SAFR 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1.SAFR 1.000                 
2.SOCR 0.250** 1.000                
3.OPPR 0.203** 0.363** 1.000               
4.TIMR 0.200** 0.376** 0.481** 1.000              
5.CHOIR 0.200** 0.271** 0.307** 0.521** 1.000             
6.LEVR 0.190** 0.289** 0.237** 0.435** 0.440** 1.000            
7.FINR 0.084 0.009 -0.024 -0.002 0.056 -0.023 1.000           
8.PERI 0.458** 0.573** 0.576** 0.633** 0.578** 0.582** 0.306** 1.000          
9.FINFS 0.029 0.081 0.095 0.106* 0.052 0.217** -0.004 0.190** 1.000         
10.GEN 0.128** 0.047 0.089 0.071 0.105* 0.116* 0.065 0.146** 0.073 1.000        
11.AGE -0.076 -0.069 -0.069 -0.182** -0.128** -0.206** 0.057 -0.126** -0.050 -0.199** 1.000       
12.MAR -0.014 0.063 0.003 -0.086 -0.067 -0.090 0.037 -0.013 -0.023 -0.059 0.491** 1.000      
13.EDU -0.098* -0.106* -0.042 -0.010 -0.038 -0.041 0.005 -0.047 -0.036 -0.105* 0.076 0.131** 1.000     
14.INC -0.046 -0.044 -0.072 -0.101* -0.074 -0.106* 0.089 -0.022 -0.099* -0.193** 0.418** 0.297** 0.238** 1.000    
15.FIL -0.117* -0.072 0.004 0.078 0.136** 0.175** -0.031 0.075 -0.012 -0.098* -0.046 -0.023 0.230** 0.087 1.000   
16.INFD 0.047 0.117* 0.049 0.076 0.100* 0.112* 0.070 0.154** 0.176** 0.053 -0.114* -0.135** -0.011 -0.133** -0.042 1.000  
17.LEVE -0.075 0.016 -0.044 0.000 -0.027 0.076 -0.035 0.029 0.260** -0.076 0.060 0.051 0.017 0.131** 0.175** -0.071 1.000 
N 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). SAFR: safety risk, SOCR: social risk, OPPR: opportunity risk, TIMR: time risk, CHOIR: choice risk, LEVR: leverage risk, FINR: financial risk, PERI: 
perceived risk of stock investment, FINFS: choices among borrowing sources, GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education levels, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal 





4.4.5 Results of main SEM models and discussion 
This study develops three structural equation models (SEM1, SEM2, and SEM3). SEM1 
examines borrowing sources as a mediator between perceived risk and debt decisions. SEM2 
examines borrowing sources a mediator between seven facets of risk and debt decisions. SEM3 
tests perceived risk as a mediator between borrowing sources and debt decisions. The 
relationships are tested after controlling for six personal characteristics; gender, age, marital 
status, education, income, and financial literacy. It is noted that other demographics are also 
tested, including investment amount, work experience, and investment experience among 
investors. The results, however, find that most of these variables have no significant association 
with debt decisions.  
The results of SEM 1 are exhibited in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.6. The results indicate a direct 
relationship between perceived risk and borrowing sources at 0.186 (p<0.01) in support of 
H4.1, in which the higher the level of risk concerns, the higher the number of borrowing sources 
used. Investors with higher concern for risk associated with stock investment prefer more 
borrowing sources because they then avoid dealing with a large debt amount from only one 
source. Alternatively, their debt amount can be divided across a number of smaller sources, 
and consequently, problems of repayment become less severe.    
Borrowing sources is positively associated with both the use of informal debt at 0.149 (p<0.01) 
and financial leverage at 0.283 (p<0.01), in support of H4.5 and H4.6, respectively. The use of 
more borrowing sources leads to the use of higher debt (informal and financial leverage). This 
supports the view that investors who borrow money from many sources can effectively double-
up on debt coming from both informal and formal lenders: that is, they borrow money from 
parents and friends first, and then continue to borrow from brokerage firms. This infers that 
investors with more borrowing sources are more likely to be risk-lovers and that they use higher 
debt in the hope of achieving higher returns. 
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Perceived risk also pertains to informal debt at 0.124 (p<0.01), supporting H4.2, in which the 
higher the level of risk concerns, the higher the level of informal debt being used. The result 
finds no significant relationship of perceived risk to financial leverage, which does not support 
H4.3. Overall, our finding of a positive risk-debt link adds to the literature alongside prior 
studies on a positive risk-return trade-off (e.g. Byrne, 2005; Diacon & Ennew, 2001; Ganzach, 
2000; Trang & Tho, 2017). Investors with higher risk perception of stock investment prefer 
informal debt to formal debt. Two reasons account for this: first is the avoidance of legal 
problems. Due to parents and friends being the main informal borrowing sources, investors 
(borrowers) may avoid commitments of repayment to their parents or friends if they cannot 
return the money to them. Second is the tendency to invest small amounts in stock investment, 
and as a result, this borrowing is not a substantial concern to the parents and friends.  
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Figure 4.2: Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions (SEM1) 
This figure presents a direct link of perceived risk to borrowing sources, perceived risk to informal debt, and 
borrowing sources to informal debt and financial leverage at a significant level (p<0.1). SEM1 also uncovers 
borrowing sources as a mediator between perceived risk and debt decisions at a significant level.  
 
A model fit with criteria: Chi-square: 16.764, df: 12, GFI: 0.978, TLI: 0.904, CFI: 0.975, RMSEA: 0.053. 
PERI: overall perceived risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education levels, MAR: 
marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
 
Table 4.6: Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions (SEM1) 
This table shows a direct association of perceived risk with borrowing sources, the perceived risk with informal 
debt, and borrowing sources with informal debt and financial leverage at a significant level (p<0.1). SEM1 also 






S.E. C.R. P 
Hypotheses 
I. Direct relationship       
FINFS <--- PERI 0.042 0.186 0.011 3.829 0.000*** H4.1 
FINFS <--- GEN 0.039 0.031 0.063 0.616 0.538  
FINFS <--- AGE 0.016 0.021 0.041 0.386 0.700  
FINFS <--- EDU -0.005 -0.003 0.076 -0.060 0.952  
FINFS <--- INC -0.085 -0.097 0.047 -1.789 0.074*  
INFD <--- FINFS 0.051 0.149 0.017 3.092 0.002*** H4.5 
INFD <--- PERI 0.010 0.124 0.004 2.579 0.010*** H4.2 
INFD <--- MAR -0.052 -0.130 0.019 -2.747 0.006***  
LEVE <--- INC 0.120 0.143 0.039 3.106 0.002***  
LEVE <--- FIL 0.031 0.168 0.008 3.641 0.000***  
LEVE <--- FINFS 0.272 0.283 0.045 6.030 0.000*** H4.6 
LEVE <--- PERI -0.007 -0.034 0.010 -0.722 0.470 H4.3 
II. Indirect relationship       
PERI->FINFS->INFD 0.002 0.028   *** H4.9 
PERI->FINFS->LELE 0.011 0.053   *** H4.10 
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
PERI: perceived risk, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial 
literacy, FINFS: borrowing sources, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
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The results of SEM2 are presented in Figure 4.3 and Table 4.7. The findings show that 
opportunity risk and leverage risk have a direct association with borrowing sources at 0.107 
(p<0.05) and 0.242 (p<0.01), respectively, which also supports H4.1. As a result of findings 
by SEM1 and SEM2, in addition to the overall perceived risk, investors are concerned about 
missing out on other financial investment opportunities if they use all the money for stock 
investments. They are also concerned about their returns being inadequate to cover their debt, 
leading to borrowing from more sources so as to reduce a severe debt amount from only one 
source.      
In addition, borrowing sources relate to informal debt at 0.176 (p<0.01) and financial leverage 
at 0.260 (p<0.01), which supports H4.5 and H4.6. Borrowing sources are also a mediator 
between opportunity risk and informal debt at 0.019 (p<0.01), between opportunity risk and 
financial leverage at 0.028 (p<0.01), between leverage risk and informal debt at 0.042 
(p<0.01), and between leverage risk and financial leverage at 0.063 (p<0.01). These results 
support H4.9 and H4.10. These hypotheses have already been mentioned in SEM1.  
The findings of SEM3 are indicated in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.8. SEM3 finds a direct 
relationship of borrowing sources to perceived risk at 0.177 (p<0.01) in support of H4.4, in 
which an increase in the number of borrowing sources leads to higher risk concerns about stock 
investment. This result contributes to the literature alongside prior studies (e.g. Nofsinger, 
2008; Thaler & Johnson, 1990) in which past outcomes affect current risk perception. Investors 
with more borrowing sources are more concerned about the risk of stock investment. When 
faced many borrowing sources, investors worry about having large borrowings from many 
lenders, leading them to be more aware of the risk of stocks chosen for investment. 
Model SEM3 also manifests the link of perceived risk to informal debt at 0.12 (p≤0.01) (H4.2), 
borrowing sources to informal debt at 0.15 (p<0.01) (H4.5), and financial leverage at 0.28 
(p<0.01) (H4.6).  These hypotheses were mentioned in SEM1 and SEM2.  
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The results also show that perceived risk mediates between borrowing sources and informal 
debt at 0.022 (p<0.01) in support of H4.7. The use of more borrowing sources leads to more 
concerns about the risk of stock investment, and more risk concerns result in the choice of 
informal debt for stock investment, and as a result, perceived risk links borrowing sources to 
informal debt decisions.  In other words, the mediating role of perceived risk may explain why 
a higher number of borrowing sources leads to the use of higher informal debt. This result also 
contributes to the literature. SEM3, however, finds no significant indirect impact of borrowing 
sources on financial leverage through perceived risk, which does not support H4.8.  
In summary, based on the main results of SEMs, as presented above, this chapter reiterates that 
borrowing, especially informal borrowing is part of Vietnamese culture. Investors with higher 
risk perception of stock investment tend to use more borrowing sources and higher informal 
debt, and those with more borrowing sources are more likely to use debt for stock investment.  
82 
 
Figure 4.3: Facets of risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions (SEM2) 
This figure reveals a direct relationship of opportunity risk and leverage risk to borrowing sources and borrowing 
sources to informal debt and financial leverage at a significant level (p<0.1). In addition, borrowing sources are 
a mediator between opportunity risk, leverage risk, and debt decisions at a significant level.  
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 22.676, df: 15, GFI: 0.990, TLI: 0.954, CFI: 0.985, RMSEA: 0.035. 
SAFR: safety risk, SOCR: social risk, OPPR: opportunity risk, TIMR: time risk, CHOIR: choice risk, LEVR: 
leverage risk, FINR: financial risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
 
Table 4.7: Facets of risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions (SEM2) 
This table indicates a direct link of opportunity risk and leverage risk to borrowing sources and borrowing sources 
to informal debt and financial leverage at a significant level (p<0.1). In addition, borrowing sources are a mediator 






S.E. C.R. P 
Hypotheses 
I. Direct relationship       
FINFS <--- SOCR 0.013 0.017 0.041 0.323 0.747  
FINFS <--- OPPR 0.097 0.107 0.049 1.997 0.046** H4.1 
FINFS <--- TIMR 0.010 0.009 0.067 0.149 0.882  
FINFS <--- CHOIR -0.083 -0.078 0.061 -1.354 0.176  
FINFS <--- LEVR 0.209 0.242 0.045 4.594 0.000*** H4.1 
FINFS <--- FINR 0.012 0.017 0.034 0.356 0.722  
FINFS <--- SAFR 0.019 0.019 0.048 0.386 0.699  
INFD <--- FINFS 0.060 0.176 0.017 3.650 0.000*** H4.5 
LEVE <--- FINFS 0.250 0.260 0.045 5.514 0.000*** H4.6 
II. Indirect relationship       
OPPR->FINFS->INFD 0.006 0.019   *** H4.9 
OPPR->FINFS->LEVE 0.024 0.028   *** H4.10 
LEVR->FINFS->INFD 0.013 0.042   *** H4.9 
LEVR->FINFS->LEVE 0.052 0.063   *** H4.10 
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
SAFR: safety risk, SOCR: social risk, OPPR: opportunity risk, TIMR: time risk, CHOIR: choice risk, LEVR: 
leverage risk, FINR: financial risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
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Figure 4.4: Borrowing sources, perceived risk and debt decisions (SEM3) 
This figure indicates that borrowing sources affect perceived risk, informal debt and financial leverage. Perceived 
risk also relates to informal debt at a significant level. SEM3, however, finds no significant relationship of 
perceived risk to financial leverage. Moreover, perceived risk significantly mediates between borrowing sources 
and informal debt. 
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 14.181, df: 12, GFI: 0.993, TLI: 0.978, CFI: 0.994, RMSEA: 0.021. 
FINFS: borrowing sources, PERI: perceived risk, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, 
INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
 
Table 4.8: Borrowing sources, perceived risk, debt decisions (SEM3) 
This table reveals the direct association of borrowing sources with perceived risk as well as debt decisions. 
Perceived risk also pertains to informal debt at a significant level. The perceived risk significantly mediates 
between borrowing sources and informal debt. However, SEM3 finds no significant link of perceived risk to 
financial leverage. 





S.E. C.R. P 
Hypotheses 
I. Direct relationship       
PERI <--- FINFS 0.776 0.177 0.208 3.738 0.000*** H4.4 
PERI <--- GEN 0.672 0.121 0.270 2.486 0.013**  
PERI <--- EDU -0.289 -0.043 0.329 -0.879 0.379  
PERI <--- AGE -0.289 -0.085 0.164 -1.765 0.077*  
PERI <--- FIL 0.079 0.094 0.041 1.935 0.053*  
INFD <--- PERI 0.010 0.124 0.004 2.579 0.010** H4.2 
INFD <--- FINFS 0.051 0.149 0.017 3.092 0.002*** H4.5 
INFD <--- MAR -0.052 -0.130 0.019 -2.747 0.006***  
LEVE <--- INC 0.120 0.144 0.039 3.106 0.002***  
LEVE <--- FIL 0.031 0.168 0.008 3.641 0.000***  
LEVE <--- PERI -0.007 -0.034 0.010 -0.722 0.470 H4.3 
LEVE <--- FINFS 0.272 0.283 0.045 6.030 0.000*** H4.6 
II. Indirect relationship       
FINFS->PERI->INFD 0.008 0.022   *** H4.7 
FINFS->PERI->LEVE -0.005 -0.006   0.470 H4.8 
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
FINFS: borrowing sources, PERI: perceived risk, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, 
INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
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4.5 Results of sub-group analysis 
This chapter next examines the differences in the relationship of perceived risk to borrowing 
sources and debt decisions amongst sub-groups: stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers, male and 
female investors and users and non-users of borrowing sources. Eight models are developed. 
SEM4 will examine this relationship among investors who are also stockbrokers, while SEM5 
will investigate this relationship among investors who are non-stockbrokers13. Male investors 
and female investors will be presented in SEM6 and SEM7, respectively.  Non-users and users 
of borrowing sources will be tested through four models using multiple regression techniques 
due to the small sample. This analysis will find which group has the strongest relationship of 
perceived risk to debt decisions.  
The first sub-group analysis is between stockbrokers (N=169) and non-stockbrokers (N=251). 
Figure 4.5 and Table 4.9 summarise the results as follows. Both SEM4 and SEM5 find an 
association of perceived risk (overall) with the use of borrowing sources at 0.24 (p<0.01) and 
0.1 (p<0.1), and the use of informal debt at 0.13 (p<0.1) and 0.12 (p<0.05), respectively. 
Borrowing sources also relate to the use of financial leverage at 0.246 (p<0.01) and 0.247 
(p<0.01), respectively. These results indicate that perceived risk predicts the use of borrowing 
sources and the use of informal debt, and borrowing sources pertain to the use of financial 
leverage among stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers.  
For the relationship between borrowing sources and the use of informal debt, only SEM4 finds 
a link from borrowing sources to informal debt at 0.25 (p<0.01), while SEM5 does not. This 
means that borrowing sources only relate to the use of informal debt among stockbrokers.  
 
13  Non-stockbrokers (N=251) include, in descending order, other jobs  (25.1%), banking officers (17.9%), 
sales/marketing managers (14.7%), administrators (12%), investment officers (9.6%), business owners (4.8%), 
accountants (3.9%), teachers/lecturers (3.2%), financial advisors (3.2%), find managers (2.8%), brokerage 
managers (1.2%), CFOs (1.2%), and CEOs (0.4%). 
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Figure 4.5: Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions between stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers 
This figure shows that both SEM4 and SEM5 find a link of perceived risk (overall) to borrowing sources and the use of informal debt and borrowing sources to financial 
leverage at a significant level. This indicates that perceived risk directly relates to borrowing sources and informal debt, and borrowing sources are associated with financial 
leverage among stockbrokers or non-stockbrokers. For the relationship between borrowing sources and informal debt, only SEM4 finds an association of borrowing sources 
with informal debt at 0.25 (p<0.01), while SEM5 does not. This means that borrowing sources only explain the use of informal debt among stockbrokers.  
Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions among stockbrokers (SEM4) 
(N=169) 
 
Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions among non-stockbrokers 
(SEM5) (N=251) 
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 5.234, Df: 12, GFI: 0.994, TLI: 1.160, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.000. 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 14.828, Df: 12, GFI: 0.988, TLI: 0.948, CFI: 0.986, 
RMSEA: 0.031. 
PERI: perceived risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education levels, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy,  




Table 4.9: Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions between stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers 
This table presents that both SEM4 and SEM5 find a link of perceived risk (overall) to borrowing sources and the use of informal debt and borrowing sources to financial 
leverage at a significant level. This indicates that perceived risk directly relates to borrowing sources and informal debt, and borrowing sources are associated with financial 
leverage among stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers. For the relationship between borrowing sources and informal debt, only SEM4 finds an association of borrowing sources 
with informal debt at 0.25 (p<0.01), while SEM5 does not. This means that borrowing sources only explain the use of informal debt among stockbrokers.   
Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions among stockbrokers 
(SEM4) (N=169) 
 
Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions among non-non-stockbrokers 
(SEM5) (N=251) 
 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001, PERI: perceived risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education levels, MAR: marital status, INC: income, 
FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
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The second sub-group analysis is between male (N=258) and female investors (N=162). Figure 
4.6 and Table 4.10 present the findings of the relationship between perceived risk, borrowing 
sources, and debt decisions between male and female investors. SEM6 finds a positive link of 
perceived risk (overall) to borrowing sources at 0.21 (p<0.01) and the use of informal debt at 
0.2 (p<0.01), and a negative association of perceived risk with the use of financial leverage at 
-0.13 (p<0.05), while SEM7 does not. Both these SEMs uncover a positive connection of 
borrowing sources to the use of financial leverage at 0.35 (p<0.01) and 0.17 (p<0.05), 
respectively.  
These findings indicate that perceived risk can predict the use of borrowing sources, informal 
debt and financial leverage among male investors. Borrowing sources can explain the use of 
financial leverage among male and female investors. It is worthy of note that SEM6 does find 
that perceived risk is negatively associated with the use of financial leverage among male 
investors, while both SEM1 and SEM2 do not find a significant association between perceived 
risk and financial leverage among all investors.  
Perceived risk, in short, is positively related to the use of informal debt among investors and 
inversely associated with the use of financial leverage among male investors. That is, higher-
risk concern investors tend to use higher informal debt and lower financial leverage. This result 
is plausible because, in a typical debt portfolio, the total debt is 100%, which means that if the 
use of informal debt increases, the use of formal debt must decrease.    
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Figure 4.6: Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions between male and female investors 
This figure shows that SEM6 finds a positive link of perceived risk (overall) to borrowing sources and the use of informal debt, and a negative link of perceived risk to the use 
of financial leverage, while SEM7 does not. Both SEMs present a relationship of borrowing sources to the use of financial leverage at 0.35 (p<0.01) and 0.17 (p<0.05), 
respectively. These results mean that perceived risk can predict the use of borrowing sources, informal debt, and financial leverage among male investors. In contrast, only 
borrowing sources can explain the use of financial leverage among female investors.  
Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions among male investors (SEM6) 
(N=258) 
 
Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions among female investors 
(SEM7) (N=162) 
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 4.584, Df: 9, GFI: 0.996, TLI: 1.091, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.000. 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 6.750, Df: 9, GFI: 0.991, TLI: 1.066, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.031. 
PERI: perceived risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education levels, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy,  





Table 4.10: Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions between male and female investors 
This table presents that SEM6 finds a positive link of perceived risk (overall) to borrowing sources and the use of informal debt, and a negative link of perceived risk to the use 
of financial leverage, while SEM7 does not. Both SEMs present a relationship of borrowing sources to the use of financial leverage at 0.35 (p<0.01) and 0.16 (p<0.05), 
respectively. These results mean that perceived risk can predict the use of borrowing sources, informal debt, and financial leverage among male investors. In contrast, only 
borrowing sources can explain the use of financial leverage among female investors.  
Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions among male investors (SEM6) 
(N=258) 
 
Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions among female investors 
(SEM7) (N=162) 
 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001, PERI: perceived risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education levels, MAR: marital status, INC: income, 
FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
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The last sub-group analysis is between users and non-users of borrowing sources including 
non-users (N=92) and users of informal borrowing sources (N=328), and non-users (N=79) 
and users of formal borrowing sources (N=341). As the sample size of non-users of borrowing 
is less than 100, multiple regression is applied to ensure a model fit. 
The results of the relationship between perceived risk and informal debt among users and non-
users of borrowing sources are presented in Table 4.11. Model 7 finds a link of perceived risk 
to informal debt among users of informal borrowing sources at 0.129 (p<0.05), while Model 6 
does not. Both Models 8 and 9 show an association of perceived risk with informal debt at 0.24 
(p<0.1) and 0.14 (p<0.01), respectively.  These results indicate that perceived risk does predict 
the use of informal debt among users of informal borrowing sources, and both non-users and 
users of formal borrowing sources, but does not relate to the use of informal debt among non-
users of informal borrowing sources.  
Table 4.11: Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions between users and non-
users of borrowing sources 
This table presents a positive link of perceived risk to informal debt at a significant level among users of informal 
borrowing sources, and non-users and users of formal borrowing sources. Note that unstandardised estimates are 
in parentheses. 
IVs Non-users of informal 
borrowing sources 
Users of informal 
borrowing sources 
Non-users of formal 
borrowing sources 
Users of formal 
borrowing sources 

























































Adj. R2 -0.053 0.032 -0.032 0.061 
F (0.3,7) (2.6,7) *** (0.7,7) (0.2,7) *** 
N 92 328 79 341 
Dependent variable: INFD: informal debt. *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01, PERI: perceived risk, GEN: gender, 




In summary, between subgroups, perceived risk has the strongest relationship to the use of 
informal debt among non-users of formal borrowing, followed by male investors, users of 
formal borrowing, stockbrokers, users of informal borrowing, and non-stockbrokers. Female 
investors’ perceived risk does not explain their use of informal debt. Alternatively, some 
demographics, marital status, and financial literacy can explain this use of informal debt among 
female investors, which are presented in Section 4.7. 
4.6 Robustness check 
This chapter applies other techniques to ensure the robustness of the results found by the SEM 
findings. The additional tests are the following; alternative measures of perceived risk and debt 
decisions, multiple linear regression, stepwise regression, Hayes and Preacher's approach, 
causality analysis in the SEM model, the T-test, and solutions to locations and response biases. 
The methodology used here was outlined in Section 3.4. 
4.6.1 Robustness check using alternative measures 
Additional measures are then applied to perceived risk and debt decisions. Perceived risk is 
measured by summing up the seven facets without using logarithm (ln) for each facet. Debt 
decisions are computed through the total informal and formal debt.  
The eighth SEM model, SEM8, is developed to test the relationship of perceived risk to 
borrowing sources and debt decisions. SEM8 aims to examine the robustness of the results by 
SEMs using alternative measures for perceived risk and debt decisions. 
Figure 4.7 and Table 4.12 summarise the results of SEM8.  Perceived risk directly relates to 
borrowing sources at 0.13 (p<0.01) and debt decisions at 0.08 (p<0.1). Borrowing sources is 
associated with debt decisions at 0.32 (p<0.01). Borrowing sources mediate between perceived 
risk and debt decisions at 0.04 (p<0.01). These results are consistent with those from SEM1, 
indicating the link of perceived risk to debt decisions are robust using additional measures.   
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Figure 4.7: Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions (SEM8) 
This figure shows a direct association of perceived risk with borrowing sources, the perceived risk with debt 
decisions, and borrowing sources with debt decisions at a significant level (p<0.1). SEM8 also uncovers 
borrowing sources as a mediator between perceived risk and debt decisions at a significant level.  
 
A model fit with criteria: Chi-square: 1.826, df: 4, GFI: 0.999, TLI: 1.058, CFI: 1.000, RMSEA: 0.000. 
PERIs: overall perceived risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education levels, MAR: 
marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, FDINFD: debt decisions. 
 
Table 4.12: Perceived risk, borrowing sources and debt decisions (SEM8) 
This table presents a direct link of perceived risk to borrowing sources, perceived risk to debt decisions, and 
borrowing sources to debt decisions at a significant level (p<0.1). SEM8 also uncovers borrowing sources as a 






S.E. C.R. P 
I. Direct relationship      
FINFS <--- PERIs 0.003 0.134 0.001 2.724 0.006*** 
FINFS <--- GEN 0.048 0.038 0.063 0.765 0.444 
FINFS <--- AGE 0.012 0.015 0.046 0.256 0.798 
FINFS <--- MAR 0.004 0.003 0.065 0.060 0.952 
FINFS <--- INC -0.076 -0.087 0.048 -1.583 0.113 
FINFS <--- EDU -0.003 -0.002 0.077 -0.045 0.964 
FDINFD <--- FINFS 0.133 0.317 0.019 6.800 0.000*** 
FDINFD <--- FIL 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.225 0.822 
FDINFD <--- EDU -0.006 -0.009 0.031 -0.183 0.855 
FDINFD <--- INC 0.025 0.069 0.017 1.447 0.148 
FDINFD <--- PERIs 0.001 0.078 0.000 1.674 0.094* 
II. Indirect relationships      
PERIs->FINFS->FDINFD 0.000 0.043   * 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001, PERIs: overall perceived risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, GEN: gender, 




4.6.2 Robustness check using multiple and stepwise regression  
The models using multiple regression are each labelled “a” and models with stepwise 
regression are each labelled “b”, with results shown in Table 4.13. The results show a 
significant relationship of perceived risk and borrowing sources to informal debt, borrowing 
sources to financial leverage, perceived risk to borrowing sources, borrowing sources to 
perceived risk, and opportunity risk and leverage risk to borrowing sources. In general, these 
results are consistent with those from the SEMs. 
4.6.3 Robustness check using the Hayes and Preacher’s approach 
The approach by Hayes and Preacher (2010) tests perceived risk as a mediator between 
borrowing sources and informal debt and borrowing sources as a mediator between perceived 
risk and debt decisions.  This approach was mentioned in Section 3.4.1. 
The results are shown in Table 4.14. Models 1-7 indicate that borrowing sources significantly 
mediate between perceived risk and informal debt in Model 1, between perceived risk and 
financial leverage in Model 2, opportunity risk and informal debt in Model 3, opportunity risk 
and financial leverage in Model 4, leverage risk and informal debt in Model 5, and leverage 
risk and financial leverage in Model 6. Moreover, perceived risk significantly mediates 
between borrowing sources and informal debt in Model 7. Overall, the results from applying 
the Hayes and Preacher's approach are consistent with those using SEMs.
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Table 4.13: Results of direct relationships using multiple regression and stepwise regression 
This table shows a direct link of perceived risk and borrowing sources to informal debt at a significant level in Models 1a and 1b. Borrowing sources significantly relate to 
financial leverage in both Models 2a and 2b. Models 3a and 3b indicate that perceived risk has a significant link to borrowing sources. Borrowing sources are significantly 
associated with the perceived risk in Models 4a and Model 4b. Models 5a and 5b find that opportunity and leverage risk have a relationship with borrowing sources at a 
significant level (p<0.1). Note that unstandardised estimates are in parentheses. 
 
IVs 
DV: INFD DV: LEVE DV: FINFS DV: PERI IVs DV: FINFS 








































































































    
Adj. R2 0.056 0.056 0.109 0.065 0.03 0.041 0.062 0.049 Adj. R2 0.037 0.065 
F,df (4.1, 8) *** (6.6,3) ** (7.4,8) *** (9.6,3) *** (2.9,7) *** (3.9,2) ** (4.9,7) *** (7.7,2) *** F, df (3.3,7) *** (4.7,2) *** 
N 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 N 420 420 
Note: a: multiple linear regression, b: stepwise regression, DV: dependent variable. IVs: independent variables. 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001, PERI: perceived risk of stock investment, FINFS: borrowing sources, GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education 
levels, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, SAFR: safety risk, SOCR: social risk, OPPR: opportunity risk, TIMR: time risk, CHOIR: choice risk, LEVR: leverage risk, 




Table 4.14: Results of indirect effects – Hayes and Preacher’s approach 
This table finds borrowing sources and perceived risk as mediators at a significant level (p≤0.1). Borrowing 
sources significantly mediate between perceived risk and informal debt in Model 1, perceived risk and financial 
leverage in Model 2, opportunity risk and informal debt in Model 3, opportunity risk and financial leverage in 
Model 4, leverage risk and informal debt in Model 5, and leverage risk and financial leverage in Model 6. The 
perceived risk significantly mediates between borrowing sources and informal debt in Model 7. 
Models Unstandardised 
value 
Se LLCI ULCI z 
1.PERI->FINFS-> INFD 0.0023* 0.0009 0.0007 0.0038 2.4007 
2.PERI->FINFS->LEVE 0.011*** 0.0035 0.0053 0.0167 3.1755 
3.OPPR->FINFS->INFD 0.0075** 0.0034 0.0019 0.0132 2.1978 
4.OPPR->FINFS->LEVE 0.0335*** 0.1290 0.0122 0.0548 2.5908 
5.LEVR->FINFS->INFD 0.0114*** 0.0043 0.0044 0.0185 2.6766 
6.LEVR->FINFS->LEVE 0.0505*** 0.0141 0.0274 0.0736 3.5924 
7.FINFS->PERI->INFD 0.0082** 0.0039 0.0018 0.0146 2.1121 
*: p≤0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. LLCI: lower level confidence interval, ULCI: upper-level confidence interval. 
Se: errors. PERI: perceived risk, OPPR: opportunity risk, LEVR: leverage risk, FINFS: borrowing sources, INFD: 
informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage.  
 
4.6.4 Robustness check using the t-test and propensity score matching approach 
The key finding of this chapter is a significantly positive relationship of perceived risk to the 
use of informal debt after controlling for six demographics (gender, age, education, marital 
status, income, and financial literacy). Perceived risk is coded as a dummy variable; 0 when 
the perceived risk is less than the Mean, and 1 when the perceived risk is higher than the Mean. 
Each group has these six control variables. This chapter first applies the two-sample t-test to 
examine whether these six demographics between the two groups are equal. The t-test is also 
outlined in Section 3.4.3.  
The t-test results with N= 420 find that the means of gender, age, education, and income 
between the two groups of perceived risk are different at a significant level (p<0.1), meaning 




and informal debt. Propensity score matching (PSM), accordingly, is applied to deal with these 
differences. After the PSM is performed, the sample size reduces to 392 respondents. 
The results of Table 4.15 present that the means of six demographic variables between the two 
groups of perceived risk are different at an insignificant level (p>0.1), using the sample of 392 
respondents. There are no differences in the means of these six control variables between the 
two groups of perceived risk, reducing the bias in choosing these six variables.  
The results of the link of perceived risk to the use of informal debt are presented in Table 4.16 
using the sample of 392. The perceived risk maintains a strong relationship with informal debt 
at 0.27 (p<0.01) after the scores of the six control variables are matched. In summary, the 
relationship between perceived risk and informal debt is robust using the propensity score 
matching technique. 
Table 4.15: The T-test results of the six variables between the two groups of perceived risk 
(N=392) 
This table presents that after the propensity matching score is performed, there are no differences in the means of 
each of the six variables between the two groups of perceived risk, reducing the bias in choosing these six 
variables. 
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0 1.37 0.0354 0.496 1.32 1.31 
-1.52 0.06 0.13 0.93 
1 1.45 0.0356 0.499 1.39 1.39 
AGE 
0 1.96 0.045 0.64 1.89 2.04 
1.10 0.86 0.27 0.13 
1 1.88 0.05 0.73 1.80 1.97 
EDU 
0 3.04 0.027 0.38 3.00 3.09 
1.07 0.85 0.28 0.14 
1 3.00 0.026 0.37 2.96 3.05 
MAR 
0 1.38 0.035 0.49 1.32 1.446 
0.19 0.57 0.85 0.43 
1 1.37 0.04 0.57 1.31 1.445 
INC 
0 2.59 0.048 0.68 2.51 2.67 
1.01 0.84 0.31 0.16 
1 2.52 0.05 0.71 2.44 2.61 
FIL 
0 9.59 0.23 3.30 9.20 9.98 
-0.39 0.36 0.72 0.64 
1 9.70 0.20 2.88 9.36 10.04 
Note: *: p<10%, **: p<5%, ***: p<1%; GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: 




Table 4.16: The results for the relationship between perceived risk and debt decisions 
(N=392) 
This table presents that perceived risk maintains a strong relationship with the use of informal debt at 0.27 
(p<0.05) using the propensity score matching method. 
Probit regression   Number of obs          = 392 
    Wald chi2(7)             = 13.66 
    Prob>chi2                 = 0.0576 
Log pseudolikelihood = -261.47  Pseudo R2                = 0.0262 
 
INFD Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
z p> |𝑧|                [90% Conf. Interval] 
PERIdummy 0.274 0.129 2.11 0.035** 0.060 0.487 
GEN 0.003 0.132 0.03 0.980 -0.214 0.221 
AGE 0.024 0.112 0.22 0.827 -0.160 0.209 
EDU 0.038 0.172 0.22 0.824 -0.245 0.322 
MAR -0.221 0.139 -1.59 0.112 -0.451 0.007 
INC -0.128 0.106 -1.20 0.229 -0.302 0.046 
FIL -0.039 0.022 -1.80 0.072 -0.075 -0.003 
Constant 0.873 0.605 1.44 0.149 -0.122 1.868 
**: p<5%, Dependent variable: INFD: informal debt. PERIdummy: perceived risk, GEN: gender, AGE: age, 
EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy. 
 
4.6.5 Robustness check on locations selection bias and response bias 
The methodology used here has been presented in Chapter 3. Briefly, this chapter examines 
and concludes that locations and response bias are not related to the relationship of perceived 
risk to informal debt.  
This chapter also examines whether respondents’ locations dampen the association between 
perceived risk and informal debt alongside other demographics such as gender, age, marital 
status, education, income, and financial literacy.  
The results are shown in Table 4.17, in which locations (denoted as PLACE) in both Model 1 
and 2 do not relate to informal debt at a significant level (p<0.1). Locations also do not dampen 













t Sig. Model 
summary 
Model 1 








PERI 0.012 0.004 0.157 3.191 0.002*** 
GEN -0.002 0.024 -0.004 -0.070 0.944 
AGE -0.001 0.016 -0.005 -0.083 0.934 
MAR -0.043 0.022 -0.107 -1.908 0.057** 
EDU 0.026 0.027 0.048 0.951 0.342 
INC -0.030 0.016 -0.101 -1.836 0.067* 
FIL -0.004 0.003 -0.059 -1.173 0.242 
PLACE -0.003 0.010 -0.016 -0.301 0.764 
Model 2: 








PERI 0.012 0.004 0.155 3.169 0.002*** 
GEN 0.016 0.026 0.037 0.629 0.530 
AGE -0.001 0.016 -0.004 -0.062 0.950 
MAR -0.045 0.022 -0.112 -2.005 0.046** 
EDU 0.026 0.027 0.049 0.967 0.334 
INC -0.032 0.017 -0.107 -1.940 0.053** 
FIL -0.004 0.003 -0.056 -1.113 0.267 
PLACE -0.028 0.025 -0.064 -1.104 0.270 
Note: *: p < 10%, **: p < 5%, ***: p < 1%, 
INFD: informal debt, PERI: perceived risk, GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education, 
INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, PLACE: locations. 
Model 1: PLACE is a categorical variable 
Model 2: PLACE is a dummy variable: HCMC and outside HCMC 
 
4.7 Demographics 
The chapter next tests how demographics relate to perceived risk, borrowing sources, and debt 
decisions, with results summarised in Figure 4.8. Education has no association with perceived 
risk, borrowing sources, or debt decisions at a significant level. Instead, financial literacy is 
related to these factors. This is perhaps because education focuses simply on academics 
degrees, while financial literacy is assessed through 16 questions of financial knowledge by 
Balloch et al. (2014) and Van Rooij et al. (2011).  In short, only education has no significant 
association with perceived risk, borrowing sources, or debt decisions. The five demographics 




Firstly, gender positively relates to perceived risk and negatively pertains to financial leverage 
among stockbrokers. This means that female investors have a higher level of risk concerns than 
male investors, and female stockbrokers use a lower level of financial leverage than male 
stockbrokers. This result seems consistent with prior studies in which females are more risk-
averse than males (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2001; Frijns et al., 2008; Grable, 2000; Hallahan et 
al., 2003; Kannadhasan, 2015; Lucarelli & Brighetti, 2011; Tho et al., 2018; Yao et al., 2011). 
Secondly, age is negatively associated with perceived risk but positively connected with 
financial leverage among non-stockbrokers. That is, the older the investors are, the lower the 
level of risk concerns about stock investment, and the higher the financial leverage used. This 
is consistent with previous studies (Frijns et al., 2008; Grable, 2000; Pålsson, 1996; Wang & 
Hanna, 1997).  
Thirdly, marital status has a negative association with the use of informal debt. Marital status 
also has an inverse association with informal debt among users of borrowing sources and 
female investors. This indicates that married investors use a lower level of informal debt than 
single investors. These results are consistent with that of Grable (2000), in which single people 
take more risk than married ones.    
Fourthly, income has an inverse relationship with borrowing sources and informal debt, and a 
positive link with financial leverage. This means that higher-income investors tend to use fewer 
borrowing sources and a lower level of informal debt but use a higher level of financial 
leverage. This also reveals that higher-income investors are less likely to use informal debt but 
more likely to use formal debt. This appears consistent with previous research in which higher-
income investors tend to take more risk (Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2003; Hallahan, Faff, 




Lastly, financial literacy positively relates to perceived risk and financial leverage but is 
negatively related to the use of informal debt among female investors. This means that higher 
financial literacy investors have a higher level of risk concerns about stock investment and use 
a higher level of financial leverage. Female investors with higher scores of financial literacy 
tend to use a lower level of informal debt for stock investment.  Overall, these findings are 
similar to those of prior research in which people with higher financial knowledge, education, 
or literacy are willing to take more risk (Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2004; Kannadhasan, 
2015; Riley Jr & Chow, 1992; Yao et al., 2011).  
Figure 4.8: A summary of demographics  




1. Gender   
Gender -> Perceived risk among investors + SEM3, Table 4.13 
Gender -> Financial leverage among stockbrokers - SEM4 
2. Age   
Age -> Perceived risk among investors - SEM3, Table 4.13 
Age -> Financial leverage among non-stockbrokers + SEM5 
3. Marital status   
Marital status -> Informal debt among investors, non-
stockbrokers, male and female investors, users of informal and 
formal borrowing 
- SEM1, SEM3, SEM5, 
SEM6, SEM7, Table 
4.11, Table 4.13 
4. Income   
Income -> Borrowing sources among investors, female 
investors, non-stockbrokers,  
- SEM1, SEM5, SEM7, 
Table 4.13 
Income -> Financial leverage among investors, female 
investors 
+ SEM1, SEM3, SEM7, 
Table 4.13 
Income -> Informal debt among stockbrokers, female 
investors, users of formal borrowing. 
- SEM4, Table 4.11  
5. Financial literacy   
Financial literacy -> Financial leverage among investors, 
stockbrokers, non-stockbrokers, male investors, female 
investors 
+ SEM1, SEM3, SEM4, 
SEM5, SEM6, SEM7, 
Table 4.13  
Financial literacy -> Perceived risk among investors + SEM3, Table 4.13 






4.8 Conclusions, contributions, implications, limitations and further 
research 
4.8.1 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the extent to which perceived risk directly relates to borrowing 
sources and debt decisions and mediates between borrowing sources and debt decisions. 
Perceived risk is positively associated with borrowing sources and the use of informal debt. 
Leverage risk and opportunity risk also directly relates to borrowing sources. Borrowing 
sources is positively related to perceived risk and debt decisions. Perceived risk is a mediator 
between borrowing sources and informal debt, and borrowing sources acts as a mediator 
between perceived risk and debt decisions. These results are robust after controlling for 
demographics and using additional techniques. 
Perceived risk also has the strongest relationship with informal debt among non-users of formal 
borrowing, followed by male investors, users of formal borrowing, stockbrokers, users of 
informal borrowing, and non-stockbrokers. In addition, perceived risk inversely pertains to the 
use of financial leverage among male investors.  
4.8.2 Contributions and implications 
This chapter provides useful insights into investors’ use of debt in the Vietnam stock market, 
and the vital roles of perceived risk and borrowing sources in this use of debt. This may 
generalise to other stock markets. Additionally, the concept of perceived risk derived from 
consumer behaviour framework provides a better understanding of investors’ behaviour 
towards debt decisions. The assumption by finance theory is that investors are only concerned 
about gains or losses (financial risk) when making an investment decision. Alternatively, this 




risk, social risk, time risk, opportunity risk, choice risk, and leverage risk. Finally, the structural 
equation models employed to detect the inter-relationship between perceived risk, borrowing 
sources, and debt decisions among investors, stockbrokers, non-stockbrokers, male investors, 
female investors, users of borrowing, and non-users of borrowing contribute to the finance 
literature. 
The results of this chapter have two implications. First is the risk concerns between investors 
and consumers. When making a purchase decision, both investors and consumers are 
concerned about financial loss,  personal information leaked by hackers or virus, low esteem 
when making a large loss, and time loss when spending much time for research on information 
related to the purchase but the outcomes being not what they expect. Integrating consumer 
behaviour theory into investor behaviour implies that either consumers or investors have some 
similar risk concerns when making any purchase decisions despite their different preferences 
for the purchase. Apart from the similarity, investors have additional risk concerns about 
missing out on other financial investment opportunities, a wrong choice of stocks for 
investment and stock returns are inadequate to cover their debt. Hence, these risk concerns 
should be taken into account during the investment decision-making process due to the impact 
on choices between informal and formal debt.  
Second is the tendency of high-risk perception associated with the use of informal debt and 
more borrowing sources related to the use of both informal and formal debt for stock 
investment. In general, investors borrow money from parents, friends and/or brokerage firms 
for stock investment having the following implications.  
(i) For borrowers, they should be careful about choices of stocks for investment and monitor 




reducing the risk of breaking private relationships with informal lenders and legal problems 
with formal lenders. An additional recommendation to the borrowers is that although informal 
borrowing is common in Vietnamese culture, borrowers should be aware of using money from 
these sources effectively and respectfully.  
(ii) For lenders, especially informal lenders, they should consider prudently about lending 
money to investors because, in some instances, investors borrow money from many informal 
sources, and as a result, failure in stock investment may have a negative influence on the family 
life of many lenders, even spreading outside the network. To minimise the possible problems, 
informal lenders should improve knowledge of stock investment to advise their borrowers on 
stock investment, rather than giving money to borrowers and leaving them to make all 
investment decisions themselves. Moreover, informal lenders should have good financial plans 
for their family in which money should be divided into many blocks to ensure that lending 
money to investors does not affect their family life. 
4.8.3 Limitations and further research 
This chapter has some limitations. The use of debt may be affected by investors’ payment 
methods. Investors may pay interest to informal lenders, share benefits based on contributed 
capital with informal lenders, or pay no interest. Differences in payment approaches may lead 
to differences in the use of debt. It is also essential to examine the heterogeneity in perceived 
risk, as well as debt decisions between non-payers and payers of interest. An additional possible 
situation is that informal lenders may borrow money from third parties and lend investors this 





Although the findings are robust after controlling for demographic variables and using 
additional techniques, this chapter finds no instrumental variables (IVs) to deal with 
endogenous problems that may be a threat to inferring a causal relationship of perceived risk 
to the use of informal debt.  This chapter also focuses on the relationship between perceived 
risk and debt decisions. Other behavioural factors, for example, risk tolerance or trust in the 
stock market, should be considered because they may impact on debt decisions. Future research 





Chapter 5 Essay Two: Risk Tolerance, Investment 
Horizons and Debt Decisions14 
5.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which risk tolerance directly 
relates to debt decisions and mediates between investment horizons and debt decisions. 
Use of debt is a contributor to the stock market and economic development as a whole 
(Mohieldin & Wright, 2000; Turvey & Kong, 2010; Wu et al., 2016). The literature, however, 
has paid little attention to the use of debt by investors. This chapter will investigate whether 
risk tolerance is strongly related to debt decisions.    
“Debt decisions” was defined in Chapter 3 as the level of debt investors use for stock 
investment. “Financial leverage” is the credit investors obtain through only brokerage firms. 
“Informal debt” is the credit investors obtain through family and non-family sources. A debt 
decision is a risky decision no matter what kind of debt is used, informal or formal, because 
users of debt may face possible insolvency if they do not manage debt well. The importance of 
debt decisions in the stock market was mentioned in Chapter 1. 
“Risk tolerance” is defined by Grable (2000) as “the maximum amount of uncertainty that 
someone is willing to accept when making a financial decision” (p. 625).  Risk tolerance lies 
 
14 The early version of this chapter was presented at the 23rd International Congress on Modeling and Simulation 
(MODSIM2019), Modeling and Simulation Society of Australia and New Zealand Inc., Australia, December 
2019. https://mssanz.org.au/modsim2019/index.html 
The proposal related to this chapter was presented at the 23rd New Zealand Finance Colloquium – NZFC, Lincoln 





at the heart of the financial field because it affects a broad range of personal financial choices 
(Grable & Roszkowski, 2008). The existing literature finds that risk tolerance is associated 
with risky decisions (see, for example, Bailey & Kinerson, 2005; Corter & Chen, 2006; Dorn 
& Huberman, 2005).  
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. The literature review and hypothesis development 
are presented in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 outlines the methodology. Section 5.4 reports the main 
results. Section 5.5 reports the results of the additional analysis. Section 5.6 exhibits the 
robustness check. Section 5.7 presents the demographics discussion. Section 5.8 ends with 
conclusions, contributions, implications, limitations and further research. 
5.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
5.2.1 Risk tolerance in decision-making 
Risk tolerance is defined as the willingness to engage in risky activities (Grable, 2008; Okun, 
1976; Weber et al., 2002).  The risk tolerance of a person is described as his or her perception 
of change and danger (Okun, 1976); or as “a tendency to be attracted or repelled by alternatives 
that he or she perceives as more risky over alternatives perceived as less risky” (Weber & 
Milliman, 1997, p. 128). Risk tolerance is sometimes referred to as “risk preference”  (Grable, 
2008).  
There has been no research on the relationships between risk tolerance, investment horizons 
and debt decisions to the best of the author’s knowledge. This chapter thus examines these 
using the following hypotheses.  





The literature finds a higher level of risk tolerance is associated with a riskier decision. For 
example, risk tolerance causes investors to hold a higher-risk investment portfolio or invest in 
stocks over bonds (Bailey & Kinerson, 2005; Corter & Chen, 2006; Dorn & Huberman, 2005). 
There is a possibility that higher-risk tolerance relates to the use of higher debt for stock 
investment. 
H5.1: The higher the level of risk tolerance, the higher the level of the financial leverage used.  
H5.2: The higher the level of risk tolerance, the higher the level of the informal debt used. 
Previous studies find that higher risk tolerance is associated with higher stock ownership (Cong 
& Hanna, 2007; Sung & Hanna, 1998; Xiao, 1996). Between short term and long term stock 
investment, short term investment (e.g. four months) has lower returns than long term 
investment (e.g., 15 months ) (Gaspar, Massa, & Matos, 2005). Very short term investors, that 
is, day traders, often buy and sell speculative stocks (Barber, Lee, Liu, & Odean, 2014), which 
also has sub-optimal outcomes (Lo, Repin, & Steenbarger, 2005). Risk levels between short-
term and long-term stock investment remain unclear in academic research. This chapter, 
therefore, argues that investing in stocks for the short-term may be riskier than investing in 
stocks for the long-term, and that risk tolerance may be positively associated with the short 
term over long term stock investment. 
H5.3: The higher the level of risk tolerance, the higher the ratio of short-term stock investment 
to long term. 
Recent research, for example, Schooley & Worden (1996) find that investment in risky assets 
is positively associated with risk tolerance. Markiewicz and Weber (2013) also find that day 




argues that a shorter stock investment horizon positively relates to higher risk tolerance and the 
use of higher debt, using the following hypotheses. 
H5.4: The higher the ratio of short-term stock investment to long term, the higher the level of 
informal debt used. 
H5.5:  The higher the ratio of short-term stock investment to long term, the higher the level of 
financial leverage used. 
H5.6: The higher the ratio of short term stock investment to long term, the higher the level of 
risk tolerance. 
Indirect (mediating) relationships 
Previous studies find some behavioural factors as mediators in decision-making. For example, 
perceived uncertainty mediates between extraversion traits and safer investment decisions 
(Trang & Khuong, 2017). The mediating role of perceived uncertainty is used to account for 
why a higher level of extraversion trait leads to a choice of safer investment. Performance risk 
is a mediating variable between perceived quality and value (Sweeney et al., 1999).  Financial 
risk is a mediator between perceived sacrifice and perceived value (Agarwal & Teas, 2001). 
Given this evidence, and also as hypothesised above in that investment horizons may relate to 
risk tolerance, and risk tolerance may pertain to debt decisions, this chapter argues that risk 
tolerance may mediate between investment horizons and debt decisions. 
H5.7: Risk tolerance mediates between investment horizons and informal debt. 






The methodology of this section was covered in Chapter 3. This chapter thus only presents 
measures of risk tolerance, investment horizons, and debt decisions, as shown in Figure 5.1.  
Risk tolerance is measured by the total scores of the 13-questions developed by Grable and 
Lytton (2001) and Grable and Lytton (1999). The 13-questions scale of risk tolerance has been 
widely used and assessed as a highly explanatory instrument for one’s risk tolerance (e.g. 
Gilliam, Chatterjee, & Grable, 2010; Grable & Joo, 2004; Grable & Lytton, 2001; Grable & 
Roszkowski, 2008). 
The term “investment horizons” is defined as the ratio of short-term stock investment to long 
term (less than one year divided by one year or more). This is consistent with prior research 
(e.g. Bebchuk & Stole, 1993; Levhari & Levy, 1977; Vives, 1995).  
Figure 5.1: Measures of risk tolerance, investment horizons, and debt decisions 
Risk tolerance Investment horizons Debt decisions 
RITO = ∑ 𝑹𝑰𝑻𝑶𝒕𝒋=𝟏 j 
 




RITO : Risk tolerance  
RITOm: Risk tolerance  
RITOj : the score of question jth 
RITOmi: low, moderate or high 
scores of risk tolerance of ith 
investors 
j =1, t=13, i: ith investors, n=420. 
SHORT = ∑ (SHORT)ni i 
LONG = ∑ (LONG)ni i 
 





SHORT: Short-term stock 
investment (less than one year) 
LONG: Long-term stock 
investment (one year or more) 
SHOLO:  the ratio of short-term 
stock investment to long term 
(known as investment horizons) 
i: ith investors, n=420. 













LEVE: Financial leverage 
INFD: Informal debt 
FD: Formal debt 
FDINFD: total debt 






5.4 Main results 
5.4.1 Investor characteristics and investment horizons 
The investor characteristics were introduced in Chapter 3. This chapter thus only presents 
investment horizons. Stock investment is divided into 60% for the short term (less than one 
year) and 40% for the long term (one year or more), on average (Mean), as revealed in Table 
5.1. Around 3% of investors do not invest in stocks for the short term, and about 18% of them 
do not invest in stocks for the long term. This means that 97% of investors invest in stocks for 
the short term, and 82% of investors invest in stocks for the long term.  
Table 5.1: A summary of investment horizons 
This table shows that stock investment is divided into 60% for the short term (less than 1 year) and 40% for the 
long term (1 year or more), on average. Stock investment is divided into short term higher than long term.  
% of the stock investment for Short term (less than one year) Long term (one year or more) 
Frequency % Frequency % 
 0% 14 3 79 18 
Between over 0% and under 50% 113 27 167 40 
50% 53 13 53 13 
Between over 50% and under 100% 167 40 113 27 
100% 73 17 8 2 
Mean  0.6 0.4 
N 420 100% 420 100% 
 
5.4.2 Levels of risk tolerance  
The levels of risk tolerance are shown in Table 5.2 among non-users and users of debt, non-
stockbrokers and stockbrokers, male and female investors, and all investors. Overall, the level 
of risk tolerance of users of debt is higher than that of non-users of debt. It is noted that on 




of debt are used. This table also shows that non-stockbrokers and male investors have slightly 
higher scores of risk tolerance than stockbrokers and female investors, respectively.  
For the data of the 420 investors, the result indicates that among investors, 49% of investors 
are classified as having a low risk tolerance, 8% as having a moderate risk tolerance, and 43% 
as having a high risk tolerance. These figures are not much different from the result of prior 
research. For example, Grable & Lytton (2001) finds that 27% of students and staff have a low 
risk tolerance, 60% have a moderate risk tolerance, and 13% have a high risk tolerance. As a 
result, investors may be higher risk tolerant than university students and staff. 
Table 5.2: A summary of investors’ risk tolerance 
This table shows that users of debt, non-stockbrokers, and male investors have a higher level of risk tolerance 
than non-users of debt, stockbrokers, and female investors, respectively. Moreover, 49% of investors are classified 

















 Freq. % 
Mean 28.55 29.58 29.47 29.28 29.41 29.39 29.40   
Median 28.00 30.00 30 30 30 29 30.00   
Minimum 18.00 15.00 15 15 15 15 15.00   
Maximum 41.00 44.00 44 42 44 41 44.00   
Std. dev. 5.12 4.52 4.83 4.36 4.8 4.39 4.64   
Low        206 49 
Moderate        33 8 
High        181 43 
N 74 346 250 170 258 162  420 100% 





5.4.3 Test of reliability of the risk tolerance scale and correlations  
The reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) of 13 items of risk tolerance is 0.618, as shown 
in Table 5.3. This result indicates an acceptable internal consistency and allows this scale to be 
used as a variable in a model. 
Table 5.3: Results of the reliability of the 13-item risk tolerance 
This table shows that the reliability of the 13-item scale of risk tolerance measured by Cronbach’s alpha is 0.618. 
This means that the 13-item scale of risk tolerance has sufficient reliability to be used as an independent variable 
in a model. 














RITO: risk tolerance     0.618 
RITO1 26.7500 19.248 0.268 0.582  
RITO2 26.6548 17.845 0.319 0.569  
RITO3 26.7238 19.336 0.196 0.594  
RITO4 26.8762 19.407 0.204 0.593  
RITO5 27.1143 19.681 0.248 0.586  
RITO6 27.3024 18.799 0.267 0.581  
RITO7 27.3524 18.873 0.249 0.584  
RITO8 27.1286 18.198 0.306 0.573  
RITO9 27.6929 18.385 0.273 0.580  
RITO10 26.9167 19.623 0.147 0.604  
RITO11 26.8857 18.889 0.176 0.602  
RITO12 28.0524 19.754 0.358 0.578  
RITO13 27.3214 18.414 0.310 0.572  
Mean: 29.39; Variance: 21.5; Standard deviation: 4.64; No of item: 13 
The correlations between factors are shown in Table 5.4. As guided by Hair et al. (2014), a 
high correlation “as indicative of a poor correlation matrix” occurs if the variables had a partial 
correlation value above 0.7 (p.102). This chapter finds that most variables have inter-
correlations at a significant level (p<0.05) and have correlation coefficients lower than 0.7. 
Risk tolerance is positively correlated with financial leverage at 0.16 (p<0.01), and investment 




Table 5.4: The correlations between risk tolerance, investment horizons, and debt decisions 
This table shows that most variables have inter-correlations at a significant level (p<0.05), and most pairs of variables have correlation coefficients lower than 0.7, except 
risk tolerance (between RITO and RITOm) and debt decisions (between INFD and FDINFD). Risk tolerance has two measures (RITO and RITOm), and debt decisions 
include informal debt (INFD) and total debt (FDINFD). This may explain why these pairs have high inter-correlations. Risk tolerance is positively correlated with financial 
leverage at 0.16 (p<0.01), statistically meaning that risk tolerance increases as the use of financial leverage increases, and vice versa. Investment horizons are positively 
correlated with informal debt at 0.096 (p<0.05), showing that stock investment for the short term over long term goes up as the use of informal debt goes up, and vice versa.  
  RITO 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.RITO 1.000                         
2.RITOm .786** 1.000                       
3.SHOLO 0.066 0.075 1.000                     
4.LONG 0.018 0.033 -0.384** 1.000                   
5.GEN 0.003 -0.027 -0.025 0.036 1.000                 
6.AGE 0.041 0.002 0.012 0.062 -0.197** 1.000               
7.MAR 0.032 -0.009 -0.005 0.054 -0.055 0.496** 1.000             
8.EDU 0.117* 0.136** 0.114* -0.046 -0.105* 0.077 0.141** 1.000           
9.INC 0.142** 0.144** 0.001 0.059 -0.209** 0.374** 0.276** 0.288** 1.000         
10.FIL 0.136** 0.113* 0.057 -0.089 -0.108* -0.031 -0.034 0.232** 0.126** 1.000       
11.INFD -0.018 0.041 0.096* 0.037 0.049 -0.112* -0.140** -0.012 -0.096* -0.055 1.000     
12.LEVE 0.160** 0.086 0.021 -0.038 -0.081 0.065 0.048 0.017 0.125* 0.174** -0.071 1.000   
13.FDINFD 0.063 0.110* 0.106* 0.030 -0.002 -0.030 -0.055 -0.009 0.055 0.010 0.618** 0.287** 1.000 
 N 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
RITO (RITOm): risk tolerance, SHOLO: investment horizons, LONG: long term stock investment. GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education, 






5.4.4 Main results and discussion 
Two main structural equation models (SEMs) are developed to examine the direct and indirect 
relationship between risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions. SEM1 examines 
the direct effect of risk tolerance on investment horizons and debt decisions. SEM2 investigates 
risk tolerance as a mediator between stock investment horizons and debt decisions.  
Both these SEM models include six demographics acting as control variables; gender, age, 
marital status, education, income, and financial literacy; with the aim of examining whether 
these control variables dampen the relationships between risk tolerance, investment horizons, 
and debt decisions. The link of these control variables to risk tolerance, investment horizons, 
and debt decisions is presented in Section 5.7.  
The results of SEM1 are presented in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.5. Risk tolerance is significantly 
related to the use of financial leverage at 0.12 (p<0.05), supporting H5.1 but is insignificantly 
associated with the use of informal debt and investment horizons, which does not support H5.2 
and H5.3.  However, the results of SEM3 below show a significantly positive relationship of 
risk tolerance to the use of informal debt and investment horizons among stockbrokers, which 
partly supports H5.2 and H5.3.  
Statistically, when risk tolerance increases by one standard deviation, the use of financial 
leverage increases by 0.12 (p<0.05). This result is consistent with prior scholars (see, for 
example, Bailey & Kinerson, 2005; Corter & Chen, 2006; Dorn & Huberman, 2005). This 
means that risk tolerance can explain the use of financial leverage for stock investment in which 
higher risk tolerance leads to the use of higher financial leverage. The reasons why investors 
use financial leverage were presented in Section 3.6. As defined by Grable (2000), risk 




to accept higher debt to achieve higher returns. They tend to invest a large amount of money 
in stocks, and consequently, they would borrow money from formal lenders rather than 
informal lenders because only formal lenders, i.e. brokerage firms can financially meet this 
borrowing.    
Investment horizons are associated with the use of informal debt at 0.1 (p<0.05), supporting 
H5.4, but are not related to the use of financial leverage at a significant level (p<0.1), which 
does not support H5.5. Investment horizons only explain the use of informal debt in which the 
higher the level of short term over long term stock investment, the higher the level of informal 
debt being used. This result adds to the literature alongside previous studies (e.g. Jordan & 
Diltz, 2003; Jordan & Diltz, 2004). In general, compared to long-term stock investment (1 year 
or more stock holdings), short-term stock investment (less-than-1-year stock holdings) is 
positively associated with the use of informal debt. That is, short-term investors are more likely 
to borrow money from parents and friends for stock investment. An outcome of this is that 
short-term investors prefer buying stocks and then selling them quickly, and as a consequence, 
informal borrowing is the best choice because it helps borrowers avoid wasting time on account 
of complex procedures and regulations with formal borrowing, and importantly then being able 




Figure 5.2: Risk tolerance, investment horizons, and debt decisions (SEM1) 
This figure shows a direct relationship of investment horizons to the use of informal debt at 0.096 (p<0.05) and 
risk tolerance to the use of financial leverage at 0.12 (p<0.05).  
 
Model fit: Chi-square: 8.292, df: 10, GFI: 0.996, TLI: 1.025, CFI: 1.000, RMSEA: 0.000.  
RITO: risk tolerance, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: 
financial literacy, SHOLO: investment horizons, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
 
Table 5.5: Risk tolerance, short-term stock investment, and debt decisions (SEM1) 
This table shows a direct association of investment horizons with the use of informal debt at 0.096 (p<0.05) and 






S.E. C.R. P Hypotheses 
SHOLO <--- RITO 0.025 0.061 0.020 1.239 0.215 H5.3 
SHOLO <--- GEN -0.061 -0.016 0.197 -0.312 0.755  
SHOLO <--- EDU 0.543 0.114 0.248 2.193 0.028**  
SHOLO <--- AGE 0.070 0.029 0.141 0.496 0.620  
SHOLO <--- MAR -0.082 -0.023 0.202 -0.404 0.686  
SHOLO <--- INC -0.132 -0.053 0.140 -0.948 0.343  
SHOLO <--- FIL 0.018 0.030 0.030 0.587 0.557  
LEVE <--- INC 0.070 0.090 0.038 1.866 0.062*  
INFD <--- MAR -0.055 -0.140 0.019 -2.900 0.004***  
LEVE <--- FIL 0.028 0.151 0.009 3.128 0.002***  
INFD <--- SHOLO 0.011 0.096 0.005 1.990 0.047** H5.4 
INFD <--- RITO 0.000 -0.010 0.002 -0.204 0.838 H5.2 
LEVE <--- RITO 0.015 0.116 0.006 2.397 0.017** H5.1 
LEVE <--- SHOLO 0.001 0.004 0.015 0.084 0.933 H5.5 
Note: *: p<10%, **: p<5%, ***: p<1% 
RITO: risk tolerance, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: 




The findings of SEM2 are shown in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.6. Like SEM1, SEM2 also finds a 
positive association of risk tolerance with financial leverage at 0.12 (p<0.05) (H5.1) and 
investment horizons with informal debt at 0.1 (p<0.05) (H5.4), which supports H5.1 and H5.4, 
as already discussed in SEM1.  
The results of SEM2 do not support H5.6, H5.5, and H5.2 because it finds an insignificant 
relationship of investment horizons to risk tolerance (H5.6) and to financial leverage (H5.5), 
and risk tolerance to informal debt (H5.2). However, the results of SEM3 find a significantly 
positive association between investment horizons and risk tolerance, and between risk 
tolerance and informal debt among stockbrokers, which partly supports H5.6 and H5.2. 
Overall, it is only H5.5 that the findings from SEMs do not support; that is, there is no support 
found for the hypothesis that there is a relationship between investment horizons and financial 
leverage.   
The results of SEM2 also find no significant mediating role of risk tolerance in the relationship 
between investment horizons and debt decisions, which does not support H5.7 and H5.8. 
However, the results of SEM7 uncover risk tolerance as a mediator between investment 




Figure 5.3: Investment horizons, risk tolerance and debt decisions (SEM2) 
This figure shows the direct relationship of investment horizons to the use of informal debt at 0.1 (p<0.05) and 
risk tolerance to financial leverage at 0.12 (p<0.05). SEM2 finds no mediating role of risk tolerance in the 
association between investment horizons and informal debt at a significant level (p<0.1). 
 
Model fit: Chi-square: 8.596, df: 10, GFI: 0.996, TLI: 1.020, CFI: 1.000, RMSEA: 0.000.  
SHOLO: investment horizons, RITO: risk tolerance, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital 






Table 5.6: Investment horizons, risk tolerance, and debt decisions (SEM2) 
This table shows a direct impact of both short term and long-term stock investment on the use of informal debt at 
0.13 and 0.1 (p<0.05), respectively. Remarkably, short term stock investment has a stronger impact on the use of 






S.E. C.R. P Hypotheses 
RITO <--- AGE 0.001 0.007 0.012 0.116 0.908  
RITO <--- GEN 0.015 0.045 0.017 0.918 0.358  
RITO <--- SHOLO 0.004 0.052 0.004 1.078 0.281 H5.6 
RITO <--- FIL 0.037 0.125 0.014 2.541 0.011**  
RITO <--- INC 0.026 0.122 0.012 2.244 0.025  
RITO <--- EDU 0.022 0.054 0.021 1.041 0.298  
RITO <--- MAR -0.001 -0.003 0.017 -0.053 0.958  
LEVE <--- FIL 0.158 0.150 0.051 3.118 0.002***  
LEVE <--- RITO 0.447 0.124 0.175 2.559 0.011** H5.1 
LEVE <--- SHOLO 0.000 0.001 0.015 0.027 0.979 H5.5 
LEVE <--- INC 0.073 0.093 0.037 1.937 0.053*  
INFD <--- MAR -0.055 -0.139 0.019 -2.895 0.004***  
INFD <--- SHOLO 0.011 0.097 0.005 2.004 0.045** H5.4 
INFD <--- RITO -0.026 -0.020 0.063 -0.413 0.680 H5.2 
Indirect relationships       
SHOLO->RITO->INFD 0.000 -0.001    H5.7 
SHOLO->RITO->LEVE 0.002 0.006    H5.8 
Note: *: p≤10%, **: p<5%, ***: p<1%. SHOLO: investment horizons, RITO: risk tolerance, GEN: gender, AGE: 
age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: 
financial leverage. 
 
In summary, this chapter mainly finds risk-tolerant investors tend to prefer formal debt. 
However, investors who prefer investing short-term to long-term stock investment and 
stockbrokers are more likely to use informal debt. This reconfirms that not only formal but 
informal finance sector is also central to investors’ borrowing source. 
 




5.5 Results of additional analysis 
5.5.1 Sub-groups 
The differences in the relationship between risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt 
decisions are possibly different between subgroups, including stockbrokers and non-
stockbrokers, male and female investors, and users and non-users of borrowing sources.  
Eight models are developed to examine this relationship. SEM3 will investigate this 
relationship among stockbrokers, while SEM4 will test this relationship among non-
stockbrokers. Male and female investors will be presented in SEM5 and SEM6, respectively. 
Users and non-users of borrowing sources will be tested in four models using multiple 
regression techniques due to the small sample. This analysis investigates what sub-groups have 
a stronger effect of risk tolerance and investment horizons in debt decisions. 
The first subgroup is between stockbrokers (N=170) and non-stockbrokers (N=250).15 The 
results are presented in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.7. There is a difference in the relationship 
between risk tolerance, investment horizons, and debt decisions between stockbrokers and non-
stockbrokers. Namely, the risk tolerance of stockbrokers relates to investment horizons at 0.14 
(p<0.1) and informal debt at 0.14 (p<0.1) in SEM3, while the risk tolerance of non-
stockbrokers is associated with financial leverage at 0.16 (p<0.05) in SEM4. Investment 
horizons also pertain to informal debt at 0.17 (p<0.01) among non-stockbrokers in SEM4.  
Only the results of SEM4 are consistent with SEM1. SEM3 presents new findings regarding 
the significant relationship of risk tolerance to investment horizons and informal debt among 
 
15  Non-stockbrokers (N=251) include, in descending order, other jobs  (25.1%), banking officers (17.9%), 
sales/marketing managers (14.7%), administrators (12%), investment officers (9.6%), business owners (4.8%), 
accountants (3.9%), teachers/lecturers (3.2%), financial advisors (3.2%), find managers (2.8%), brokerage 




stockbrokers. As presented above, levels of risk tolerance of non-stockbrokers are higher than 
those of stockbrokers, on average. This may explain why risk-tolerant non-stockbrokers tend 





Figure 5.4: Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions between stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers 
The results of SEM3 differ from those of SEM4. The risk tolerance of stockbrokers relates to investment horizons at 0.14 (p<0.1) and informal debt at 0.14 (p<0.1) in SEM3, 
while the risk tolerance of non-stockbrokers is associated with financial leverage at 0.16 (p<0.05) in SEM4. Investment horizons also pertain to informal debt at 0.17 (p<0.01) 
among non-stockbrokers in SEM4. 
Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions among 
stockbrokers (SEM3) (N=170) 
 
Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions among non-
stockbrokers (SEM4) (N=250) 
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 8.352, Df: 9, GFI: 0.990, TLI: 1.028, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.000. 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 6.545, Df: 9, GFI: 0.965, TLI: 1.060, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.031. 
RITO: risk tolerance, SHOLO: stock investment horizons, GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: 





Table 5.7: Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions between stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers 
The results of SEM3 differ from those of SEM4. The risk tolerance of stockbrokers relates to investment horizons at 0.14 (p<0.1) and informal debt at 0.14 (p<0.1) in SEM3, 
while the risk tolerance of non-stockbrokers is associated with financial leverage at 0.16 (p<0.05) in SEM4. Investment horizons also pertain to informal debt at 0.17 (p<0.01) 
among non-stockbrokers in SEM4. 
  Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions among 
stockbrokers (SEM3) (N=170) 
 
Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions among non-
non-stockbrokers (SEM4) (N=250) 
 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001, RITO: risk tolerance, SHOLO: stock investment horizons, GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education, INC: income, 




The second subgroup is between male (N= 258) and female investors (N=162). The results of 
SEM5 focusing on male investors, and SEM6 focusing on female investors, are shown in 
Figure 5.5 and Table 5.8. SEM5 shows an association of risk tolerance with financial leverage 
at 0.18 (p<0.01), and investment horizons with informal debt at 0.15 (p<0.05), while SEM6 
does not.  
The results, in general, show that male investors’ risk tolerance and investment horizons can 
explain their debt decisions, which is consistent with SEM1. In contrast, female investors’ risk 
tolerance or investment horizons do not relate to their debt decisions. Female investors’ 
demographics which do partly account for their debt decisions are income, marital status, and 
financial literacy, which are presented in Section 5.7. 
The last subgroup is between users and non-users of borrowing sources, for which the data 
subsets are users (N=328) and non-users of informal borrowing sources (N=92), and users 
(N=78) and non-users of formal borrowing sources (N=342). Since the number of non-users of 
borrowing is less than 100, in order to ensure that a model can fit with such a small sample, 
this chapter applies multiple regression to test the relationship between risk tolerance, 
investment horizons, and debt decisions among this subgroup. 
The results of the relationship of risk tolerance and investment horizons to debt decisions 
between users and non-users of borrowing sources are presented in Table 5.9. Only the risk 
tolerance of users of formal borrowing sources has a significant link to financial leverage, at 
0.09 (p<0.1).  Also, only the investment horizons of users of borrowing sources are associated 
with informal debt, at 0.13 (p<0.01). In short, risk tolerance or investment horizons can explain 




Figure 5.5: Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions between male and female investors 
This figure shows that only SEM5 finds an association of risk tolerance with financial leverage at 0.18 (p<0.01), and investment horizons with informal debt at 0.15 (p<0.05), 
while SEM6 does not. This means that only male investors’ risk tolerance and investment horizons can explain their debt decisions. 
Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions among male 
investors (SEM5) (N=258) 
 
Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions among female 
investors (SEM6) (N=162) 
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 3.346, Df: 7, GFI: 0.997, TLI: 1.121, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.000. 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 4.228, Df: 7, GFI: 0.994, TLI: 1.114, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.000. 
RITO: risk tolerance, SHOLO: stock investment horizons, GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: 





Table 5.8: Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions between male and female investors 
This table presents that only SEM5 finds an association of risk tolerance with financial leverage at 0.18 (p<0.01), and investment horizons with informal debt at 0.15 (p<0.05), 
while SEM6 does not. This means that only male investors’ risk tolerance and investment horizons can explain their debt decisions. 
 
  Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions among 
male investors (SEM5) (N=258) 
 
Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions among female 
investors (SEM6) (N=162) 
 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001, RITO: risk tolerance, SHOLO: stock investment horizons, GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education, INC: income, 




Table 5.9: Risk tolerance, investment horizons, and informal debt between users and non-
users of borrowing sources 
Only the risk tolerance of users of formal borrowing has a significant link to financial leverage at 0.09 (p<0.1).  
Also, only investment horizons of users of borrowing are associated with informal debt at 0.13 (p<0.01). In short, 
only debtors’ risk tolerance or investment horizons can explain their debt decisions. Note: unstandardised 
coefficients in the parentheses.  
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Adj. R2 -0.078 0.033 0.003 0.074 -0.085 0.045 -0.039 0.099 
F,df 0.18,8 2.39**,8 1.03,8 4.26***,8 0.246,8 2.8***,9 0.64,8 5.7***,8 
N 92 328 92 328 78 342 78 342 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. IVs: independent variables, DV: dependent variables 
RITO: risk tolerance, SHOLO: short-term stock investment, GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, 
EDU: education, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
 
In summary, risk tolerance has the strongest relationship to the use of financial leverage among 
non-users of informal borrowing sources, followed by male investors, non-stockbrokers, and 
users of formal borrowing sources. In addition, risk tolerance also positively relates to the use 
of informal debt among stockbrokers, which was above-mentioned (Section 5.4.4). 
5.5.2 Mediating role of risk tolerance  
This thesis develops the seventh SEM model, SEM7, to examine the mediating role of risk 
tolerance. As presented above, SEM2 finds no significantly mediating role of risk tolerance in 




SEM3 uncovers a significant relationship of investment horizons to risk tolerance, and risk 
tolerance to informal debt among stockbrokers. SEM7, therefore, will find risk tolerance is a 
mediator between investment horizons and debt decisions among stockbrokers (N=170).  
The results of SEM7 are presented in Figure 5.6 and Table 5.10. Investment horizons are related 
to risk tolerance at 0.14 (p<0.1), and risk tolerance to informal debt at 0.14 (p<0.1). Risk 
tolerance mediates between investment horizons and informal debt at 0.021 (p<0.1). 
Importantly, investment horizons are not significantly related to informal debt. Due to risk 
tolerance, this relationship is significant among stockbrokers. In summary, this chapter finds 
risk tolerance is not a mediator between investment horizons and debt decisions among 
investors but does mediate for this relationship among stockbrokers. 
Figure 5.6: Investment horizons, risk tolerance and debt decisions among stockbrokers 
(N=170) (SEM7)  
This figure shows an association of investment horizons with risk tolerance at 0.15 (p<0.1) and risk tolerance 
with informal debt at 0.14 (p<0.1). Risk tolerance is a mediator between investment horizons and informal debt 
at 0.021 (p<0.1). 
 
Model fit: Chi-square: 7.936, df: 8, GFI: 0.991, TLI: 1.003, CFI: 1.000, RMSEA: 0.000.  
SHOLO: investment horizons, RITO: risk tolerance, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital 




Table 5.10: Investment horizons, risk tolerance and debt decisions among stockbrokers 
(N=170) (SEM7) 
This table shows an association of investment horizons with risk tolerance at 0.15 (p<0.1) and risk tolerance with 
informal debt at 0.14 (p<0.1). Risk tolerance is a mediator between investment horizons and informal debt at 
0.021 (p<0.1). 






S.E. C.R. P 
I. Direct relationships      
RITO <--- SHOLO 0.013 0.148 0.007 1.937 0.053* 
RITO <--- EDU -0.002 -0.004 0.035 -0.048 0.961 
RITO <--- AGE 0.001 0.003 0.019 0.030 0.976 
RITO <--- GEN -0.008 -0.029 0.020 -0.385 0.700 
RITO <--- MAR 0.007 0.030 0.022 0.341 0.733 
RITO <--- INC 0.040 0.215 0.015 2.644 0.008*** 
RITO <--- FIL -0.025 -0.088 0.021 -1.175 0.240 
LEVE <--- INC 0.223 0.301 0.055 4.033 0.000*** 
LEVE <--- FIL 0.172 0.150 0.082 2.095 0.036** 
INFD <--- RITO 0.212 0.144 0.112 1.900 0.057* 
LEVE <--- RITO 0.043 0.011 0.294 0.148 0.882 
LEVE <--- SHOLO 0.000 -0.001 0.026 -0.018 0.986 
LEVE <--- EDU -0.268 -0.148 0.133 -2.022 0.043** 
INFD <--- SHOLO -0.011 -0.083 0.010 -1.087 0.277 
LEVE <--- GEN -0.192 -0.181 0.076 -2.519 0.012*** 
INFD <--- MAR -0.063 -0.172 0.028 -2.275 0.023*** 
II. Indirect relationships      
SHOLO->RITO->INFD 0.003 0.021   * 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. IVs: independent variables, DV: dependent variables 
RITO: risk tolerance, SHOLO: investment, horizons, GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: 
education, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
 
5.5.3 Facets of risk tolerance 
Grable and Lytton (1999) and Grable and Lytton (2001) perform a principal components 
analysis16 on their data and find 3 components of risk tolerance. The first factor is “investment 
risk tolerance”, which is examined through questions 4, 5, 8, 11, and 12.  The second factor is 
“financial risk tolerance”, which is examined through questions 21, 3, 6, 7, and 13. The last 
 
16 “Factor analysis” provides the structure of the intercorrelations among variables by defining sets of variables 
that are highly correlated, which is known as “factors” (Hair et al., 2014). The term “factor loadings” indicate the 
correlation between each variable and the factor, and a higher factor loading indicates higher representativeness 
of the factor (Hair et al., 2014). The minimal factor loading is from ±0.3 through ±0.4, reaching 1 as the highest 




factor is “speculative risk tolerance” comprising questions 2, 9, and 10. The 13 questions of 
risk tolerance are attached at the end of this chapter.  
This chapter also undertook the principal components analysis. As shown in Table 5.11 and 
5.12, risk tolerance has 5 components, the eigenvalues of which are greater than 1 and explain 
approximately 53% of the total variance, in comparison with the 3 components found by Grable 
and Lytton (1999) and Grable and Lytton (2001). This difference may be due to the differences 
between respondents (i.e., students versus investors in this chapter). 
Table 5.11: Results of the total variance explained by the components of risk tolerance  




Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 












1 2.395 18.421 18.421 2.395 18.421 18.421 1.591 12.239 12.239 
2 1.351 10.394 28.815 1.351 10.394 28.815 1.561 12.005 24.244 
3 1.093 8.406 37.22 1.093 8.406 37.22 1.436 11.048 35.292 
4 1.05 8.078 45.299 1.05 8.078 45.299 1.175 9.037 44.329 
5 1.011 7.779 53.077 1.011 7.779 53.077 1.137 8.749 53.077 
6 0.939 7.225 60.302       
7 0.889 6.842 67.144       
8 0.799 6.145 73.289       
9 0.793 6.099 79.388       
10 0.768 5.91 85.298       
11 0.666 5.124 90.422       
12 0.66 5.075 95.497       
13 0.585 4.503 100       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. KMO and Bartlett’s Test: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 





The results of Table 5.12 also show that some variables’ communalities are lower than 0.5, and 
the Cronbach’s alpha of the 5 factors are each below 0.6, indicating that these 5 factors are not 
individually strong enough to be used as distinct measures, which is consistent with the finding 
of Grable and Lytton (1999), in which the Cronbach’s alpha of factors 2 and 3 are below 0.6.  
Table 5.12: Five components of risk tolerance 
This table shows that most loadings of each factor are highly correlated with each factor. For example, RITO09 
has the loading of 0.774, indicating that the degree of correspondence between RITO09 and factor 1 is 77.4%.  






1 2 3 4 5  
RITO9 
0.494 
0.774     0.640 
RITO12 0.693     0.557 
RITO3 
0.478 
 0.742    0.625 
RITO2  0.560    0.454 
RITO7  0.483    0.407 
RITO13  0.429    0.425 
RITO6  0.385    0.257 
RITO5 
0.425 
  0.747   0.593 
RITO4   0.739   0.559 
RITO11 
0.254 
   0.824  0.708 
RITO8    0.517  0.480 
RITO10 
0.229 
    0.825 0.693 
RITO1     0.464 0.503 
RITO: risk tolerance, i: the question ith of risk tolerance  
Cronbach’s alpha of risk tolerance including 13 variables: 0.618  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
 
 
17 Communality is defined as the total amount of variance an original variable shares with all other variables 




It is also important to note that the five factors of risk tolerance by this chapter are sub-
categories of the original three factors developed by Grable and Lytton (1999) and Grable and 
Lytton (2001). Namely, as revealed in Table 5.13, investment risk tolerance is divided into two 
sub-groups; risk as a level of comfort,18 and risk as a level of preferences; while in Grable and 
Lytton’s studies, the two are grouped as one. Speculative risk tolerance also has two types; risk 
for the choice between sure gain, and risk for the choice between sure loss; instead of the two 
types being gathered into one as in the Grable and Lytton studies. In terms of financial risk 
tolerance, both this chapter and Grable and Lytton’s studies have a similar result. Only question 
1 in Grable and Lytton’s studies is replaced by question 2 in this chapter.   
Risk tolerance, in short, has five facets instead of the three facets found by Grable and Lytton. 
These are investment risk as a level of comfort, investment risk as a level of preference, 
financial risk, speculative risk as a choice for a sure gain, and speculative risk as a choice for a 
sure loss. 
Table 5.13: Facets of risk tolerance between this chapter and Grable and Lytton’s studies 
This table shows that compared with Grable and Lytton’s studies, investment risk tolerance has two sub-groups; 
risk as a level of comfort, and risk as a level of preferences. Speculative risk tolerance also has two types; risk for 
the choice between sure gain, and risk for the choice between sure loss. In terms of financial risk tolerance, both 
this study and Grable and Lytton’s studies have a similar result, with the exception that question 1 in Grable and 
Lytton’s studies is replaced by question 2 in this chapter. 
  Facets (Grable & Lytton, 1999, 2001) This chapter 
1/ Investment risk 
tolerance 
RITO4, RITO5, RITO8, RITO11 and 
RITO12 
 
In terms of comfort  RITO4 and RITO5 
In terms of preferences  RITO8 and RITO11 
2/ Financial risk 
tolerance 
RITO1, RITO3, RITO6, RITO7 and 
RITO13 
RITO2, RITO3, RITO6, RITO7 
and RITO13 
3/ Speculative risk 
tolerance 
RITO2, RITO9 and RITO10  
In terms of gains  RITO9 and RITO12 
In terms of losses  RITO1 and RITO10 
RITOi: the ith question of risk tolerance. 
 
18 Grable and Lytton (1999) classified the questions of risk tolerance into eight groups, for example, the question 
of “how comfortable investors are investing in shares” termed “risk as a level of comfort” (Grable & Lytton, 1999, 




5.6 Robustness check 
This chapter applies additional techniques to ensure the robustness of the results by SEMs. The 
robustness check has six sections. First, risk tolerance and debt decisions have additional 
measures. Second, multiple and stepwise regression testing is performed on direct 
relationships. Third, Hayes and Preacher’s approach examines indirect relationships. Fourth, 
the t-test and the propensity matching score examines the key result of this chapter, which is a 
causal relationship of risk tolerance to debt decisions. Fifth, the instrumental variable approach 
detects a causal relationship of risk tolerance to debt decisions. Lastly, the solutions reduce the 
locations selection and responses biases.  
5.6.1 Robustness check using additional measures 
The eighth SEM model, SEM8, is developed to examine the relationship of risk tolerance to 
investment horizons and debt decisions. Risk tolerance is classified as low, moderate and high 
compared with Median as suggested by Grable and Lytton (1999). Debt decisions are measured 
by the sum of informal and formal debt. This analysis aims to prove the robustness of results 
using an alternative measure for risk tolerance and debt decisions  
The results of SEM8 are presented in Figure 5.7 and Table 5.14. There is a positive link of risk 
tolerance and investment horizons to debt decisions at 0.1 (p<0.05). These results are 




Figure 5.7: Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions (SEM8) 
This figure shows an association of risk tolerance and investment horizons to debt decisions at 0.1 (p<0.05). These 
results are consistent with those from SEM1 and SEM2.  
 
Model fit: Chi-square: 3.794, df: 5, GFI: 0.998, TLI: 1.030, CFI: 1.000, RMSEA: 0.000.  
SHOLO: investment horizons, RITOm: risk tolerance, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital 
status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, FDINFD: debt decisions. 
Table 5.14: Risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions (SEM3) 
This table shows an association of risk tolerance and investment horizons to debt decisions at 0.1 (p<0.05). These 






S.E. C.R. P 
SHOLO <--- AGE 0.080 0.033 0.141 0.566 0.571 
SHOLO <--- GEN -0.055 -0.014 0.196 -0.279 0.780 
SHOLO <--- RITOm 0.127 0.063 0.099 1.282 0.200 
SHOLO <--- FIL 0.173 0.051 0.170 1.020 0.308 
SHOLO <--- INC -0.139 -0.055 0.140 -0.992 0.321 
SHOLO <--- MAR -0.067 -0.019 0.202 -0.333 0.739 
SHOLO <--- EDU 0.517 0.109 0.247 2.088 0.037** 
FDINFD <--- SHOLO 0.013 0.100 0.007 2.053 0.040** 
FDINFD <--- RITOm 0.028 0.104 0.013 2.142 0.032** 
FDINFD <--- FIL -0.007 -0.016 0.022 -0.333 0.739 
Note: *: p<10%, **: p<5%, ***: p<1% 
SHOLO: investment horizons, RITOm: risk tolerance, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital 





5.6.2 Robustness check using multiple and stepwise regressions 
Table 5.15 shows six models from 1 through 3 with multiple regression, and models from 1’ 
through 3’ with stepwise regression. Both Models 1 and 1’ show an association of investment 
horizons with informal debt at 0.099 (p<0.05) and 0.095 (p<0.05), respectively. Models 2 and 
2’ find a relationship of risk tolerance to financial leverage at 0.129 (p<0.05) and 0.124 
(p<0.05), respectively. Models 3 and 3’ present a significant link of risk tolerance and 
investment horizons to debt decisions. These findings are consistent with those by SEM1, 
SEM2 and SEM8.  
Table 5.15: Robustness check on the direct relationships  
Both Models 1 and 1’ show an association of investment horizons with informal debt at 0.099 (p<0.05) and 0.095 
(p<0.05), respectively. Models 2 and 2’ find a relationship of risk tolerance to financial leverage at 0.129 (p<0.05) 
and 0.124 (p<0.05), respectively. Models 3 and 3’ present a significant link of risk tolerance and investment 
horizons to debt decisions. Note: Unstandardised coefficients are in parenthesis. 
 IVs DV: INFD DV: LEVE DV: FDINFD 





















































































N 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Note: *: p<10%, **: p<5%, ***: p<1%, IVs: independent variables, DV: dependent variable, Models 1-3: multiple 
regression. Models 1’-3’: stepwise regression. RITO: risk tolerance, SHOLO: investment horizons, GEN: gender, 
AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, INFD: informal debt, 





5.6.3 Robustness check using Hayes and Preacher’s approach 
This approach by Hayes and Preacher (2010) is used to examine the mediating roles of risk 
tolerance in the relationship of investment horizons to debt decisions among stockbrokers 
(N=170). This method was mentioned in Section 3.4.1. 
The results of Hayes and Preacher’s approach are exhibited in Table 5.16. Only risk tolerance 
significantly relates to informal debt at 0.13 (p<0.1), which is consistent with the results from 
SEM3 and SEM8. This approach, however, finds no significant indirect relationship of 
investment horizons to informal debt through risk tolerance, which is inconsistent with SEM8. 
The main cause of this inconsistency may emanate from the difference between the two 
techniques, that is, SEM and Hayes and Preacher.  
Table 5.16: A summary of the results using Hayes and Preacher’s approach (N=170) 
This table finds a link of risk tolerance to informal debt at 0.13 (p<0.1) but an insignificant indirect relationship 
of investment horizons to informal debt through risk tolerance at 0.015 (p>0.1).  
IVs 
Direct effect of X 
on M 
Direct effect of X and M on 
Y (INFD) 
Indirect effect of X on Y via M 
  Coefficient LLCI - ULCI 





-0.0042 - 0.043 
M: RITO  0.13* 
(0.19) 
R2 0.013 0.02   
F, df1  2.20,1 1.64, 2   
N 170 170 170  
Note: *: p<10%, **: p<5%, ***: p<1%, IVs: independent variables, Y: (INFD) informal debt, LL/ULCI: 






5.6.4 Robustness check using the t-test and propensity score matching approach 
The t-test and propensity score matching (PSM) methods are applied to examine the key 
finding of the positive relationship of risk tolerance to the use of financial leverage. Risk 
tolerance is a treatment with 0 coded as risk tolerance less than Mean, and 1 as risk tolerance 
higher than Mean.  
The t-test results (N=420) find that the means of income and financial literacy between the two 
groups are significantly different (p<0.1), indicating that these variables may affect both risk 
tolerance and financial leverage. As a result of this, propensity score matching is undertaken 
to deal with these issues. 
The number of investors after the scores matched is 336, with 168 for each group. As shown 
in Table 5.17, the means of the six control variables between the two groups are insignificantly 
different (p>0.1), meaning that the means of each of the control variables are equal between 
the two groups of risk tolerance. This result reduces the bias in choosing these variables.    
Table 5.17: The t-test results of six variables between two groups of risk tolerance (N=336) 
This table presents that, after the propensity matching score is performed, there are no differences in the means of 
each of the six variables between the two groups. This reduces the bias in choosing these variables.  







t Ha:  









0 1.38 0.04 0.49 1.30 1.45 
0.89 0.81 0.37 0.18 
1 1.33 0.03 0.47 1.26 1.40 
AGE 
0 1.98 0.06 0.81 1.85 2.10 
0.75 0.77 0.45 0.22 
1 1.91 0.05 0.77 1.79 2.03 
EDU 
0 3 0.04 0.48 2.92 3.07 
0.28 0.61 0.77 0.38 
1 2.98 0.02 0.24 2.95 3.02 
MAR 
0 1.39 0.04 0.52 1.31 1.47 
0.39 0.65 0.69 0.34 
1 1.36 0.04 0.57 1.28 1.45 
INC 
0 2.45 0.06 0.78 2.33 2.57 
1.03 0.8 0.3 0.15 
1 2.37 0.05 0.68 2.27 2.48 
FIL 
0 2.08 0.05 0.64 1.98 2.17 
-0.43 0.33 0.67 0.67 
1 2.11 0.04 0.58 2.02 2.19 
RITOdummy: risk tolerance, IVs: independent variables, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital 





The results of the relationship of risk tolerance to the use of financial leverage are presented in 
Table 5.18 using the sample size of 336. Risk tolerance is associated with financial leverage at 
0.25 (p<0.1) after the scores of the 6 control variables are matched. In summary, the 
relationship between risk tolerance and financial leverage is robust using the propensity score 
matching technique. 
Table 5.18: The results of the relationship between risk tolerance and debt decisions (N=336) 
This table presents that risk tolerance maintains a strong relationship with the use of financial leverage at 0.26 
(p<0.1) using the propensity score matching method. 
Probit regression   Number of obs          = 336 
    Wald chi2(7)             = 10.49 
    Prob>chi2                 = 0.1626 
Log pseudolikelihood = -177.80  Pseudo R2                = 0.0297 
LEVE Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
z p> |𝑧|                [90% Conf. Interval] 
RITOdummy 0.257 0.154 1.67 0.095* 0.034 0.509 
GEN -0.003 0.167 -0.02 0.987 -0.278 0.272 
AGE 0.115 0.128 0.90 0.369 -0.095 0.326 
EDU -0.115 0.226 -0.51 0.609 -0.487 0.256 
MAR -0.039 0.148 -0.26 0.792 -0.284 0.205 
INC 0.075 0.121 0.62 0.533 -0.124 0.275 
FIL 0.307 0.119 2.57 0.010 0.110 0.504 
Constant -0.035 0.744 -0.05 0.962 -1.259 1.189 
Note: *: p<10%, **: p<5%, ***: p<1%. Dependent variable: LEVE: financial leverage. RITOdummy: risk 
tolerance, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy.  
5.6.5 Robustness check using the instrumental variables method 
This chapter attempts to find an instrumental variable to deal with these issues that are a threat 
to inferring the causal relationship of risk tolerance to the use of financial leverage. The 
methodology was presented in Section 3.4.3. 
Trading accounts are the accounts investors use for stocks trading. This chapter finds investors 
have from one through five trading accounts, and that 80% of them have from one through two 
accounts. This chapter argues that risk tolerance is positively correlated with the number of 
trading accounts, meaning the higher the level of risk tolerance, the higher the number of 
trading accounts. Also, the number of trading accounts does not relate to a debt decision to be 




investment experience relating to investment decisions. Based on this evidence, trading 
accounts may also be postulated as an instrumental variable for risk tolerance concerning debt 
decisions. 
The results of trading accounts as the instrumental variable for risk tolerance are shown in 
Table 5.19. This chapter applies the IVs approach with two-stage least squares and finds that 
trading accounts are highly significant in predicting the instrumented variable for risk 
tolerance. Durbin Chi-squared and Wu-Hausman F also detect endogeneity at a significant 
level (p<0.05), rejecting the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. This result adds to the literature 
alongside Chu and Vuong (2015). 
Table 5.19: The findings of an instrumental variable for risk tolerance 
This table shows that trading accounts as the instrumental variable are highly significant in predicting the 
instrumented variable of risk tolerance. Durbin Chi-squared and Wu-Hausman F stats also detect endogeneity at 
a significant level (p<0.05), rejecting the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression  Number of obs          = 420 
    Wald chi2(7)             = 19.61 
    Prob>chi2                 = 0.0065 
    Pseudo R2                = . 
   Root MSE                = 0.7547 
LEVE Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
z p> |𝑧|                [95% Conf. Interval] 
RITO 3.466 1.370 2.53 0.011** 0.779 6.153 
GEN -0.111 0.080 -1.39 0.166 -0.268 0.046 
AGE 0.007 0.056 0.12 0.902 -0.102 0.116 
EDU -0.175 0.103 -1.70 0.089 -0.376 0.027 
MAR 0.034 0.079 0.43 0.664 -0.121 0.190 
INC -0.011 0.065 -0.16 0.869 -0.138 0.117 
FIL 0.060 0.084 0.71 0.475 -0.105 0.225 
Constant -10.170 4.296 -2.37 0.018 -18.591 -1.749 
Instrumented: RITO 
Instruments: GEN AGE EDU MAR INC FIL ACC 
  
              Tests of endogeneity 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
 
Durbin (score) chi2(1)  = 8.39 (p = 0.0038)*** 
              Wu-Hausman F(1,411)  = 8.377 (p = 0.0040)*** 
Note: *: p<10%, **: p<5%, ***: p<1%. Dependent variable: LEVE: financial leverage. RITO: risk tolerance, 





The number of trading accounts, in short, can solve the endogeneity issues in the causal 
relationship of risk tolerance to the use of financial leverage. This evidence confirms that risk 
tolerance strongly relates to the use of financial leverage, and higher-risk tolerance leads to the 
use of higher-financial leverage. 
5.6.6 Robustness check on locations selection and response bias 
The methodology for this section was presented in Chapter 3. This chapter thus only examines 
whether respondents’ locations dampen the relationship of risk tolerance to debt decisions, as 
shown in Table 5.20. Locations (PLACE) in Model 1 is measured as a categorical variable (1: 
HCM City, 2: Ha Noi Capital, 3: Da Nang City, 4: Mekong Delta, and 5: other places), and a 
dummy variable (1: HCM City and 0: outside HCM City) in Model 2. Both models show no 
significant relationship of locations to the use of financial leverage (p<0.1), meaning that the 
places investors have been living do not relate to debt decisions. This minimises the bias in 
location selection. 
Table 5.20: Results of an effect of locations on debt decisions 
Both Models 1 and 2 indicate a significant relationship of risk tolerance to financial leverage (p<0.1). Importantly, 







t Sig. Model 
summary 
Model 1 








RITO 0.468 0.610 0.130 2.660 0.008*** 
GEN -0.066 0.176 -0.054 -1.090 0.276 
AGE 0.012 0.060 0.016 0.272 0.786 
MAR 0.030 0.043 0.028 0.494 0.621 
EDU -0.103 0.062 -0.070 -1.359 0.175 
INC 0.067 0.076 0.086 1.571 0.117 
FIL 0.173 0.043 0.164 3.301 0.001*** 










t Sig. Model 
summary 
Model 2: 








RITO 0.471 0.176 0.130 2.671 0.008*** 
GEN -0.066 0.060 -0.054 -1.095 0.274 
AGE 0.012 0.043 0.016 0.280 0.780 
MAR 0.031 0.062 0.028 0.509 0.611 
EDU -0.103 0.076 -0.070 -1.365 0.173 
INC 0.066 0.043 0.085 1.554 0.121 
FIL 0.173 0.052 0.164 3.305 0.001*** 
PLACE -0.013 0.059 -0.011 -0.229 0.819 
Dependent variable: LEVE: financial leverage, ***: p < 1%, RITO: risk tolerance, GEN: gender, AGE: age, 
MAR: marital status, EDU: education, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, PLACE: locations. 
 
5.7 Demographics 
The results of the demographics are shown in Table 5.21. This chapter finds that five out of six 
demographics relates to risk tolerance, investment horizons, or debt decisions, with the 
exception of age. Firstly, gender does play a role in relation to the use of financial leverage 
among stockbrokers and users of formal borrowing sources. This means that female investors 
tend to use a lower level of financial leverage than male investors, which is in line with prior 
studies, in which females are less risk-tolerant than males  (Barber & Odean, 2001; Frijns et 
al., 2008; Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2003; Kannadhasan, 2015; Lucarelli & Brighetti, 2011; 
Yao et al., 2011).  
Secondly, education has a positive association with investment horizons and risk tolerance, 
meaning an increase in education levels leads to an increase in stock investment for the short 
term, rather than the long term, and levels of risk tolerance. These findings seem consistent 




(Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2004; Kannadhasan, 2015; Riley Jr & Chow, 1992; Yao et al., 
2011). Education, however, has a negative relationship with the use of financial leverage 
among stockbrokers and users of informal borrowing. This may be explained based on the 
results of Blume and Friend (1978) in which educated heads of households are somewhat less 
willing to take substantial risks and Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) who find education increases 
a person’s risk aversion but also increases one’s risk-seeking based on his/her desire to control 
the environment.   
Thirdly, married investors may collectively have less need to use informal debt. This result 
contributes to the literature alongside the result of Grable (2000), in which married people are 
found to be less risk-tolerant. 
Fourthly, income is positively associated with risk tolerance and financial leverage, 
manifesting that higher-income investors are more willing to take on risk and use higher levels 
of financial leverage. This is consistent with prior studies in which people who earn higher 
income are found to take on more risk (Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2003, 2004; Morin & 
Suarez, 1983; Yao et al., 2011). Higher-income investors are, however, less likely to invest in 
short term stocks than in long term stocks among stockbrokers and female investors. This result 
adds to the literature. 
Finally, financial literacy positively relates to risk tolerance and financial leverage and 
negatively pertains to informal debt among female investors. This means that investors with 
higher financial literacy are prone to be more risk tolerant, use higher levels of financial 
leverage, and use lower levels of informal debt. This finding seems similar to that of Balloch 





Table 5.21: A summary of demographics 
Demographic variables Positive (+) 
negative (-) 
relationship 
Findings in the models 
1. Gender   
Gender -> financial leverage among users of formal 
borrowing sources  
- Table 5.9 
2. Education   
Education -> investment horizons among investors, 
stockbrokers, male investors 
+ SEM1, SEM3, SEM5, 
SEM8,  
Education -> financial leverage among stockbrokers, 
users of informal borrowing sources 
- SEM3, Table 5.9 
3. Marital status   
Marital status -> informal debt among investors, 
stockbrokers, non-stockbrokers, male investors, female 
investors, users of borrowing sources. 
- SEM1, SEM2, SEM3, 
SEM4, SEM5, SEM6,  
Table 5.9, SEM7, Table 5.15 
Marital status -> investment horizons among 
stockbrokers 
- SEM3 
4. Income   
Income -> financial leverage among investors, 
stockbrokers, female investors, users of formal 
borrowing sources, 
+ SEM1, SEM2, SEM3, 
SEM6, Table 5.9, SEM7, 
Table 5.15 
Income -> risk tolerance among investors, stockbrokers,  + SEM2, SEM7 
Income -> investment horizons among stockbrokers, 
female investors 
- SEM3, SEM6 
5. Financial literacy   
Financial literacy -> financial leverage among investors, 
stockbrokers, non-stockbrokers, male investors, female 
investors, users of formal borrowing sources 
+ SEM1, SEM2, SEM3, 
SEM4, SEM5, SEM6, Table 
5.9, SEM7, Table 5.15 
Financial literacy -> risk tolerance among investors + SEM2 







5.8 Conclusions, contributions, implications, limitations and further 
research 
5.8.1 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the extent to which risk tolerance directly relates to debt decisions 
and mediates between investment horizons and debt decisions. The results indicate that risk 
tolerance has a direct relationship to the use of financial leverage, while investment horizons 
are related to the use of informal debt. Risk tolerance positively relates to the use of informal 
debt and also mediates between investment horizons and debt decisions among stockbrokers. 
The results are, in general, robust after controlling for demographics and using additional 
techniques. 
Risk tolerance has the strongest relationship to the use of financial leverage among non-users 
of informal borrowing sources, followed by male investors, non-stockbrokers and users of 
formal borrowing sources.  
5.8.2 Contributions and implications 
The following contributions are made by this chapter. Firstly, this chapter provides useful 
insights into investors' use of debt in the Vietnam stock market and the vital roles of risk 
tolerance and investment horizons in this use of debt. Secondly, the informal debt sector plays 
a vital role in the Vietnam stock market, and it is also possible to generalise this importance to 
other stock markets. Thirdly, the SEM models are developed to examine the inter-relationship 
between risk tolerance, investment horizons and debt decisions among investors, as well as 
stockbrokers, non-stockbrokers, male investors, female investors, users of borrowing and non-




tolerance to solve the endogeneity problem in the relationship of risk tolerance to debt 
decisions, which contribute to the finance literature. 
The findings of this chapter have the following implications. First, risk tolerance is positively 
associated with the use of financial leverage. Use of financial leverage for stock investment 
has advantages and disadvantages. The benefit this brings to investors is to earn higher returns 
or greater returns from a small equity base. However, the risks investors face are a large loss 
and then legal problems if insolvency situations occur. Therefore, risk-tolerant investors should 
consider prudently what stocks are financially leveraged to minimise the risks. Moreover, they 
should control levels of returns expected from financial leverage by following strictly the 
trading strategy of “cut losses and take profits”. That is, investors identify how much the stocks 
are sold for to achieve loss-cutting or for profit-taking.    
Second, short-term investors and stockbrokers tend to use informal debt for stock investment 
in which informal lenders are mainly parents and friends.  This implies that investors’ stock 
investment may impact on the life of parents and friends. Therefore, investors should 
contemplate the choices of stocks for investment and effectiveness of these stocks to avoid 
harm to their family or friends. Although informal borrowing is common in Vietnamese 
culture, investors should limit the amount of borrowed money from informal lenders because 
this borrowing could have flow-on effects on the broader network.  
Lastly, stockbrokers are more likely to borrow money from parents or friends for stock 
investment, perhaps because of their social standing in stock market circles. This implies that 
they may care “too much” for their reputations, leading them to ignore the possible risk to their 
family or friends. Thus, stockbrokers should be careful when making decisions on informal 




to the social standing while borrowing money for stock investment, leading to biases in the 
decision-making process.  
5.8.3 Limitations and further research     
This chapter has some limitations. Firstly, the result of risk tolerance as a mediator is not robust 
using Hayes and Preacher’s approach. This chapter suggests extra tests for this mediating 
relationship. Secondly, as already mentioned in Chapter 4, debt decisions may be affected by 
payment methods. Investors may pay interest to the informal lenders, or they share profits or 
losses based on their contributed capital, or they pay no interest. A difference in payment 
methods may cause heterogeneity in the use of debt. Also, debt decisions may differ between 
payers and non-payers of interest. Besides, in some instances, informal lenders may borrow 
money from third parties, then give these borrowings to investors. This may lead to the flow-
on effect in a broader network if investors’ stock investments encounter problems. Thirdly, 
other behavioural factors, for example, trust or perceived risk, may also impact on risk 
tolerance or debt decisions.  All these unexplored aspects should be considered in future 





Chapter 6 Essay Three: Trust, Trading Frequency 
and Debt Decisions19 
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which trust in the stock market 
is directly associated with trading frequency and debt decisions, and whether it mediates 
between trading frequency and debt decisions. 
“Trust” is an essential ingredient for the success of a securities market (Stout, 2009). Trust also 
contributes to economic development; for example, aggregate economic activity (Knack & 
Keefer, 1997), or growth rates (Zak & Knack, 2001). While there are numerous publicised 
studies on the relationship between trust and stock market participation (e.g. Balloch et al., 
2014; Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011; Guiso et al., 2008), there has been no academic research 
examining an association of trust with the use of informal debt for stock investment. This 
chapter will investigate whether trust directly relates to debt decisions and mediates between 
trading frequency and debt decisions.  
This chapter, as presented in Chapter 3, defines “debt decisions” as the level of debt which 
investors use for stock investment. “Financial leverage” is the credit investors obtain only 
through brokerage firms. “Informal debt” is the credit investors obtain through family and non-
family sources. A debt decision is a risky decision, regardless of whether it is informal or formal 
 
19 The early version of this chapter was presented at the International Conference on Business and Finance 2019, 
University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, August 2019 https://vietnam2019.sciencesconf.org/ 
and at the 24rd New Zealand Finance Colloquium – NZFC, Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand, 





debt, because debtors may face insolvency or bankruptcy if their results cannot cover their debt. 
The importance of debt decisions for both enterprises and individuals was discussed in Chapter 
1. 
“Trust” lies at the centre of our global life, in which society itself would disintegrate unless 
people trust each other (Blair & Stout, 2001; Möllering, 2001). Hardin (2006) characterises 
trust as the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another under uncertain conditions. Trust 
is pointless unless there is some risk of loss, as there is no trust without vulnerability  (Blair & 
Stout, 2001; Hardin, 2006).  
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 presents the literature review and 
hypothesis development. Section 6.3 shows the methodology. Section 6.4 reports the main 
results. Section 6.5 presents the results of the additional analysis. Section 6.6 focuses on the 
robustness check. Section 6.7 presents the demographics discussion. Section 6.8 ends with 
conclusions, contributions, implications, limitations and further research. 
6.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
The concept of trust and trust in finance are presented in Section 2.4. While there are numerous 
studies on the link between trust and investment decisions, to the author’s knowledge, there 
has been no research on the relationships between trust, trading frequency and debt decisions. 
This chapter examines the following hypotheses.  
Direct relationships 
The existing literature finds that trust in the stock market is positively associated with trading 
frequency (stock market participation) (e.g. Balloch et al., 2014; Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011; 




Cook & Cooper, 2003). Like prior studies, this chapter argues that there is a positive link 
between trust and trading frequency and debt decisions. 
H6.1: The higher the level of trust in the stock market, the higher the trading frequency. 
H6.2: The higher the level of trust in the stock market, the higher the level of informal debt 
used. 
H6.3: The higher the level of trust in the stock market, the higher the level of financial leverage 
used. 
Investors who trade excessively hold riskier investment portfolios (Barber & Odean, 2000, 
2001; Frijns et al., 2008; Glaser & Weber, 2007; Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2003; Nofsinger, 
2008; Odean, 1999). In this chapter, it is argued that investors who trade more often may use 
higher debt for stock investment, under the following hypotheses:  
H6.4: The higher the trading frequency, the higher the level of informal debt used.  
H6.5: The higher the trading frequency, the higher the level of financial leverage used. 
Li, Turmunkh, and Wakker (2019) define trust as a decision made under ambiguity. A trust 
decision is a risky decision because trust givers (those who trust someone else) may have 
adverse results if their trust is misplaced, and thus, a higher trading frequency may lead to a 
higher level of trust. 
 H6.6: The higher the trading frequency, the higher the trust in the stock market. 
Indirect relationships 
Prior studies find trust in the stock market relates to trading frequency, and trading frequency 
is associated with risky decisions (Balloch et al., 2014; Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001; Frijns et 




2008; Hallahan et al., 2003; Nofsinger, 2008; Odean, 1999). Hence, this chapter argues that 
trading frequency mediates between trust and debt decisions. 
H6.7: Trading frequency mediates between trust and the use of informal debt. 
H6.8: Trading frequency mediates between trust and the use of financial leverage. 
This chapter also argues that trading frequency may relate to trust in the stock market, and trust 
in the stock market is associated with debt decisions. Hence, trust in the stock market is possibly 
a mediator between trading frequency and debt decisions. 
H6.9: Trust mediates between trading frequency and the use of informal debt. 
H6.10: Trust mediates between trading frequency and the use of financial leverage. 
6.3 Methodology 
The methodology for this section was presented in Chapter 3.  Debt decisions and six control 
variables were presented in Section 3.6. This chapter thus only presents measures of trust in 
the stock market, trading frequency, and debt decisions, as shown in Figure 6.1.  
Trust in the stock market, known as “overall trust”, is measured by the sum of the scores of six 
facets; trust in stockbrokers, websites of financial investment, brokerage firms, listed firms, 
friends or relatives who are working for brokerage firms (abbreviated to trust in friends), and 
the stock exchanges. This measure of trust is based on prior studies (e.g. Balloch et al., 2014; 
Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011; Guiso et al., 2008). Trading frequency is measured by how often 
investors trade in stocks,  which is in line with previous research (for example, Graham, 
Harvey, & Huang (2009). Lastly, debt decisions have two measures; informal debt, and 




investors through informal lenders, while financial leverage is credit obtained by investors 
through formal lenders (i.e. brokerage firms).   
Figure 6.1: Measures of trust, trading frequency and debt decisions 




 ∑ (𝒏𝒊 SHBRi+ WEBSi 
 + BFRMi  + 
LICOi  + FRENi  + EXCHi ) 
where: 
SHBR : trust in stockbrokers  
WEBS : trust in websites of financial investment 
BFRM : trust in brokerage firms  
LICO : trust in listed firms 
FREN : trust in friends or relatives who are 
working for brokerage firms 
EXCH : trust in the stock exchange(s) 
TRUS : overall trust; n=420, m=6 






TRADi: the level of trading 
frequency of ith investor 
TRAD: trading frequency. 
n=420 
 










LEVE: Financial leverage 
INFD: Informal debt 
i: ith investors, n=420. 
Note: debt over total 
assets. 
 
6.4. Main results and discussion 
The investor characteristics were demonstrated in Section 3.5. This chapter describes investors’ 
overall trust and its facets, the reliability of the scale of trust, correlations between variables, 
and main results by SEMs. The description of trading frequency and debt decisions was 
presented in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.  
6.4.1 Levels of trust 
The levels of trust (overall) among users and non-users of debt, non-stockbrokers and 
stockbrokers, male and female investors, and all investors are shown in Table 6.1. Most 
investors (60%) have a higher level of trust than the average, indicating most investors have, 




The average trust (mean) of users of debt is higher than that of non-users of debt. Stockbrokers 
and female investors have a higher level of trust than non-stockbrokers and male investors, 
respectively.  

















 Freq. % 
Mean 18.57 19.16 18.91 19.28 19.057 19.062 19.06   
Median 19 19 19 19 19 19 19   
Mode 19 18 18 18 18 18 18   
Std. dev. 3.6 3.4 3.65 3.10 3.46 3.43 3.44   
Minimum 8 5 5 6 5 6 5   
Maximum 29 28 29 26 29 25 29   
Low trust        168 40 
High trust        252 60 
N 75 345 250 170 259 161  420 100% 
 
Table 6.2 presents the extent to which investors trust stockbrokers, websites, brokerage firms, 
listed firms, friends who work for securities companies, and stock exchanges. Among them, 
investors have the highest level of trust in the listed firms (49%), followed by trust in the stock 
exchange (42%), brokerage firms (37%), websites and friends (36%), and stockbrokers (30%). 
In general, most investors have a level of trust between moderate and high. 
       Table 6.2: A summary of six facets of trust  
This table indicates investors have the highest level of trust in the listed firms (49%), followed by trust in the 
stock exchange (42%), brokerage firms (37%), websites and friends (36%), and stockbrokers (30%). 
Six facets of trust 
Do not trust Neutral Trust Do not have this one 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
1. Trust in stockbrokers 24 1.70 206 49.0 126 30.0 64 15.2 
2. Trust in websites 58 13.8 245 58.4 122 36.2   
3. Trust in brokerage firms 39 9.30 222 52.9 156 37.1   
4. Trust in listed firms 29 6.90 185 44.0 206 49.0   
5. Trust in friends* 36 8.60 201 47.9 152 36.2 31 7.4 
6. Trust in stock exchanges 42 10.0 189 45.0 178 42.4   




6.4.2 Reliability test of the scale of trust  
The reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) of overall trust created by its six facets is 0.618, 
as shown in Table 6.3. This result indicates an acceptable internal consistency and allows this 
scale to be used as a variable in a model. 
Table 6.3: Test of reliability of the scale of overall trust 

















TRUS: overall trust     0.61 
SHBR 16.2291 8.345 0.196 0.102 0.604  
WEBS 15.9069 8.998 0.352 0.190 0.504  
BFRM 15.7924 9.567 0.354 0.252 0.512  
LICO 15.6110 9.640 0.349 0.222 0.515  
FREN 15.9881 8.385 0.320 0.140 0.518  
EXCH 15.8067 8.673 0.385 0.216 0.488  
 
6.4.3 Test of correlations  
The correlations between variables are shown in Table 6.4. Most variables have positive inter-
correlations at a significant level (p<0.05). More specifically, the six facets of trust have 
significant correlations with overall trust, ranked in descending order, trust in the stock 
exchange at 0.606 (p<0.01), trust in friends or relatives who work for the securities companies 
at 0.593 (p<0.01), trust in websites of financial investment at 0.564 (p<0.01), trust in 
stockbrokers at 0.549 (p<0.01), trust in listed firms at 0.535 (p<0.01), and trust in brokerage 
firms at 0.522 (p<0.01). Trust also correlates with trading frequency at 0.107 (p<0.05) and 
informal debt at 0.143 (p<0.01). Overall, all variables have lower correlation coefficients than 
0.7. This indicates that “a poor correlation matrix” does not occur if these variables are tested 




Table 6.4: The correlations between trust, trading frequency and debt decisions 
Most variables have positive inter-correlations at a significant level (p<0.05). Trust in stock exchange had the highest correlation coefficient with overall trust at 0.606 (p<0.01).  
Overall trust correlated with trading frequency at 0.107 (p<0.01), and informal debt at 0.143 (p<0.01). Trading frequency correlated with financial leverage at 0.122 (p<0.01). 
 SHBR WEBS BFRM LICO FREN EXCH TRUS TRAD INFD LEVE GEN AGE MAR EDU INC FIL 
SHBR 1.000                
WEBS 0.103* 1.000               
BFRM 0.039 0.385** 1.000              
LICO 0.021 0.250** 0.378** 1.000             
FREN 0.309** 0.131** 0.073 0.149** 1.000            
EXCH 0.073 0.285** 0.322** 0.371** 0.209** 1.000           
TRUS 0.549** 0.564** 0.522** 0.535** 0.593** 0.606** 1.000          
TRAD 0.073 0.011 0.071 0.032 0.061 0.092 0.107* 1.000         
INFD 0.119* 0.054 0.099* 0.038 0.108* 0.059 0.143** -0.066 1.000        
LEVE 0.068 0.005 -0.015 -0.004 0.010 -0.002 0.033 0.122* -0.063 1.000       
GEN 0.019 0.022 0.004 -0.114* 0.123* -0.115* -0.002 0.064 0.047 -0.073 1.000      
AGE -0.032 -0.136** -0.058 0.012 -0.025 -0.051 -0.090 -0.068 -0.109* 0.060 -0.194** 1.000     
MAR -0.005 -0.112* -0.040 0.015 -0.001 -0.065 -0.055 0.004 -0.136** 0.048 -0.052 0.475** 1.000    
EDU -0.028 0.025 0.089 0.090 0.046 0.054 0.083 0.016 0.003 0.043 -0.085 0.072 0.123* 1.000   
INC -0.055 -0.036 -0.017 0.150** 0.038 0.105* 0.048 0.037 -0.087 0.134** -0.198** 0.368** 0.258** 0.322** 1.000  
FIL 0.041 0.089 0.061 0.144** 0.032 0.200** 0.173** 0.147** -0.044 0.172** -0.097* -0.040 -0.031 0.253** 0.137** 1.000 
N 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
TRUS: overall trust, SHBR: trust in stockbrokers, WEBS: trust in websites of financial investment, BFRM: trust in brokerage firms, LICO: trust in listed firms, FREN: trust in friends 
or relatives working for brokerage firms, EXCH: trust in the stock exchange, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: 




6.4.4 Results of main SEM models and discussion 
Two structural equation models (SEM1 and SEM2) are developed with six control variables 
(gender, age, marital status, education levels, investment experience, and financial literacy). 
SEM1 examines the direct impact of trust on trading frequency, trading frequency on debt 
decisions, and both trust and trading frequency on debt decisions. SEM2 examines the direct 
effect of trading frequency on trust, trust on debt decisions, and both trading frequency and 
trust on debt decisions. SEM1 also examines trading frequency as a mediator between trust and 
debt decisions, and SEM2 investigates trust as a mediator between trading frequency and debt 
decisions. Demographics found by the SEM models are presented in Section 6.7. 
The results of SEM1 are shown in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.5. SEM1 finds a direct relationship 
of trust (overall) to the trading frequency with a standardised coefficient of 0.102 (p<0.05), in 
support of H6.1. Statistically, when trust increases by 1 standard deviation, trading frequency 
increases by 0.1. This result is consistent with prior studies (for example, Balloch et al., 2014; 
Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011; Guiso et al., 2008). In general, investors who trust the stock 
market tend to trade frequently. Investors trust many parties such as stockbrokers, websites on 
financial investment, brokerage firms, listed companies, friends who are working for brokerage 
firms and stock exchanges. These parties hold a belief and have a given reputation to investors. 
Therefore, when these parties advise investors on stock investment, investors feel more 
confident to engage in the stock market. 
Trust is also related to informal debt at 0.145 (p<0.01), supporting H6.2. Trust, however, has 
no significant association with the use of financial leverage, which does not support H6.3. 
Trusting investors tend to use informal debt for stock investment. There is a possibility that 




than they themselves making decisions, leading them to feel safer with informal borrowing. 
Importantly, they would minimise legal issues if the stock investment failed.  
Trading frequency is associated with the use of financial leverage at 0.02 (p<0.05), in support 
of H6.5, but has no significant link to the use of informal debt, which does not support H6.4. 
The reasons for the use of debt are presented in Chapter 3 – Section 3.6.3. Frequent traders 
tend to use financial leverage rather than informal debt for stock investment. Frequent traders 
are associated with risk-taking behaviour (Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001), leading them to use 
financial leverage in an attempt to achieve high returns from a small equity outlay. In addition, 
they may borrow a large amount of money for stock investment for which only formal lenders, 
i.e. brokerage firms can financially meet this borrowing. 
The results of SEM1 also indicate that trading frequency is a mediator between trust and 
financial leverage at 0.01 (p<0.05), supporting H6.8. Trading frequency, however, 
insignificantly mediates between trust and informal debt, which does not support H6.7. This 
mediating role of trading frequency accounts for why a higher level of trust leads to a higher 
level of financial leverage. Noticeably, trust has no significant link to the use of financial 




Figure 6.2: Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions (SEM1) 
This figure shows a significant positive link of trust to trading frequency, trust to informal debt, and trading 
frequency to financial leverage. Trading frequency significantly mediates between trust and financial leverage.   
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 10.105, Df: 13, GFI: 0.995, TLI: 1.031, CFI: 1.000, RMSEA: 0.000 
TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial 
literacy, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage.  
 
Table 6.5: Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions (SEM1) 
This table indicates a significant direct relationship of trust to the trading frequency and informal debt, and trading 






S.E. C.R. P 
Hypotheses 
I. Direct relationship       
TRAD <--- TRUS 0.038 0.098 0.019 2.022 0.043** H6.1 
TRAD <--- EDU 0.022 0.007 0.149 0.146 0.884  
TRAD <--- GEN 0.189 0.07 0.133 1.422 0.155  
TRAD <--- AGE -0.09 -0.055 0.081 -1.11 0.267  
INFD <--- TRAD -0.012 -0.071 0.008 -1.487 0.137 H6.4 
LEVE <--- TRUS -0.002 -0.009 0.008 -0.184 0.854 H6.3 
INFD <--- TRUS 0.009 0.146 0.003 3.045 0.002*** H6.2 
INFD <--- MAR -0.053 -0.134 0.019 -2.807 0.005***  
LEVE <--- INC 0.103 0.129 0.038 2.682 0.007***  
LEVE <--- FIL 0.028 0.147 0.009 3.034 0.002***  
LEVE <--- TRAD 0.05 0.11 0.022 2.308 0.021** H6.5 
II. Indirect relationship       
TRUS->TRAD->INFD 0.000 -0.007    H6.7 
TRUS->TRAD->LEVE 0.002 0.011   ** H6.8 
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial 




The results of SEM2 are presented in Figure 6.3 and Table 6.6. SEM2 finds a direct association 
of trading frequency with trust at 0.09 (p<0.1), in support of H6.6. This result adds to the 
literature alongside prior studies (e.g., Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2003; Kwon & Suh, 
2004).   
Like SEM1, SEM2 also uncovers a link of trust to informal debt at 0.146 (p<0.01), supporting 
H6.2, and trading frequency to financial leverage at 0.11 (p<0.05), in support of H6.4. These 
hypotheses were presented in SEM1. 
The results of SEM2 also find trust as a mediator between trading frequency and informal debt 
at 0.013 (p<0.1), supporting H6.9. Trust, however, insignificantly mediates between trading 
frequency and financial leverage, which does not support H6.10. More importantly, trading 
frequency has no significant link to the use of informal debt. Thanks to trust, trading frequency 
relates to the use of informal debt. The mediating role of trust accounts for why a higher level 
of trading frequency leads to the use of higher informal debt. 
Figure 6.3: Trading frequency, trust and debt decisions (SEM2) 
This figure shows a significant direct link of trading frequency on trust and financial leverage and trust on informal 
debt. Trust mediates between the trading frequency and informal debt significantly. 
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 7.119, Df: 12, GFI: 0.997, TLI: 1.056, CFI: 1.000, RMSEA: 0.000 
TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial 




Table 6.6: Trading frequency, trust and debt decisions (SEM2) 
This table indicates trading frequency directly relates to trust, informal debt and financial leverage, and trust has 







S.E. C.R. P 
Hypotheses 
I. Direct relationship       
TRUS <--- TRAD 0.224 0.086 0.126 1.772 0.076* H6.6 
TRUS <--- EDU 0.293 0.037 0.396 0.738 0.46  
TRUS <--- GEN -0.051 -0.007 0.345 -0.147 0.883  
TRUS <--- AGE -0.321 -0.075 0.21 -1.532 0.125  
TRUS <--- FIL 0.143 0.133 0.054 2.647 0.008***  
INFD <--- TRUS 0.009 0.146 0.003 3.047 0.002*** H6.2 
LEVE <--- TRAD 0.05 0.11 0.022 2.301 0.021** H6.4 
INFD <--- TRAD -0.012 -0.071 0.008 -1.487 0.137 H6.5 
INFD <--- MAR -0.053 -0.134 0.019 -2.81 0.005***  
LEVE <--- INC 0.103 0.128 0.038 2.682 0.007***  
LEVE <--- FIL 0.028 0.147 0.009 3.023 0.003***  
LEVE <--- TRUS -0.002 -0.009 0.008 -0.184 0.854 H6.3 
II. Indirect impact       
TRAD->TRUS->INFD 0.002 0.013   * H6.9 
TRAD->TRUS->LEVE 0.000 -0.001    H6.10 
 Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial 
literacy, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage.  
 
In summary, based on SEMs’ results, as presented above, trusting investors tend to prefer 
informal debt, while investors who trade frequently are more likely to use formal debt for stock 
investment. This reemphasises that informal and formal finance sectors are the important 
sources for stock market investors. 
6.5. Results of additional analysis 
This chapter further analyses what facets of trust relate to debt decisions and find a difference 
in the relationship of trust and trading frequency to debt decisions between non-stockbrokers 
and stockbrokers, male and female investors, and non-users and users of borrowing sources. 
These analyses aim at exploring what facets of trust relate to debt decisions and find that who 




6.5.1 Results of six facets of trust 
The third SEM model, SEM3 is developed to examine the relationship between the facets of 
trust, trading frequency and debt decisions. Trust has six facets, including trust in share brokers, 
trust in websites of financial investment, trust in brokerage firms, trust in listed companies, 
trust in friends, and trust in the stock exchange. As presented above, 64 out of 420 investors do 
not have any stockbrokers (about 15%), and 31 out of 420 investors do not have any friends or 
relatives who are working for brokerage firms (around 7%). Due to this inconsistency in levels 
of trust, these 6 facets of trust should each be deemed to be categorical variables.  
The results of SEM3 are indicated in Figure 6.4 and Table 6.7; both trusts in stockbrokers and 
brokerage firms have a connection with informal debt at 0.1 (p<0.1). Trading frequency also 
pertains to financial leverage at 0.12 (p<0.05), which is consistent with SEM1 and SEM2. Not 
only does overall trust, but trust in stockbrokers and brokerage firms also strongly relates to 




Figure 6.4: Six facets of trust, trading frequency and debt decisions (SEM3) 
This figure indicates both trusts in stockbrokers and brokerage firms has a relationship on informal debt at 0.1 
(p<0.1). Trading frequency also affects financial leverage at 0.12 (p<0.05). 
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 6.280, Df: 7, GFI: 0.997, TLI: 1.013, CFI: 1.000, RMSEA: 0.000 
SHBR: trust in stockbrokers, WEBS: trust in websites of financial investment, LICO: trust in listed firms, FREN: 
trust in friends or relatives who are working for brokerage firms, EXCH: trust in the stock exchange, BFRM: trust 
in brokerage firms, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage.  
 
Table 6.7: The results of six facets of trust, trading frequency, and debt decisions (SEM3) 
This table presents both trusts in stockbrokers and brokerage firms have an impact on informal debt at 0.1 (p<0.1). 






S.E. C.R. P 
TRAD <--- LICO 0.015 0.009 0.089 0.171 0.864 
TRAD <--- WEBS -0.022 -0.016 0.072 -0.311 0.756 
TRAD <--- SHBR 0.077 0.081 0.049 1.576 0.115 
TRAD <--- FREN 0.055 0.048 0.059 0.921 0.357 
INFD <--- SHBR 0.015 0.099 0.008 1.952 0.051* 
INFD <--- FREN 0.014 0.075 0.01 1.458 0.145 
INFD <--- WEBS -0.001 -0.005 0.012 -0.09 0.928 
INFD <--- BFRM 0.027 0.098 0.016 1.758 0.079* 
INFD <--- LICO -0.005 -0.016 0.016 -0.297 0.767 
INFD <--- EXCH 0.004 0.017 0.012 0.316 0.752 
INFD <--- TRAD -0.013 -0.077 0.008 -1.602 0.109 
LEVE <--- TRAD 0.052 0.115 0.022 2.371 0.018** 
LEVE <--- SHBR 0.024 0.057 0.021 1.165 0.244 
LEVE <--- WEBS 0 -0.001 0.031 -0.014 0.989 
Note: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
SHBR: trust in stockbrokers, WEBS: trust in websites of financial investment, LICO: trust in listed firms, FREN: 
trust in friends or relatives who are working for brokerage firms, EXCH: trust in the stock exchange, BFRM: trust 
in brokerage firms, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage.  




6.5.2 Results of subgroup analysis  
The first subgroup analysis is between stockbrokers (N=170) and non-stockbrokers (N=250).20 
Among stockbrokers, only 13.5% have no stockbrokers themselves, meaning that most 
stockbrokers (86.5%) have other stockbrokers. This indicates that most individual investors 
have stockbrokers, no matter who they are, stockbrokers or non-stockbrokers.  
The results of SEM4 and SEM5 are presented in Figure 6.5 and Table 6.8. Both SEM4 and 
SEM5 find a relationship of trust (overall) to the use of informal debt at 0.13 (p<0.1) and 0.16 
(p<0.1), respectively. SEM4 also uncovers a link from the trust to trading frequency among 
stockbrokers at 0.135 (p<0.1), while SEM5 does not. SEM5 detects an association of trading 
frequency with financial leverage among non-stockbrokers at 0.1 (p<0.1), whereas SEM4 does 
not.  In general, trust has a strong relationship with the use of informal debt among all investors, 
stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers. 
The second subgroup analysis is between male (N=260) and female (N=160) investors. The 
results are shown in Figure 6.6 and Table 6.9. SEM6 indicates an association of trust with 
informal debt at 0.22 (p<0.01), and trading frequency with financial leverage at 0.12 (p<0.05) 
among male investors, while SEM7 does not. Overall, between male and female investors, only 
male investors’ trust significantly relates to the use of informal debt. 
 
20 Non-stockbrokers (60%) includes, ranked in descending order, other careers (15.4%), banking officers (10.7%), 
sales/marketing managers (8.8%), administrative officer/manager (7.1%), investment officers (5.5%), business 
owners (2.9%), accountants (2%), teachers/lecturers (2%), financial advisors (2%), fund managers (1.7%), CFOs 




Figure 6.5: Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions between stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers 
This figure shows that both SEM4 and SEM5 find an effect of trust (overall) on the use of informal debt at 0.13 (p<0.1) and 0.16 (p<0.1), respectively. SEM4 also finds an 
effect of trust on trading frequency among stockbrokers at 0.135 (p<0.1), and SEM5 reveals an impact of trading frequency on financial leverage among non-stockbrokers at 
0.1 (p<0.1).  In general, trust exerts a strong impact on informal debt, regardless of whether investors are stockbrokers or non-stockbrokers. 
 
Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions among stockbrokers 
(SEM4) (N=170) 
 
Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions among non-stockbrokers 
(SEM5) (N=250) 
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 10.819, Df: 13, GFI: 0.988, TLI: 1.017, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.000. 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 11.073, Df: 13, GFI: 0.991, TLI: 1.032, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.000. 
Note: TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal 





Table 6.8: Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions between stockbrokers and non-stockbrokers  
This table indicates that both SEM4 and SEM5 find a link of trust (overall) to the use of informal debt at 0.13 (p<0.1) and 0.16 (p<0.1), respectively. SEM4 also finds a 
relationship of trust to trading frequency among stockbrokers at 0.135 (p<0.1), and SEM5 reveals an association of trading frequency with financial leverage among non-
stockbrokers at 0.1 (p<0.1).  In general, trust strongly relates to informal debt, regardless of whether investors are stockbrokers or non-stockbrokers. 
Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions among stockbrokers (SEM4)  
(N=170) 







S.E. C.R. P 
TRAD <--- TRUS 0.044 0.135 0.025 1.775 0.076* 
INFD <--- TRAD -0.014 -0.073 0.015 -0.965 0.334 
LEVE <--- EDU -0.293 -0.162 0.129 -2.268 0.023** 
INFD <--- MAR -0.059 -0.161 0.028 -2.145 0.032** 
LEVE <--- TRUS -0.011 -0.065 0.012 -0.932 0.351 
LEVE <--- GEN -0.178 -0.168 0.075 -2.375 0.018** 
LEVE <--- AGE 0.132 0.154 0.065 2.035 0.042** 
LEVE <--- FIL 0.024 0.132 0.013 1.876 0.061* 
LEVE <--- INC 0.192 0.253 0.058 3.331 0.000*** 
LEVE <--- TRAD 0.011 0.020 0.038 0.289 0.773 







S.E. C.R. P 
TRAD <--- TRUS 0.032 0.081 0.025 1.269 0.204 
TRAD <--- GEN 0.035 0.011 0.202 0.172 0.863 
TRAD <--- AGE 0.009 0.005 0.113 0.080 0.936 
TRAD <--- EDU -0.142 -0.049 0.197 -0.722 0.470 
TRAD <--- INC 0.040 0.020 0.144 0.274 0.784 
INFD <--- TRAD -0.005 -0.034 0.010 -0.546 0.585 
INFD <--- MAR -0.059 -0.139 0.026 -2.249 0.025** 
LEVE <--- TRUS 0.005 0.030 0.011 0.470 0.638 
LEVE <--- TRAD 0.044 0.104 0.027 1.670 0.095* 
INFD <--- TRUS 0.010 0.160 0.004 2.577 0.010*** 
LEVE <--- FIL 0.025 0.133 0.012 2.078 0.038** 
 
Note: *: p≤0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Unstd.: unstandardised, Std.: standardised  
TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal debt, 





Figure 6.6: Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions between male and female investors 
This figure presents that SEM6 finds a link of trust to informal debt at 0.22 (p<0.01) and trading frequency to financial leverage at 0.12 (p<0.05) among male investors. By 
contrast, the results of SEM7 finds no relationship of trust to informal debt among female investors. Overall, between male and female investors, only male investors’ trust is 
found to have a link to their use of informal debt at a significant level (p<0.1).   
 
Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions among male investors 
(SEM6) (N=260) 
 
Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions among female investors 
(SEM7) (N=160) 
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 5.258, Df: 10, GFI: 0.986, TLI: 1.107, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.000. 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 5.746, Df: 10, GFI: 0.992, TLI: 1.119, CFI: 1.000, 
RMSEA: 0.000. 
Note: TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal 





Table 6.9: Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions between male and female investors 
This table shows that SEM5 finds an association of trust with informal debt at 0.22 (p<0.01) and trading frequency with financial leverage at 0.12 (p<0.05) among male 
investors. By contrast, the results of SEM6 find no significant link of trust to informal debt among female investors. Overall, between male and female investors, only male 
investors’ trust is found to have a relationship to their use of informal debt at a significant level (p<0.1).   
Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions among male investors (SEM6) 
(N=260) 







S.E. C.R. P 
TRAD <--- TRUS 0.026 0.068 0.024 1.086 0.278 
TRAD <--- AGE -0.038 -0.024 0.115 -0.331 0.741 
TRAD <--- EDU -0.063 -0.023 0.181 -0.349 0.727 
TRAD <--- MAR 0.063 0.026 0.169 0.374 0.708 
TRAD <--- FIL 0.050 0.122 0.027 1.865 0.062* 
TRAD <--- INC -0.011 -0.006 0.127 -0.090 0.928 
LEVE <--- TRUS -0.012 -0.071 0.010 -1.166 0.244 
LEVE <--- TRAD 0.055 0.123 0.028 2.015 0.044** 
LEVE <--- FIL 0.036 0.196 0.011 3.191 0.001*** 
INFD <--- TRAD -0.009 -0.055 0.010 -0.910 0.363 







S.E. C.R. P 
TRAD <--- TRUS 0.048 0.122 0.031 1.529 0.126 
TRAD <--- AGE -0.185 -0.104 0.139 -1.334 0.182 
TRAD <--- FIL 0.017 0.041 0.033 0.517 0.605 
LEVE <--- TRAD 0.047 0.103 0.035 1.337 0.181 
INFD <--- TRAD -0.016 -0.093 0.013 -1.200 0.230 
INFD <--- TRUS 0.006 0.087 0.005 1.100 0.272 
LEVE <--- FIL 0.019 0.102 0.015 1.285 0.199 
LEVE <--- INC 0.172 0.214 0.065 2.663 0.008*** 
INFD <--- MAR -0.075 -0.179 0.032 -2.330 0.020** 
INFD <--- FIL -0.010 -0.142 0.005 -1.808 0.071* 
LEVE <--- EDU -0.148 -0.079 0.154 -0.961 0.337 
 
Note: *: p≤0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Unstd.: unstandardised, Std.: standardised  
TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal debt, 




The third subgroup analysis is between users and non-users of borrowing sources; users 
(N=328) and non-users (N=92) of informal borrowing sources, and users (N=342) and non-
users (N=78) of formal borrowing sources. The number of investors who do not borrow money 
from informal or formal borrowing sources is less than 100.  This chapter applies the multiple 
regression to ensure a model fit, and then to examine the differences in the relationship of trust 
and trading frequency to debt decisions between these groups. 
Eight models are developed to examine this relationship. Model 5a and 5b will examine the 
relationship of trust and trading frequency with informal debt, while Model 6a and 6b will test 
this relationship with financial leverage among users and non-users of informal borrowing 
sources, respectively. Model 7a and 7b will also test this relationship with informal debt, while 
Model 8a and 8b will investigate this relationship with financial leverage among users and non-
users of formal borrowing sources, respectively. 
The results are presented in Table 6.10. Both models 5b and 6b find a link of trust to informal 
debt at 0.193 (p<0.01), and trading frequency to financial leverage at 0.09 (p<0.1) among users 
of informal borrowing sources. Both models 7b and 8b also reveal a connection between trust 
and informal debt at 0.17 (p<0.01), and trading frequency to financial leverage at 0.1 (p<0.1) 
among users of formal borrowing sources. 
The results, in short, indicate that between users and non-users of borrowing sources, only trust 
(and trading frequency) of users of borrowing sources have a significant relationship with 
informal debt (and financial leverage). 
In summary, between subgroups, trust has the strongest relationship to the use of informal debt 
among male investors, followed by users of informal borrowing, users of formal borrowing, 




informal debt among female investors. Alternatively, some demographics of female investors; 
marital status, income, and financial literacy; are associated with the use of informal debt. 
These demographics are presented in Section 6.7.  
Table 6.10:  Trust, trading frequency and debt decisions between users and non-users of 
borrowing sources 
This table shows that both models 5b and 6b find a link of trust to informal debt at 0.193 (p<0.01), and trading 
frequency to financial leverage at 0.09 (p<0.1) among users of informal borrowing sources. Both models 7b and 
8b reveal the association of trust with informal debt at 0.17 (p<0.01) and trading frequency with financial 
leverage at 0.1 (p<0.1) among users of formal borrowing sources. The results, in short, indicate that between 
users and non-users of borrowing sources, only trust (and trading frequency) of users of borrowing sources 
relate to their informal debt (and financial leverage). Note. Unstandardised coefficients in the parenthesis. 

















































































































































Adjust R2 -0.042 0.058 -0.032 0.057 0.109 0.029 0.022 0.038 
F, df 0.543,8 3.5, 8*** 0.65,8 3.5,8*** 2.17,8** 2.3,8** 1.22,8 2.7,8*** 
N 92 328 92 328 78 342 78 342 
Note: *: p≤0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Unstd.: unstandardised, Std.: standardised  
TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: 
financial literacy, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage. 
 
6.6 Robustness check 
This chapter applies additional techniques to ensure the robustness of the results from the 
SEMs. The robustness check has six sections. First, debt decisions have additional measures. 
Second, multiple and stepwise regression test the direct relationships. Third, Hayes and 




matching score examines the key result of this chapter: a causal relationship of trust to debt 
decisions. Lastly, solutions reduce the locations selection and responses biases.  
6.6.1 Robustness check using additional measures 
The eighth SEM model, SEM8, is developed to test the relationship between trust, trading 
frequency and debt decisions using additional measures. Debt decisions are measured by the 
sum of informal and formal debt. This analysis aims to examine whether the results are robust 
using an alternative measure for debt decisions  
The results of SEM8 are presented in Figure 6.7 and Table 6.11. There is a positive link of 
trading frequency to trust (overall) at 0.09 (p<0.1) and trust to debt decisions at 0.14 (p<0.01). 
Trust is also a mediator between trading frequency and debt decisions at 0.01 (p<0.1). These 
results are consistent with those from SEM2. In short, the relationship of trust to debt decisions 
are robust using an additional measure for debt decisions.  
Figure 6.7: Trading frequency, trust and debt decisions (SEM8) 
This figure shows an association of trading frequency with trust at 0.09 (p<0.1), and trust with debt decisions at 
0.14 (p<0.01). Trust is a mediator between trading frequency and debt decisions. These results are consistent with 
those from SEM2.  
 
Model fit criteria: Chi-square: 4.147, Df: 6, GFI: 0.998, TLI: 1.037, CFI: 1.000, RMSEA: 0.000 
TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial 




Table 6.11: Trading frequency, trust and debt decisions (SEM8) 
This table presents a link of trading frequency to trust at 0.09 (p<0.1), and trust to debt decisions at 0.14 (p<0.01). 
Trust is a mediator between trading frequency and debt decisions at 0.01 (p<0.1). These results are consistent 






S.E. C.R. P 
I. Direct relationships      
TRUS <--- TRAD 0.224 0.086 0.126 1.774 0.076* 
TRUS <--- EDU 0.250 0.031 0.413 0.607 0.544 
TRUS <--- GEN -0.026 -0.004 0.348 -0.076 0.940 
TRUS <--- AGE -0.323 -0.076 0.251 -1.289 0.197 
TRUS <--- MAR -0.120 -0.019 0.354 -0.337 0.736 
TRUS <--- INC 0.128 0.028 0.256 0.502 0.615 
TRUS <--- FIL 0.140 0.130 0.054 2.582 0.010 
FDINFD <--- TRUS 0.011 0.139 0.004 2.865 0.004*** 
FDINFD <--- TRAD -0.011 -0.055 0.010 -1.141 0.254 
II. Indirect relationships      
TRAD->TRUS->FDINFD 0.002 0.012   * 
Note: *: p≤0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Unstd.: unstandardised, Std.: standardised  
TRUS: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: 
financial literacy, TRAD: trading frequency, FDINFD: total debt. 
 
6.6.2 Robustness check using multiple and stepwise regression 
The results from multiple regression using the models 1a to 4a, and stepwise regression using 
the models 1b to 4b, are presented in Table 6.12. The results show significant links of trust to 
informal debt (Models 1a and 1b), trading frequency to financial leverage (Models 2a and 2b), 
trust to trading frequency (Models 3a and 3b), and trading frequency on trust (Models 4a and 




Table 6.12: Results of direct relationships between multiple and stepwise regression 
This table shows the effect of trust on informal debt (in Models 1a and 1b), trading frequency on financial leverage 
(in Models 2a and 2b), trust on trading frequency (in Models 3a and 3b), and trading frequency on trust (Models 
4a and 4b) at a significant level (p<0.1). Unstandardised coefficients are in the parentheses.  
Variables DV: INFD DV: LEVE DV: TRAD DV: TRUS 
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N 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001. (1a) -> (4a): multiple regression, (1b) -> (4b): stepwise regression. TRUS: 
overall trust, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: Informal debt, LEVE: financial leverage, GEN: gender, AGE: age, 
MAR: marital status, EDU: education, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy. 
 
6.6.3 Robustness check using the Hayes and Preacher’s approach 
This approach by Hayes and Preacher (2010) was presented in Section 3.4.1. The results using 




significant relationship between trading frequency and trust, and trust and informal debt, and 
as a result, trust significantly mediates between trading frequency and informal debt. Model 2 
reveals a link between trust and the trading frequency, and trading frequency and financial 
leverage, and as a consequence, trading frequency significantly mediates between trust and 
financial leverage. These findings, using Hayes and Preacher’s approach are consistent with 
those of SEM1 and SEM2 and show that trust and trading frequency are mediators.  
Table 6.13: Results of the relationships using Hayes and Preacher’s approach 
This table shows mediating roles of trust and trading frequency for other factors in debt decisions. Model 1 
indicates a significant link of trading frequency to trust, trust to informal debt, and as a result, trust significantly 
mediates between trading frequency and informal debt. Model 2 reveals a significant relationship of trust to the 
trading frequency and trading frequency to financial leverage, and as a consequence, trading frequency 




TRAD (X) -> TRUS (M) -> INFD (Y) 
Model 2: 
TRUS (X) -> TRAD (M) -> LEVE (Y) 
TRUS INFD Indirect effect 
of TRAD on 
INFD via TRUS 
TRAD LEVE Indirect effect of 
TRUS on LEVE 
via TRAD 
Constant 17.97*** 0.03  3.25*** 0.715***  

















R square 0.01 0.02  0.01 0.015  
F 4.508** 5.59***  4.508** 3.129**  
Df1-df2 1-418 2-417  1-418 2-417  
LLCI-ULCI   0.0024 - 0.0320   0.0012- 0.0283 
Note: *: p<10%, **: p<5%, ***: p<1%. TRUS: overall trust, TRAD: trading frequency, INFD: Informal debt, 
LEVE: financial leverage. A relationship is assessed as significance (p<0.1) if zero does not include between 





6.6.4 Robustness check using the T-test method 
The key finding of this chapter is a significantly positive relationship of trust to the use of 
informal debt after controlling for six demographics (gender, age, education, marital status, 
income, and financial literacy). This chapter applies the two-sample t-test to examine whether 
the means of these six demographics are equal between two groups of trust. The t-test is 
presented in Section 3.4.3.  
The results are presented in Table 6.14 and 6.15. Trust is coded as a dummy variable: 0 as trust 
less than Mean; and 1 as trust higher than Mean. The means of each of the six demographics 
between the two groups of trust is insignificantly different (p>0.1), accepting the null 
hypothesis of no differences in means between two groups of trust. This reduces the selection 
bias in the six demographics as the control variables in a model between trust and informal 
debt.  
Table 6.14: The t-test results of six control variables between two groups of trust (N=420) 
This table presents that the means of the six control variables between two groups of trust are insignificantly 
different (p>0.1).  This indicates no differences in each of the six variables between the two groups of trust.  







t Ha:  









0 1.39 0.03 0.49 1.33  1.44 
0.19 0.57 0.84 0.42 
1 1.38 0.034 0.48 1.32 1.43 
AGE 
0 2.03 0.05 0.78 1.94 2.11 
0.14 0.55 0.88 0.44 
1 2.02 0.06 0.83 1.92 2.12 
EDU 
0 3.02 0.03 0.49 2.96 3.07 
-0.91 0.18 0.36 0.81 
1 3.06 0.02 0.34 3.02 3.10 
MAR 
0 1.41 0.03 0.52 1.34 1.46 
0.22 0.59 0.81 0.40 
1 1.39 0.04 0.55 1.33 1.46 
INC 
0 2.54 0.05 0.73 2.45 2.62 
-1.18 0.12 0.23 0.88 
1 2.62 0.053 0.74 2.53 2.71 
FIL 
0 9.38 0.23 3.43 9.00 9.76 
-1.58 0.05 0.16 0.94 
1 9.87 0.21 2.88 9.53 10.21 
Dependent variable: TRUSdummy: overall trust, IVs: independent variables, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: 





The results of the relationship of trust to informal debt, including the six demographics 
variables are presented in Table 6.15. The findings show that trust significantly relates to the 
use of informal debt at 0.36 (p<0.01) and that there are no significant relationships of each of 
six control variables to informal debt (p<0.1). Trust is strongly related to the use of informal 
debt after controlling for the six demographic variables. 
Table 6.15: The results of the relationship of trust to informal debt (N=420) 
This table presents that trust significantly relates to the use of informal debt after controlling for the six 
demographic variables.  
Probit regression   Number of obs          = 420 
    Wald chi2(7)             = 18.43 
    Prob>chi2                 = 0.0102 
Log pseudolikelihood = -279.573  Pseudo R2                = 0.0320 
LEVE Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
z p> |𝑧|                [90% Conf. Interval] 
TRUSdummy 0.367 0.125 2.92 0.003*** 0.160 0.573 
GEN 0.047 0.130 0.36 0.720 -0.167 0.262 
AGE -0.107 0.094 -1.13 0.259 -0.263 0.048 
EDU 0.142 0.152 0.93 0.353 -0.109 0.393 
MAR -0.174 0.134 -1.29 0.195 -0.395 0.047 
INC -0.061 0.096 -0.64 0.523 -0.221 0.097 
FIL -0.033 0.020 -1.63 0.103 -0.067 0.0003 
Constant 0.409 0.533 0.77 0.443 -0.467 1.287 
Dependent variable: INFD: informal debt, TRUSdummy: overall trust, GEN: gender, AGE: age, EDU: 
education, MAR: marital status, INC: income, FIL: financial literacy. 
6.6.5 Robustness check on locations selection and response bias 
The methodology used in this section was presented in Chapter 3. This chapter thus only 
examines whether respondents’ locations dampen the relationship of risk tolerance to debt 
decisions alongside other demographics such as gender, age, marital status, education, income, 
and financial literacy.  
As shown in Table 6.16, both Model 1 and 2 find no significant relationship between locations 
(denoted as PLACE) and informal debt. This means that locations do not dampen the link of 





Table 6.16: Results of an effect of locations on debt decisions 
Both Models 1 and 2 indicate a strong relationship of trust (overall) to informal debt at a significant level (p<0.1) 
after controlling for seven demographics. Both Models 1 and 2 find no links of locations to the use of informal 








t Sig. Model 
summary 
Model 1 








TRUS 0.009 0.003 0.150 3.067 0.002*** 
GEN 0.010 0.022 0.024 0.478 0.633 
AGE -0.005 0.016 -0.020 -0.337 0.736 
MAR -0.046 0.022 -0.116 -2.078 0.038 
EDU 0.021 0.026 0.043 0.822 0.412 
INC -0.017 0.016 -0.059 -1.066 0.287 
FIL -0.005 0.003 -0.073 -1.448 0.148 
PLACE 0.006 0.009 0.032 0.659 0.511 
Model 2: 








TRUS 0.009 0.003 0.151 3.093 0.002*** 
GEN 0.011 0.022 0.025 0.501 0.617 
AGE -0.005 0.016 -0.020 -0.339 0.735 
MAR -0.045 0.022 -0.112 -2.013 0.045** 
EDU 0.020 0.026 0.041 0.784 0.434 
INC -0.018 0.016 -0.061 -1.102 0.271 
FIL -0.005 0.003 -0.070 -1.391 0.165 
PLACE -0.031 0.021 -0.071 -1.465 0.144 
Dependent variable: INFD, *: p < 10%, **: p < 5%, ***: p < 1%  
INFD: informal debt, TRUS: trust (overall), GEN: gender, AGE: age, MAR: marital status, EDU: education, 
INC: income, FIL: financial literacy, PLACE: locations. 
Model 1: PLACE is a categorical variable 





Six investor characteristics; gender, age, education, marital status, income, and financial 
literacy; are found to affect trust, trading frequency, and debt decisions, as shown in Figure 6.8. 
Firstly, gender positively impacts on trading frequency among investors and negatively affects 
financial leverage among stockbrokers. Female investors trade stocks more often than male 
investors, and female stockbrokers use lower levels of financial leverage than male 
stockbrokers. In general, this result seems to be consistent with prior studies (Barber & Odean, 
2001; Frijns et al., 2008; Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2003; Kannadhasan, 2015; Lucarelli & 
Brighetti, 2011; Yao et al., 2011) in which females take less risk than males. 
Secondly, age has a positive impact on financial leverage among stockbrokers. That is, the 
older they are, the higher the level of financial leverage used. This finding is similar to prior 
research (see, for example, Frijns et al., 2008; Grable, 2000; Pålsson, 1996; Wang & Hanna, 
1997). 
Thirdly, education is inversely associated with the use of financial leverage among 
stockbrokers. Higher education leads to a lower level of financial leverage. This result is 
inconsistent with previous studies (see, for example, Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2004; 
Kannadhasan, 2015; Riley Jr & Chow, 1992; Yao et al., 2011) in which the higher the level of 
education, the higher the risk-taking. This chapter, however, has a similar finding to Blume 










1. Gender   
Gender -> Trading frequency among investors + Table 6.12 
Gender -> financial leverage  
(stockbrokers) 
- SEM4 
2. Age   
Age -> financial leverage 
(stockbrokers) 
+ SEM4 
3. Education   
Education -> financial leverage 
(stockbrokers) 
- SEM4 
4. Marital status   
Marital status -> Informal debt  
(all investors, stockbrokers, non-stockbrokers, female 
investors, non-users of formal borrowing sources      
- 
SEM1, SEM2, SEM4, SEM5, 
SEM7, Table 6.10, Table 6.12 
5. Income   
Income -> Financial leverage  
(all investors, stockbrokers, female investors,  
users of borrowing sources) 
+ 
SEM1, SEM2, SEM4, SEM7, 
Table 6.10, Table 6.12 
Income -> Informal debt  
(non-users of formal borrowing sources) 
- Table 6.10 
6. Financial literacy   
Financial literacy -> Financial leverage  
(all investors, male investors, stockbrokers, non-
stockbrokers, users of borrowing sources, female investors) 
+ 
SEM1, SEM2, SEM4, SEM5, 
SEM6, Table 6.10, Table 6.12 
Financial literacy -> Trading frequency among investors, 
male investors 
+ SEM6, Table 6.12,  
Financial literacy -> Trust among investors + SEM2, SEM8, Table 6.12 
Financial literacy -> Informal debt  
(female investors, users of borrowing sources) 





Fourthly, marital status has a negative influence on informal debt among investors, 
stockbrokers, non-stockbrokers, and female investors. Married investors use lower levels of 
informal debt than single investors. These findings are in line with those of prior studies in 
which married people take less risk than single people (e.g. Cohn, Lewellen, Lease, & 
Schlarbaum, 1975; Dohmen et al., 2011; Roussanov & Savor, 2014). 
Fifthly, income positively affects financial leverage among investors, stockbrokers, female 
investors and users of informal borrowing sources, and negatively impacts informal debt use 
among non-users of formal borrowing sources. In general, a higher income causes a higher 
level of financial leverage use and a lower level of informal debt use. This result is similar to 
those of previous studies in which people having higher income tend to take more risk (see, for 
example, Grable, 2000; Hallahan et al., 2003, 2004; Morin & Suarez, 1983; Riley Jr & Chow, 
1992; Yao et al., 2011).  
Lastly, financial literacy has a positive impact on financial leverage, trading frequency and 
trust among investors, and a negative effect on informal debt among female investors and users 
of borrowing sources, in general. That is a higher level of financial literacy results in a higher 
level of financial leverage use, a higher level of trading frequency, a higher level of trust, and 
a lower level of informal debt use.  These results appear consistent with those of prior studies 
in which people with a high level of stock market literacy tend to participate in the stock market 
more frequently and take more risk (see, for example, Lusardi & Mitchelli, 2007; Lusardi & 




6.8 Conclusions, contributions, implications, limitations and further 
research 
6.8.1 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the extent to which trust in the stock market directly relates to trading 
frequency and debt decisions and mediates between trading frequency and debt decisions. The 
results show a significantly positive relationship between trust and trading frequency and the 
use of informal debt. Trust in stockbrokers and brokerage firms is directly related to the use of 
informal debt. Trading frequency is also positively associated with trust in the stock market 
and the use of financial leverage. Trust is a mediator between trading frequency and informal 
debt, and trading frequency acts as a mediator between trust and financial leverage. The results 
are robust after controlling for demographics and using additional techniques. 
6.8.2 Contributions and implications 
This chapter provides useful insights into investors’ use of debt in the Vietnam stock market, 
and the vital roles of trust in the stock market and trading frequency in this use of debt. The 
informal debt sector also plays a vital role in the Vietnam stock market, and the importance of 
this result can be generalised to other stock markets. The SEM models are developed to 
examine the inter-relationship between trust in the stock market, trading frequency and debt 
decisions among investors, stockbrokers, non-stockbrokers, male investors, female investors, 
users of borrowing and non-users of borrowing, which all contribute to the literature in finance.  
The results of this chapter have the following implications. First, investors trust many parties 
such as stockbrokers, websites of financial investment, brokerage firms, listed companies, 
friends who are working for brokerage firms and stock exchanges. Trust is related to 




To reduce mistrust, investors should consider the levels of trust in the parties and assess when 
and what situations they should trust, especially, they should evaluate the reliability of the 
advice by the parties.    
Second, higher trust is associated with trading more frequently. It is noted that excessive 
trading is a proxy for overconfidence and that overconfident investors tend to think that they 
are better than they actually are (Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001), leading them to earn suboptimal 
returns. Therefore,  trusting investors should control the levels of trading frequency to avoid 
overconfidence in investment decisions, which often leads to poor outcomes. 
Third, higher trust is associated with higher levels of informal debt use. There are two 
implications to this. First is for trusting investors in which they may think that borrowing from 
parents and friends makes it safer to engage in stock investment. However, this choice might 
affect parents and friends’ lives if the stock investment is not successful. Trusting investors, 
therefore, should be careful about choices of stocks for investment and importantly, they should 
evaluate the effectiveness and trends of the stocks to reduce the possible risk to informal 
lenders. Second is for informal lenders in that they may face difficulties with their lending. For 
example, they may bring financial hardship to their family if the investors they lend to meet 
with failure in their stock investments. To reduce the risk to the family, informal lenders should 
not leave all financial decisions to investors. Alternatively, informal lenders should improve 
knowledge of stock investment to advise investors on how to invest in stocks effectively, or at 
least informal lenders may monitor their money alongside investors. 
Finally, trading frequency is positively related to the use of financial leverage. This implies 
that frequent traders prefer financial leverage for stock investment. A major reason for the use 




returns on equity (ROE) or returns on assets (ROA) are the key financial ratios to assess 
performances for both individual and institutional investors. Using financial leverage 
effectively can help investors earn high returns from a small equity outlay, but investors may 
face bankruptcy if the investment fails. Frequent traders, thus, should balance the ratios 
between equity and leverage so as to reduce the possible risk of bankruptcy if stock prices go 
down.        
6.8.3 Limitations and further research 
Despite great efforts, this chapter has not still found an instrumental variable for trust to deal 
with the endogenous problem that may be a threat to inferring a causal relationship of trust to 
the use of informal debt. Further research should consider this. Besides, the key focus of this 
chapter is on the relationship of trust to debt decisions. Other behavioural factors; for example, 
perceived risk or risk tolerance; may affect debt decisions.  
Debt decisions may be affected by payment methods, as already mentioned in Chapter 4 and 
5.  Investors may pay interest or distribute returns from stock investments to informal lenders. 
Therefore, a difference in payment methods may cause heterogeneity in debt decisions. 
Investors may also pay without interest to informal lenders. This may lead to differences in a 
debt decision to be made between payers and non-payers of interest. In some instances, 
informal lenders borrow money from third parties, then lend investors this money. This may 
adversely affect a broader network if investors’ stock investments fail. These unexplored 






Chapter 7 Conclusions 
Introduction to this chapter 
This thesis mainly examines the relationships between debt decisions and three behavioural 
factors’ being perceived risk of stock investment, financial risk tolerance, and trust in the stock 
market. The results find perceived risk and trust positively relate to the use of informal debt, 
and risk tolerance is positively associated with the use of financial leverage. These behavioural 
factors also act as mediators for other factors in debt decisions. This chapter presents the 
significant findings, contributions, implications and recommendations of the three essays, and 
suggests further areas for research. 
7.1 Major findings 
The findings of Essay One respond to the primary research question in Chapter 1, being what 
role does perceived risk play in debt decisions? The finding is that perceived risk is positively 
associated with the use of informal debt and mediates between borrowing sources and the use 
of informal debt. 
The results are summarised in Figure 7.1. Essay One finds that perceived risk positively relates 
to borrowing sources and the use of informal debt. Besides this, borrowing sources are 
positively associated with perceived risk and the use of debt. Perceived risk also mediates 
between borrowing sources and informal debt and borrowing sources act as a mediator between 
perceived risk and debt decisions. These findings are robust after controlling for six 




Figure 7.1: A summary of the findings of Essay One 
 Hypotheses Findings supported 
H4.1 The higher the level of perceived risk, the higher the number of borrowing 
sources used. 
Yes 
H4.2 The higher the level of perceived risk, the higher the level of informal debt 
used 
Yes 
H4.3 The higher the level of perceived risk, the higher the level of financial 
leverage used. 
No 
H4.4 The higher the number of borrowing sources, the higher the level of perceived 
risk. 
Yes 
H4.5 The higher the number of borrowing sources, the higher the level of informal 
debt used. 
Yes 
H4.6 The higher the number of borrowing sources, the higher the level of financial 
leverage used. 
Yes 
H4.7 Perceived risk mediates between borrowing sources and informal debt Yes 
H4.8 Perceived risk mediates between borrowing sources and financial leverage No 
H4.9 Borrowing sources mediates between perceived risk (opportunity risk and 
leverage risk) and informal debt 
Yes 
H4.10 Borrowing sources mediates between perceived risk (opportunity risk and 
leverage risk) and financial leverage 
Yes 
 
The findings of Essay Two respond to the primary research question of what role does risk 
tolerance play in debt decisions? The answer is that risk tolerance positively relates to financial 
leverage and mediates between investment horizons and informal debt.21 
The results are summarised in Figure 7.2. This essay finds that risk tolerance is positively 
associated with the use of financial leverage, and investment horizons have a positive 
relationship with the use of informal debt. Risk tolerance also mediates between investment 
horizons and financial leverage. Most findings are robust after controlling for demographics 
and using additional techniques. 
 
21 The mediating role of risk tolerance in the relationship between investment horizons and debt decisions is only 




Figure 7.2: A summary of the findings of Essay Two 
 Hypotheses Supported 
H5.1 The higher the level of risk tolerance, the higher the level of financial 
leverage used. 
Yes 
H5.2 The higher the level of risk tolerance, the higher the level of informal debt 
used. 
No 
H5.3 The higher the level of risk tolerance, the higher the stock investment for the 
short term over the long term. 
No 
H5.4 The higher the stock investment for the short term over the long term, the 
higher the level of informal debt used. 
Yes 
H5.5 The higher the stock investment for the short term over the long term, the 
higher the level of financial leverage used. 
No 
H5.6 The higher the stock investment for the short term over the long term, the 
higher the level of risk tolerance. 
Yes 
H5.7 Risk tolerance as a mediator between investment horizons and informal debt  Yes – among 
stockbrokers 




The findings of Essay Three, as summarised in Figure 7.3, respond to the primary research 
question of what role does trust in the stock market play in debt decisions? The answer is that 
trust has a positive relationship with the use of informal debt and mediates between trading 
frequency and informal debt. 
This essay finds trust in the stock market (overall) positively pertains to the trading frequency 
and the use of informal debt. Trading frequency is positively associated with the use of debt. 
Trust also mediates between trading frequency and the use of informal debt, and trading 
frequency as a mediator between trust and debt decisions. The findings are robust after 




Figure 7.3: A summary of the findings of Essay Three 
 Hypotheses Supported 
H6.1 The higher the level of trust in the stock market, the higher the level of trading 
frequency.  
Yes 
H6.2 The higher the level of trust in the stock market, the higher the level of informal 
debt used. 
Yes 
H6.3 The higher the level of trust in the stock market, the higher the level of financial 
leverage used. 
No 
H6.4 The higher the level of trading frequency, the higher the level of financial leverage 
used. 
Yes 
H6.5 The higher the level of trading frequency, the higher the level of informal debt 
used. 
Yes 
H6.6 The higher the level of trading frequency, the higher the level of trust in the stock 
market. 
Yes 
H6.7 Trading frequency mediates between trust and informal debt Yes 
H6.8 Trading frequency mediates between trust and financial leverage Yes 
H6.9 Trust mediates between trading frequency and informal debt Yes 
H6.10 Trust mediates between trading frequency and financial leverage No 
 
7.2 Contributions 
This thesis makes the following contributions for academics and practitioners. Firstly, this 
thesis provides useful insights into Vietnamese investors’ debt decisions and three key 
behavioural factors related to the use of debt in the Vietnam stock markets. That is, the 
perceived risk of stock investment and trust in the stock market can account for the use of 
informal debt, and risk tolerance can explain the use of financial leverage for stock investment. 
These findings may be generalised to other stock markets.  
Secondly, the concept of perceived risk examined within the consumer behavioural framework 
contributes to a better understanding of investors’ perceived risk and its relationship with debt 
decisions and is a novel contribution. Numerous studies in finance (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Nofsinger, 2008; Thaler & Johnson, 1990), find that investors are only concerned about 




of risk concern than only financial risk. The additional concerns are information safety (safety 
risk), time waste (time risk), social standing (social risk), wrong choices among stocks (choice 
risk), missing out on other financial opportunities (opportunity risk), and debt problems 
(leverage risk).  
Lastly, the structural equation models (SEM) developed in this thesis to examine direct and 
indirect relationships between perceived risk, risk tolerance, trust, and debt decisions are an 
additional contribution to the current methodology in finance. SEM techniques are widely 
applied in consumer behaviour, but little utilised in finance. The advantage of SEM compared 
to the traditional techniques; for example, multiple regression with fixed effect and the random 
effect; is that SEM can test the relationships between multiple independent and dependent 
variables in a model. 
7.3 Implications and recommendations 
The results of this thesis have nine implications, as presented in chapter 4,5 and 6. First, a major 
finding is that perceived risk of stock investment directly relates to the use of informal debt, 
while risk tolerance is associated with the use of financial leverage. Although perceived risk 
and risk tolerance both refer to the subjective risk attitudes, risk tolerance, shaped through the 
13-item scale developed by Grable and Lytton (1999), is more prone to personality traits, 
whereas risk perception is more inclined to be a subjective judgement, that is, how to think and 
feel about the risks (Renner, Gamp, Schmälzle, & Schupp, 2015). Therefore, the findings of 
this thesis imply that the subjective judgement about risk and personality traits toward risk may 
work differently in regard to the choice of borrowing, either formal or informal. 
Second, when making a purchase decision, both investors and consumers are concerned about 




holding low esteem when making a large loss), and time loss (i.e. spending much time on 
looking for information, but the outcomes being not what are expected). This implies that these 
four risk concerns are the general risk concerns for people who make purchase decisions 
despite their different preferences for the purchase. However, buyers need to be aware that the 
more the concerns about these types of risk, the more the borrowing is from informal lenders. 
For investors who borrow money for stock investment, they should be careful about their 
choices of stocks for investment and monitor the investment results frequently to execute a 
timely adjustment in their investment strategy, reducing the risk of breaking private 
relationships with informal lenders and legal problems with formal lenders. Besides, although 
informal borrowing is common in Vietnamese culture, borrowers should be aware of using 
money from these sources effectively and respectfully.  
For lenders, especially informal lenders, they should consider prudently about lending money 
to investors because, in some instances, investors borrow money from many informal sources, 
and as a result, failure in stock investment may impact on the family life of many lenders, even 
spreading out to a larger network. To minimise the possible problems, informal lenders should 
improve knowledge of stock investment to advise their borrowers on the stock investment, 
rather than giving money to borrowers and leaving them to make all investment decisions 
themselves. Moreover, informal lenders should have good financial plans for their family in 
which money should be divided into many alternative uses to ensure that lending money to 
investors does not affect their family life.        
Third, risk tolerance is positively associated with the use of financial leverage. Use of financial 
leverage for stock investment has advantages and disadvantages. The benefits this brings for 




However, the risks investors face are a large loss and then legal problems if insolvency occurs. 
Therefore, risk-tolerant investors should consider prudently which stocks to financially 
leverage to minimise the risks. Moreover, they should control levels of returns expected from 
financial leverage by following strictly the trading strategy of “cut losses and take profits”. 
That is, investors identify the parameters in which stocks are sold for loss-cutting or profit-
taking.    
Short-term investors and stockbrokers tend to use informal debt for stock investment in which 
informal lenders are mainly parents and friends.  This implies that investors’ stock investment 
may impact on the life of parents and friends. Therefore, investors should contemplate the 
choices of stocks for investment and effectiveness of these investments to avoid harm to their 
family or friends. Although informal borrowing is common in Vietnamese culture, investors 
should limit the amount of money borrowed from informal lenders because this borrowing 
could have flow-on effects on the broader network.  
Fourth, stockbrokers are more likely to borrow money from parents or friends for stock 
investment, perhaps because of their social standing in stock market cycles. This implies that 
they may care “too much” for their reputations, leading them to ignore the possible risk to their 
family or friends. Thus, stockbrokers should be careful when making decisions on informal 
borrowing due to its influence on others’ lives. Importantly, they should not pay much attention 
to the social standing while borrowing money for stock investment, leading to biases in the 
decision-making process.   
Fifth, trust is also associated with the use of informal debt. Investors highly trust many parties, 
ranked in descending order, listed firms, stock exchanges, brokerage firms, friends or relatives 




This thesis, hence, draws attention to the trustworthiness of these trust parties for investors, 
particularly stock market corporations and policymakers. This is because, if trust in the stock 
market is misplaced, this problem may spread to a wider network. 
Sixth, investors trust many parties such as stockbrokers, websites of financial investment, 
brokerage firms, listed companies, friends who are working for brokerage firms and stock 
exchanges. Trust is related to vulnerability (Blair & Stout, 2001), leading investors to be 
vulnerable if their trust is misplaced. To reduce mistrust, investors should consider the levels 
of trust in the parties and assess when and what situations they should trust, especially, they 
should evaluate the reliability of the advice by the parties.    
Seventh, higher trust is associated with trading more frequently. It is noted that excessive 
trading is a proxy for overconfidence and that overconfident investors tend to think that they 
are better than they actually have (Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001), leading them to earn 
suboptimal returns. Therefore, trusting investors should control the levels of trading frequency 
to avoid overconfidence in investment decisions, which can result in poor outcomes. 
Eighth, higher trust is associated with higher levels of informal debt use. There are two 
implications to this. First is for trusting investors in which they may think that borrowing from 
parents and friends makes stock investment safer. However, this choice might affect parents 
and friends’ lives if the stock investment was not successful. Trusting investors, therefore, 
should be careful about choices of stocks for investment and importantly, should evaluate the 
effectiveness and trends of the stocks to reduce the possible risk to informal lenders. Second is 
for the informal lenders themselves in that they may face difficulties with their lending, for 
example, putting financial pressure on their families if the investors they lend to failure in their 




financial decisions to investors. Alternatively, informal lenders should improve knowledge of 
stock investment to advise investors on how to invest in stocks effectively, or at least informal 
lenders may monitor the investments they are exposed to alongside investors. 
Finally, trading frequency is positively related to the use of financial leverage. This implies 
that frequent traders prefer financial leverage for stock investment. The likely main cause for 
the use of financial leverage is to earn higher returns from a small equity outlay. In practice, 
returns on equity (ROE) or returns on assets (ROA) are the key financial ratios to assess 
performance for both individual and institutional investors. Using financial leverage effectively 
helps investors to earn higher returns from a small equity outlay, but can lead to investors 
facing bankruptcy. Frequent traders, thus, should balance the ratios between equity and 
leverage so as to reduce the possible risk if stock prices go down.        
7.4 Further areas of research 
This thesis has the following limitations. Although the findings of a relationship between 
perceived risk and informal debt are robust after controlling for demographic variables and 
using additional techniques, this thesis finds no instrumental variables (IVs) to deal with 
endogenous problems that may be a threat to inferring a causal relationship of perceived risk 
to the use of informal debt.  This thesis also focuses on the relationship between perceived risk 
and debt decisions. Other behavioural factors, for example, risk tolerance or trust in the stock 
market, should be considered because they may impact on debt decisions. Future research 
should pay attention to these aspects.   
Next, the result of risk tolerance as a mediator is not robust using Hayes and Preacher’s 
approach. This study suggests extra tests for this mediating relationship. Secondly, as already 




the informal lenders, or they share profits or losses based on their contributed capital, or they 
pay no interest. A difference in payment methods may cause heterogeneity in the use of debt. 
Also, debt decisions may differ between payers and non-payers of interest. Besides, in some 
instances, informal lenders may borrow money from third parties, then give these borrowings 
to investors. This may lead to the flow-on effect to a broader network if investors’ stock 
investments encounter problems. Thirdly, other behavioural factors, for example, trust or 
perceived risk, may also impact on risk tolerance or debt decisions.  All these unexplored 
aspects should be considered in future research.     
This thesis has not found an instrumental variable for trust to deal with the endogenous problem 
that may be a threat to inferring a causal relationship of trust to the use of informal debt. Further 
research should consider this. Besides, the key focus is on the relationship of trust (or perceived 
risk and risk tolerance) with debt decisions. Other behavioural biases, including herding 
behaviour, representativeness, mental accounting and anchor bias, should be considered as the 
antecedents of debt decisions.  
Lastly, an unexplored aspect pertains to investors’ payment methods, which may affect debt 
decisions.  Investors may pay interest or dividend returns on the contributed capital to informal 
lenders. A difference in payment methods may lead to heterogeneity in the level of debt used. 
There may also be a difference in the use of debt between payers and non-payers of interest. 
Moreover, in some instances, informal lenders (to investors) may borrow money from third 
parties, and then lend investors this borrowing. This means that the credit that investors obtain 
through informal lenders may not be the informal lenders’ own money. This could magnify the 
flow-on effect in a broader network if investors’ stock investment fails. Future research could 
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Appendix 1 – Consent form and Questionnaire – English version 
CONSENT FORM 
TITLE OF STUDY: 
THE EFFECT OF PERCEIVED RISK, RISK TOLERANCE AND TRUST ON DEBT DECISIONS 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: 
Name   : Trang Phung 
Department  : School of Economics and Finance 
Address  : 
Massey University Manawatū, Private Bag 11 222 
Palmerston North 4442, New Zealand 
Phone   : 0274745308 
Email   : T.Phung@massey.ac.nz 
 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
You are being asked to take part in a research study. Before you decide to participate in this study, it is important 
that you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please read the following information 
carefully. Please ask the researcher if there is anything that is not clear or if you need more information. The 
purpose of this study is to find out the effects of individual investors’ risk perception of investing in stocks, risk 
tolerance, and trust in the stock market on their debt decisions. 
 
STUDY PROCEDURES AND RISKS IF ANY 
The survey should only take about 45 minutes of your time. All responses will remain anonymous, and you are 
free to opt out at any time. You may decline to answer any or all questions and you may terminate your 
involvement at any time if you choose. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Your responses to this survey will be anonymous. Please do not write any identifying 
information on your survey. Every effort will be made by the researcher to preserve your 
confidentiality including the following: 
- Assigning code names/numbers for participants that will be used on all research notes and documents 
- Keeping notes and any other identifying participant information in a locked file cabinet in the personal possession 
of the researcher. 
Participant data will be kept confidential except in cases where the researcher is legally obligated to report specific 





This project has been reviewed and approved by the Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern B, 
Application 19/07. If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research, please contact Dr Rochelle 
Stewart-Withers, Chair, Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern B, telephone 06 356 9099 x 
83657, email humanethicsouthb@massey.ac.nz  
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part in this study. If 
you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
After you sign the consent form, you are still free to withdraw at any time (e.g. two weeks after taking part in the 
data collection) and without giving a reason. Withdrawing from this study will not affect the relationship you 
have, if any, with the researcher. If you withdraw from the study before data collection is completed, your data 
will be returned to you or destroyed. 
 
CONSENT 
I have read and I understand the provided information and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without 
giving a reason and without cost. I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form. I voluntarily agree 
to take part in this study. 
Participant's signature ______________________________ Date __________ 




A questionnaire on the effect of perceived risk, risk tolerance and trust on debt 
decisions 
 
1/ Thinking about your typical share investment portfolio, how do you divide your portfolio into the short-term 
and long-term investment? 
 
   Typical share investment Proportion (%) of portfolio 
Short-term investment (less than 1 year)  
Long-term investment (1 year or more)   
Total 100% 
 
2/ Thinking about your short-term investment, how do you divide your short-term investment that depends on 
trading time? 
Short-term share investment 
 
Proportion (%) of short-term 
investment 
1 month or less  
Between more than 1 month and 3 months  
Between more than 3 months and 6 months  
Between more than 6 months and less than 1 year   
Total 100% 
 
3/ Thinking about borrowing from family sources such as parents, a spouse, sisters, brothers, relatives, to invest 
in shares (you can choose more than 1 answer): 
□ 1. Parents.        
□ 2. Grandparents.      
□ 3. Brothers/sisters.      
□ 4. Parents in law. 
□ 5. Brothers/sisters in law.  
□ 6. Cousins/nieces/nephews. 
□ 7. Husband/wife. 
□ 8. Other family sources: ………. 
□ 9. I do not borrow from any family sources.  
 
4/ If you have from two family sources, please choose ONE you use most:  



















5/ Borrowing from non-family sources such as friends, teachers, co-workers,  ... (you can choose more than 1 
answer): 
□ 1. Friends 
□ 2. Girlfriends/boyfriends/partners 
□ 3. Teachers/lecturers 
□ 4. Colleagues/co-workers 
□ 5. Bosses/managers 
□ 6. Business partners 
□ 7. Neighbours 
□ 8. Other non-family sources: ………. 





6/ If you have from two sources, please choose ONE you use most 



















7/ Borrowing from formal sources such as banks, credit institutions, brokerage firms, (you can choose more than 
1 answer): 
□ 1. Banks 
□ 2. Credit institutions 
□ 3. Brokerage firms 
□ 4. Other formal sources: ………………… 
□ 5. I do not borrow from any formal sources. 
 
8/If you have from two sources, please choose ONE you use most: 
1 2 3 4 
Banks Credit institutions Brokerage firms Other formal sources 
 
9/ Thinking about the total money for stock investment, how would you divide this amount between the 
borrowing and your own money?  
The total money for stock investment: % 
Borrowing from informal sources  
Borrowing from formal sources  
My equity  
Total 100%  
 
10/ Supposing that a share has the highest financial leverage in accordance with the brokerage firms’ rules, if 
you would like to buy this share, what financial leverage ratios do you often use? 
□ do not leverage 
□ less than 20%  
□ 20% to less than 30%  
□ 30% to less than 50%  
□ Use the highest lending ratio  
 
11a/ How concerned are you about your confidential information being leaked to others if you trade shares 
online or you ask someone else (e.g. brokers, individuals or institutions) to trade for you?   
(1: not at all concerned, 2: slightly concerned, 3: somewhat concerned, 4: moderately concerned, 5: extremely 
concerned). 
1 2 3 4 5 
11b/ How important is it to you if your confidential information is leaked to others? 
(1: not at all important, 2: slightly important, 3: somewhat important, 4: moderately important, 5: extremely 
important). 
1 2 3 4 5 
12a/ How concerned are you about a negative impact of this loss on your social standing if you make a large 
loss in share investments?  
1 2 3 4 5 
12b/ How important is it to you if you are held in lower esteem due to your large loss in share investment? 
1 2 3 4 5 
13a/ How concerned are you about missing out on other financial investment opportunities if you used all the 
money for share investments?   
1 2 3 4 5 
13b/ How important is it to you if you miss out on other financial investment opportunities? 




14a/ How concerned are you about spending a lot of time on share investment and the results are not what you 
expect? 
1 2 3 4 5 
14b/ How important is it to you If you spend a lot of time on share investment and the results are not what you 
expect? 
1 2 3 4 5 
15a/ How concerned are you about your wrong choices when choosing shares for your portfolio?   
1 2 3 4 5 
15b/ How important is it to you if you make a wrong decision on choosing shares for your portfolio? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
For those who borrow to invest in shares:  
16a/ How concerned are you about your investment returns being inadequate to cover your loan interest and 
principal at maturity? 
1 2 3 4 5 
16b/ How important is it to you if your investment results cannot cover your debt? 
1 2 3 4 5 
17a/ What ratios of loss over equity below make you concerned?  
□ ≤ 10%  
□ > 10% to 20% 
□ > 20% to 30% 
□ > 30% to 50% 
□ > 50% 
17b/ What ratios of loss over equity are important to you?  
□ ≤ 10%  
□ > 10% to 20% 
□ > 20% to 30% 
□ > 30% to 50% 
□ > 50% 
 
18/ Suppose you had 100 million VND in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 1 year, 
how much do you think you would have in this account if you left the money to grow?  
(i) More than VND 102 million;  
(ii) Exactly VND 102 million; 
(iii) Less than VND 102 million; 
(iv) I don’t know. 
 
19/ Suppose you had 100 million VND in a savings account and the interest rate is 20% per year and you never 
withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how much would you have in this account in total?  
(i) More than VND 20 million; 
(ii) Exactly VND 20 million; 
(iii) Less than VND 20 million; 
(iv) I don’t know. 
 
20/ Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 
1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account?  
(i) More than today; 
(ii) Exactly the same;  
(iii) Less than today; 
(iv) I don’t know. 
 
21/ Assume Peter inherits VND 10,000 million today and John inherits 10,000 million 3 years from now. Who 
is richer because of the inheritance? (note: other factors do not mention) 
(i) Peter; 
(ii) John;  
(iii) They are equally rich; 




22/ Suppose that in the year 2020, your income has doubled, and the price of all goods has also doubled. In 
2020, how much will you be able to buy with your income? (note: other factors are not considered)? 
(i) More than today;  
(ii) The same;  
(iii) Less than today; 
(iv) I don’t know. 
 
23/ Which of the following statements describes the main function of the share market?  
(i) The share market helps to predict share earnings; 
(ii) The share market results in an increase in the price of shares;  
(iii) The share market brings people who want to buy shares together with those who want to sell shares; 
(iv) None of the above; 
(v) I don’t know. 
 
24/ If somebody buys the share of firm B in the share market:  
(i) He owns part of firm B; 
(ii) He has lent money to firm B 
(iii) He is liable for firm B’s debts;  
(iv) None of the above; 
(v) I don’t know. 
 
25/ If somebody buys a bond of firm B:  
(i) He owns a part of firm B; 
(ii) He has lent money to firm B;  
(iii) He is liable for firm B’s debts; 
(iv) None of the above; 
(v) I don’t know. 
 
26/ If the interest rate falls, what should happen to bond prices of bondholders?  
(i) Rise; 
(ii) Fall; 
(iii) Stay the same;  
(iv) None of the above; 
(v) I don’t know. 
 
27/ Normally, which asset displays the highest fluctuations over time?  
(i) Savings accounts;  
(ii) Bonds; 
(iii) Shares; 
(iv) I don’t know. 
 
28/ Which of the following statements is correct?  
(i) Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year;  
(ii) Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds; (iii) Mutual 
funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance; 
(iii) None of the above;  
(iv) Don’t Know. 
 
29/ Buying a company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.  
(i) True;  
(ii) False;  
(iii) Don’t Know. 
 
30/ Shares are normally riskier than bonds.  
(i) True;  
(ii) False;  




31/ Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset normally gives the highest return?  
(i) Savings accounts;  
(ii) Bonds;  
(iii) Shares;  
(iv) Don’t Know. 
 
32/ When an investor spreads his money among different assets, does the risk of losing money: 
(i) Increase;  
(ii) Decrease;  
(iii) Stay the same;  
(iv) Don’t Know. 
 
33/ If you buya10-year bond, it means you cannot sell it after 5 years without incurring a major penalty.  
(i) True;  
(ii) False;  
(iii) Don’t know. 
 
34/ In general, how would you describe yourself in share investment? 
a/ A real gambler 
b/ Willing to take risks after completing adequate research 
c/ Cautious 
d/ A real risk avoider 
 
35/ You are on a TV game show and can choose one of the following. Which would you take? 
a/ VND 1 million in cash. 
b/ A 50% chance at winning VND 5 million. 
c/ A 30% chance at winning VND 10 million. 
d/ A 5% chance at winning VND 100 million.  
 
36/ You have just finished saving for a “once-in-a-lifetime” vacation, but you have not yet paid. Three weeks 
before you plan to leave, you lose your job. You would: 
a/ Cancel the vacation 
b/ Take a much more modest vacation 
c/ Go as scheduled, reasoning that you need the time to prepare for a job search 
d/ Extend your vacation, because this might be your last chance to go vacation. 
 
37/ If you unexpectedly received VND 200 million to invest, what would you do? 
a/ Deposit it in a bank account. 
b/ Invest it in bond mutual funds. 
c/ Invest it in shares or share mutual funds. 
 
38/ In terms of experience, how comfortable are you investing in shares or share mutual funds? 
a/ Not at all comfortable 
b/ Somewhat comfortable 
c/ Very comfortable 
 
39/ When you think of the word “risk” which of the following words comes to mind first? 




40/ Experts agree that government bonds should be relatively safe. Most of your investment assets are now in 
high interest government bonds. What would you do? 
a/ Hold the bonds 
b/ Sell the bonds, put half the proceeds into money market account, and the other half into other assets 
c/ Sell the bonds and put the total proceeds into other assets 




41/ Given the best and worst case returns of the four investment choices below, which would you prefer? 
a/ The best case: gain (+) VND 200 million; The worst case: loss (-) VND 0. 
b/ The best case: gain (+) VND 800 million; The worst case: loss (-) VND 200 million. 
c/ The best case: gain (+) 2,600 million VND; The worst case: loss (-) VND 800 million. 
d/ The best case: gain (+) 4,800 million VND; The worst case: loss (-) VND 2,400 million. 
 
42/ In addition to whatever you own, you have been given VND 1 billion. You are now asked to choose 
between: 
a/ A sure gain of VND 500 million. 
b/ A 50% chance to gain 1 billion and a 50% chance to gain nothing. 
 
43/ In addition to whatever you own, you have been given VND 1 billion. You are now asked to choose 
between: 
a/ A sure loss of VND 500 million. 
b/ A 50% chance to lose VND 1 billion and a 50% chance to lose nothing. 
 
44/ Suppose a relative left you an inheritance of VND 1 billion, stipulating in the will that you invest ALL the 
money in ONE of the following choices. Which one would you select? 
a/ A savings account or money market mutual fund 
b/ A mutual fund that owns shares and bonds 
c/ A portfolio of 15 common shares 
d/ Commodities like gold, silver, and oil 
 
45/ If you had to invest VND 20 billion, which of the following investment choices would you find most 
appealing? 
a/ 60% in low-risk investment 30% in medium-risk investment 10% in high-risk investments. 
b/ 30% in low-risk investment 40% in medium-risk investment 30% in high-risk investments 
 
46/ Your trusted friend and neighbour, an experienced geologist, is putting together a group of investors to fund 
an exploratory gold mining venture. The venture could pay back 50 to 100 times the investment if successful. If 
the mine is a bust, the entire investment is worthless. Your friend estimates the chance of success is only 20%. If 
you had VND 1 billion, how much would you invest? 
a/ Nothing 
b/ 10% - <30% 
c/ 30% - < 60% 
d/ > 60% 
 
47/ How much do you trust stockbroker(s)? (1: do not trust at all, 2: do not trust, 3: neutral, 4: trust, 5: 
completely trust) 
1 2 3 4 5 0: I don’t have one 
48/ How much do you trust websites of financial investment, e.g. cafef.vn, vietstock, cophieu68.com? 
1 2 3 4 5  
49/ How much do you trust brokerage firm(s)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
50/ How much do you trust listed companies that you invest in? 
1 2 3 4 5 
51/ How much do you trust your friends or relatives’ advice, who are working for brokerage firms? 
1 2 3 4 5 0: I don’t have one 
52/ How much do you trust the stock exchange where you invest? 







1/ Gender:  □ Male  □ Female  □ unspecified  
 
2/ What is your age-range:  
□ < 25 years old 
□ 25 – 35 
□ 36 – 45 
□ 46-55 
□ 56 or more 
   
3/ Marital status:   
□ Single  
□ Married  
□ Divorced      
□ Widowed      
 
4/ How many children do you have?  
□ 0 
□ 1  
□ 2 
□ 3 
□ 4 or more 
 
5/ What place do you live in? 
□ 1. District ……….Ho Chi Minh City 
□ 2. District ………Ha Noi capital 
□ 3. District ………Da Nang City 
□ 4. Mekong delta 
□ 5. Other: 
 
6/ How many properties do you have in total?   
□ 0 
□ 1  
□ 2 
□ 3 
□ 4 or more 
 
7/ Which best describes your highest formal educational qualification? 
□ Secondary school degree or less 
□ High school degree 
□ Bachelor’s degree  
□ Postgraduate qualification or more 
 
8/ On average, how much income (VND) per month do you receive from your work?  
□ 0 
□ less than 10 million   
□ 10 million – 50 million 
□ more than 50 million – 100 million 
□ more than 100 million   
9/ Apart from your work income, how much other income (e.g. rental income, investment, business) per month 
do you receive? 
□ 0 
□ less than 10 million   
□ 10 million – 50 million 
□ more than 50 million – 100 million 




10/ Do you (or have you in the past) described yourself as the main income earner in your household? 
 □ Yes  □ No 
 
11/ When it comes to financial decision-making, what role would you play? 
 □ I am the main financial decision-maker 
 □ I share the financial decision-making 
 □ I have limited input, someone else makes the financial decisions. 
12/ What is your main field of occupation?  
□ 1. Fund manager 
□ 2. Broker-dealer 
□ 3. Brokerage manager/director 
□ 4. Financial advisor 
□ 5. Banking officer 
□ 6. Business owner 
□ 7. CEO (Chief executive officer) 
□ 8. CFO (Chief financial officer)/ Chief Accountant 
□ 9. Investment officer 
□ 10. Accountant 
□ 11. Administrative officer/manager 
□ 12. Sale/Marketing officer/manager 
□ 13. Teacher/lecturer 
□ 14. Other: ……. 
 
13/ What is your parents’ occupation:  
□1. Businessman/woman/investor 
□2. Teacher/lecturer 
□3. Farmer/Agricultural filed 
□4. Retiree 
□5. Other: …… . 
□6. Died 
 
14/ Do your parents or siblings purchase shares?  □Yes  □ No 
 
15/ How many years of work experience do you have?  
□ < 3 years 
□ 3 - 5 years 
□ more than 5 - 10 years 
□ more than 10 to 20 years 
□ more than 20 years 
 
16/ How many years of share investment experience do you have?  
□ < 3 years 
□ 3 - 5 years 
□ more than 5 - 10 years 
□ more than 10 to 20 years 
□ more than 20 years 
 
 
17/ What kinds of share prices (VND) do you purchase most?  
□ Less than 10,000 
□ 10,000 – 20,000 
□ more than 20,000 - 50,000 
□ more than 50,000 – 100,000 





18/ How many trading accounts do you have?  
□ 1  
□ 2 
□ 3 
□ 4  
□ 5 or more 
 
19/ In general, how often do you trade shares? 
□ At least once a day 
□ 1 to 6 times/week 
□ 1 to 3 times/month  
□ 1 to 2 times/quarter  
□ 1 to 3 times/year  
□ Less than once a year 
 
20/. The total own money (equity) (VND) that you have used for share investment since last year 
a) < 200 million 
b) 200 million to 500 million  
c) 501 million to 1 billion    
d) more than 1billion to 3 billion 
e) more than 3 billion  
 




Appendix 2: Consent form and Questionnaire - Vietnamese version 
GIẤY CHẤP THUẬN 
TIÊU ĐỀ NGHIÊN CỨU: 
ẢNH HƯỞNG CỦA NHẬN THỨC RỦI RO, CHẤP NHẬN RỦI RO VÀ NIỀM TIN VÀO THỊ TRƯỜNG 
CHỨNG KHOÁN TRONG QUYẾT ĐỊNH SỬ DỤNG NỢ 
 
NGHIÊN CỨU SINH: 
Họ và tên : Phùng Thái Minh Trang 
Khoa  : Kinh tế - Tài chính 
Địa chỉ   : Trường Đại Học Massey, Manawatū 
Private Bag 11 222 
Palmerston North 4442, New Zealand. 
Điện thoại : +64274745308 
Email  : T.Phung@massey.ac.nz 
 
MỤC ĐÍCH CỦA NGHIÊN CỨU 
Bạn đang được yêu cầu tham gia vào nghiên cứu này. Trước khi bạn quyết định tham gia, điều quan trọng là bạn 
hiểu lý do tại sao nghiên cứu đang được thực hiện và những gì sẽ liên quan. Xin hãy đọc thông tin sau đây một 
cách cẩn thận. Vui lòng hỏi nhà nghiên cứu nếu có bất cứ điều gì không rõ ràng hoặc nếu bạn cần thêm thông 
tin. Mục đích của nghiên cứu này là khám phá sự ảnh hưởng của nhận thức rủi ro của các nhà đầu tư cá nhân khi 
đầu tư vào cổ phiếu, sự chấp nhận rủi ro, và sự tin tưởng vào thị trường chứng khoán đối với các quyết định nợ 
của họ. 
 
THỦ TỤC NGHIÊN CỨU VÀ RỦI RO NẾU CÓ 
Cuộc khảo sát mất khoảng 45 phút. Bạn có thể từ chối trả lời bất kỳ hoặc tất cả các câu hỏi và có thể chấm dứt 
sự tham gia bất cứ lúc nào bạn muốn. 
 
BẢO MẬT 
Tất cả các câu trả lời của bạn được bảo mật. Xin vui lòng không viết bất kỳ thông tin nhận dạng về khảo sát của 
bạn. Để lưu giữ và bảo mật câu trả lời của bạn, Nhà nghiên cứu thực hiện:  
- Đánh số thứ tự người tham gia trên tất cả các ghi chú và tài liệu nghiên cứu của người trả lời đó. 
- Lưu giữ tất cả các chi tiết và bất kỳ các thông tin nhận dạng của người tham gia trong tủ két có khoá của nhà 
nghiên cứu này. 
Dữ liệu của người tham gia sẽ được giữ bí mật trừ trường hợp nhà nghiên cứu có nghĩa vụ pháp lý báo cáo các 
sự cố cụ thể. Những sự cố này bao gồm, nhưng có thể không giới hạn ở các sự cố lạm dụng và nguy cơ tự tử. 
Bảng câu hỏi này đã được xem xét và chấp thuận của trường Đại Học Massey, Hội đồng Đánh Giá Về Đạo Đức 




Nếu bạn có bất kỳ mối quan tâm về  việc quản lý đề tài nghiên cứu này, xin vui lòng liên hệ với tiến sĩ Rochelle 
Stewart-Withers, chủ tịch hội đồng, đại học Massey, Hội đồng Đánh Giá Về Đạo Đức Con Người: Miền Nam B, 
điện thoại 06 356 9099 x 83657, email humanethicsouthb@massey.ac.nz 
THAM GIA TỰ NGUYỆN 
Bạn tự nguyện tham gia vào nghiên cứu này. Nếu bạn quyết định tham gia vào nghiên cứu này, bạn sẽ được yêu 
cầu ký vào một mẫu đơn đồng ý. Sau khi bạn ký vào mẫu đồng ý, bạn vẫn có thể rút lui bất cứ lúc nào (ví dụ: 
hai tuần sau khi tham gia thu thập dữ liệu) và không cần đưa ra lý do. Rút khỏi nghiên cứu này sẽ không ảnh 
hưởng đến mối quan hệ bạn (nếu có) với nhà nghiên cứu. Nếu bạn rút khỏi nghiên cứu trước khi dữ liệu hoàn 
tất, dữ liệu của bạn sẽ được trả về cho bạn hoặc bị hủy. 
 
ĐỒNG Ý   
Tôi đã đọc và tôi hiểu các thông tin được cung cấp. Tôi hiểu rằng sự tham gia của tôi là tự nguyện và tôi có thể 
rút lui bất cứ lúc nào mà không cần đưa ra lý do và không mất phí. Tôi hiểu rằng tôi sẽ được cung cấp một bản 
sao của mẫu chấp thuận này và tự nguyện đồng ý tham gia vào nghiên cứu này. 
Người tham gia ký tên ____________________________ Ngày __________ 




BẢNG CÂU HỎI 
 
1/ Nghĩ về danh mục đầu tư cổ phiếu của anh/chị, Anh/chị phân bổ danh mục đầu tư cổ phiếu ngắn hạn và dài 
hạn như thế nào? 
   Danh mục đầu tư cổ phiếu Tỷ lệ phân bổ (%) 
Đầu tư ngắn hạn (dưới 1 năm)  
Đầu tư dài hạn (từ 1 năm trở lên)   
Tổng cộng 100% 
 
2/ Nghĩ về đầu tư cổ phiếu ngắn hạn của anh/chị, Anh/chị phân bổ danh mục đầu tư cổ phiếu ngắn hạn theo thời 
gian như thế nào? 
Đầu tư ngắn hạn  Tỷ lệ phân bổ (%) 
Dưới 1 tháng  
Trên 1 tháng đến 3 tháng   
Trên 3 tháng đến 6 tháng   
Trên 6 tháng đến dưới 1 năm  
Tổng cộng 100% 
 
3/ Nghĩ về nguồn tiền cá nhân từ gia đình như ba mẹ, vợ chồng, anh chị, họ hàng, …., mà Anh/Chị mượn hoặc 
vay để đầu tư cổ phiếu (Anh/Chị có thể chọn nhiều nguồn): 
□ 1. Ba mẹ ruột.        
□ 2. Ông bà ngoại/nội.      
□ 3. Anh/chị/em ruột.      
□ 4. Ba mẹ chồng/vợ. 
□ 5. Anh/chị/em chồng/vợ.  
□ 6. Anh/chị/em họ và cháu ruột/chồng/vợ. 
□ 7. Chồng/vợ. 
□ 8. Nguồn gia đình khác: ………. 
□ 9. Tôi không mượn nguồn gia đình.  
 
4/ Nếu Anh/Chị mượn hoặc vay từ hai nguồn (gia đình) trở lên, vui lòng chọn MỘT nguồn mà Anh/Chị sử dụng 
nhiều nhất? 













họ và cháu 
ruột/chồng/vợ 
Chồng/vợ Nguồn gia 
đình khác  
 
5/ Nguồn tiền cá nhân ngoài gia đình như từ bạn bè, thầy cô, đồng nghiệp mà Anh/Chị mượn hoặc vay để đầu tư 
cổ phiếu (Anh/Chị có thể chọn nhiều nguồn): 
□ 1. Bạn bè 
□ 2. Bạn gái/bạn trai 
□ 3. Cô giáo/Thầy giáo 
□ 4. Đồng nghiệp 
□ 5. Cấp trên 
□ 6. Đối tác làm ăn 
□ 7. Hàng xóm 
□ 8. Nguồn ngoài gia đình khác: ……….. 
□ 9. Tôi không mượn nguồn ngoài gia đình.  
 
6/ Nếu Anh/Chị mượn hoặc vay từ hai nguồn (ngoài gia đình) trở lên, vui lòng chọn MỘT nguồn mà Anh/Chị 
sử dụng nhiều nhất? 











Hàng xóm Đối tác làm 
ăn 
Nguồn ngoài 





7/ Nguồn tiền từ tổ chức như ngân hàng, tổ chức tín dụng, công ty chứng khoán mà Anh/Chị vay để đầu tư cổ 
phiếu (Anh/Chị có thể chọn nhiều nguồn):  
□ 1.Ngân hàng 
□ 2.Tổ chức tín dụng 
□ 3.Công ty chứng khoán 
□ 4.Nguồn khác từ bên ngoài: ………………… 
□ 5.Tôi không mượn từ nguồn tổ chức. 
 
8/ Nếu Anh/Chị mượn hoặc vay từ hai nguồn (tổ chức) trở lên, vui lòng chọn MỘT nguồn mà Anh/Chị sử dụng 
nhiều nhất? 
1 2 3 4 
Ngân 
hàng 
Tổ chức tín 
dụng 
Công ty chứng 
khoán 
Nguồn khác từ 
bên ngoài 
 
9/ Nghĩ về tổng số tiền trong danh mục đầu tư cổ phiếu, Anh/Chị sử dụng bao nhiêu nợ và bao nhiêu vốn tự có?  
 Tổng số tiền trong danh mục đầu tư cổ phiếu từ: % 
Vay cá nhân  
Vay tổ chức  
Vốn tự có  
Tổng cộng  100%  
  
10/ Khi Anh/Chị đầu tư cổ phiếu, tỷ lệ đòn bẩy Anh/Chị sử dụng là: 
□ Không sử dụng đòn bẩy 
□ Dưới 20% mức ký quỹ theo quy định 
□ 20% đến dưới 30% mức ký quỹ theo quy định 
□ 30% đến dưới 50% mức ký quỹ theo quy định 
□ Sử dụng tối đa mức ký quỹ theo quy định 
 
11a/ Mức độ lo lắng về thông tin cá nhân của Anh/Chị có thể bị rò rỉ khi sử dụng trực tuyến (online), ủy quyền 
cho môi giới hoặc nhờ cá nhân (tổ chức) giao dịch giúp?  
(1: Hoàn toàn không lo lắng, 2: Không lo lắng, 3: Bình thường, 4: Lo lắng, 5: Rất lo lắng) 
1 2 3 4 5 
11b/ Mức độ quan trọng nếu thông tin cá nhân của Anh/Chị bị rò rỉ?  
(1: Hoàn toàn không quan trọng, 2: Không quan trọng, 3: Bình thường, 4: Quan trọng, 5: Rất quan trọng) 
1 2 3 4 5 
12a/ Mức độ lo lắng về sự thất bại có thể ảnh hưởng đến vị trí xã hội của Anh/Chị nếu Anh/Chị đầu tư chứng 
khoán bị thất bại (thua lỗ)?  
1 2 3 4 5 
12b/ Mức độ quan trọng nếu việc đầu tư chứng khoán bị thất bại (thua lỗ) ảnh hưởng đến vị trí xã hội của 
Anh/Chị? 
1 2 3 4 5 
13a/ Mức độ lo lắng về việc mất cơ hội đầu tư tài chính khác nếu Anh/Chị sử dụng toàn bộ tiền của Anh/Chị 
cho việc đầu tư cổ phiếu? 
1 2 3 4 5 
13b/ Mức độ quan trọng nếu Anh/Chị bị mất cơ hội đầu tư tài chính khác? 
1 2 3 4 5 
14a/ Mức độ lo lắng về việc Anh/Chị dành quá nhiều thời gian cho việc đầu tư cổ phiếu và kết quả không như 
mong đợi? 
1 2 3 4 5 
14b/ Mức độ quan trọng nếu Anh/Chị dành quá nhiều thời gian cho việc đầu tư cổ phiếu và kết quả không như 
mong đợi? 
1 2 3 4 5 
15a/ Mức độ lo lắng của Anh/Chị về việc quyết định lựa chọn các cổ phiếu khi lựa chọn cổ phiếu cho danh mục 
đầu tư? 
1 2 3 4 5 
15b/ Mức độ quan trọng nếu Anh/Chị quyết định sai trong việc lựa chọn các cổ phiếu cho danh mục đầu tư? 




16a/ Mức độ lo lắng của Anh/Chị về việc kết quả đầu tư cổ phiếu không thể trả được lãi vay và các khoản tiền 
vay? 
1 2 3 4 5 
16b/ Mức độ quan trọng nếu Anh/Chị không thể trả được lãi vay và các khoản vay? 
1 2 3 4 5 
17a/ Tỷ lệ lỗ so với vốn nào dưới đây khiến Anh/Chị lo lắng nếu đầu tư cổ phiếu bị lỗ? 
□ ≤ 10%  
□ > 10% to 20% 
□ > 20% to 30% 
□ > 30% to 50% 
□ > 50% 
 
17b/ Tỷ lệ lỗ so với vốn nào dưới đây khiến Anh/Chị cảm thấy quan trọng?  
□ ≤ 10%  
□ > 10% to 20% 
□ > 20% to 30% 
□ > 30% to 50% 
□ > 50% 
 
18/ Giả sử Anh/Chị có 100 triệu VND trong tài khoản tiết kiệm và lãi suất là 2%/năm. Sau 1 năm, Anh/Chị nghĩ 
có bao nhiêu tiền VND trong tài khoản này nếu Anh/Chị không rút ra? 
(i) Lớn hơn 102 triệu VND 
(ii) 102 triệu VND 
(iii) Nhỏ hơn 102 triệu VND 
(iv) Không biết 
 
19/ Giả sử Anh/Chị có 100 triệu VND trong tài khoản tiết kiệm và lãi suất là 20%/năm và Anh/Chị không rút số 
tiền này ra hoặc lãi suất tiền gửi. Sau 5 năm, Anh/Chị có tổng cộng bao nhiêu tiền VND trong tài khoản? 
(i) Lớn hơn 200 triệu VND 
(ii) 200 triệu VND 
(iii) Nhỏ hơn 200 triệu VND 
(iv) Không biết 
 
20/ Giả sử rằng lãi suất của tài khoản tiết kiệm của Anh/Chị là 1%/năm và lạm phát là 2%/năm. Sau 1 năm, 
Anh/Chị có thể mua được bao nhiêu hàng hóa với số tiền trong tài khoản này?   
(i ) Lớn hơn hôm nay 
(ii) Bằng hôm nay  
(iii) Thấp hơn hôm nay 
(iv) Không biết. 
 
21/ Giả sử hôm nay Nam thừa kế 10,000 triệu VND và Khoa sẽ thừa kế 10 tỷ VND sau 3 năm. Ai giàu hơn bởi 
vì sự thừa kế này?  (Các yếu tố khác không thay đổi) 
(i)  Nam 
(ii) Khoa  
(iii) Cả hai đều giàu bằng nhau 
(iv) Không biết 
 
22/ Giả sử rằng năm 2020, thu nhập của Anh/Chị tăng gấp đôi và giá của tất cả hàng hóa cũng tăng gấp đôi. 
Trong năm 2020, Anh/Chị sẽ mua được bao nhiêu hàng hóa với mức thu nhập này?   
(i ) Lớn hơn hôm nay 
(ii) Bằng hôm nay  
(iii) Thấp hơn hôm nay 





23/ Câu nào sau đây mô tả chức năng chính của thị trường chứng khoán?   
(i) Thị trường chứng khoán giúp dự đoán lợi nhuận cổ phiếu;  
(ii) Thị trường chứng khoán dẫn đến sự tăng giá của cổ phiếu;  
(iii) Thị trường chứng khoán mang mọi người muốn mua cổ phiếu và mọi người muốn bán cổ phiếu lại với 
nhau;  
(iv) Không câu nào ở trên đúng; 
(v) Không biết. 
 
24/ Nếu một người nào đó mua cổ phiếu của công ty B:   
(i) Người này sở hữu một phần của công ty B;  
(ii) Người này cho công ty B mượn tiền;  
(iii) Người này nợ tiền của công ty B;  
(iv) Không câu nào ở trên đúng; 
(v) Không biết. 
 
25/ Nếu một người nào đó mua trái phiếu của công ty B  
(i) Người này sở hữu một phần của công ty B;  
(ii) Người này cho công ty B mượn tiền;  
(iii) Người này nợ tiền của công ty B;  
(iv) Không câu nào ở trên đúng; 
(v) Không biết. 
 
26/ Nếu lãi suất giảm, điều gì xảy đến với giá trái phiếu của Anh/Chị đang nắm giữ?  
(i) Tăng; (ii) Giảm; (iii) Vẫn giữ nguyên;  (iv) Không câu nào ở trên đúng; 
(v) Không biết. 
 
27/ Thông thường, đầu tư nào hiển thị sự biến động cao nhất theo thời gian?  
(i) Tiền tiết kiệm;  
(ii) Trái phiếu;  
(iii) Cổ phiếu;  
(iv) Không biết. 
 
28/ Câu nào sau đây là đúng?  
(i) Khi một người đầu tư vào công ty quản lý quỹ, người này không thể rút tiền trong năm đầu tiên.  
(ii) Công ty quỹ có thể đầu tư vào một vài tài sản, ví dụ, đầu tư vào cổ phiếu và trái phiếu;  
(iii) Công ty quỹ trả lãi suất bảo đảm tùy thuộc vào năng lực quá khứ của công ty; 
(iv) Không câu nào ở trên đúng; 
(v) Không biết. 
 
29/ Mua một cổ phiếu của công ty niêm yết thường an toàn hơn mua một chứng chỉ quỹ 
(i) Đúng;  (ii) Sai;  (iii) Không biết. 
 
30/ Cổ phiếu thường rủi ro hơn trái phiếu.   
(i) Đúng;  (ii) Sai;  (iii) Không biết. 
 
31/ Xem xét một thời gian dài (ví dụ 10 hoặc 20 năm), tài sản nào thường có lợi nhuận cao nhất? (Các yếu tố 
khác không thay đổi) 
(i) Tài khoản tiết kiệm; (ii) Trái phiếu; (iii) Cổ phiếu; (iv) Không biết. 
 
32/ Khi một nhà đầu tư phân bổ tiền đầu tư vào các loại tài sản khác nhau, rủi ro về mất tiền:   
(i) Tăng;  (ii) Giảm;  (iii) Giữ nguyên;  (iv) Không biết. 
 
33/ Nếu Anh/Chị mua một trái phiếu 10 năm, điều này có nghĩa là Anh/Chị thể bán nó sau 5 năm mà không bị 
phạt nặng.   





34/ Nhìn chung, Anh/Chị mô tả về Anh/Chị như là một người như thế nào trong đầu tư cổ phiếu?  
a/ Như một người chơi bài chuyên nghiệp.  
b/ Sẵn sàng chấp nhận rủi ro sau khi hoàn thành nghiên cứu thông tin đầy đủ. 
c/ Dè dặt. 
d/ Một người tránh rủi ro thực sự. 
 
35/ Anh/Chị tham gia trò chơi trên truyền hình (ti vi) và có thể chọn lựa một trong các trường hợp sau đây. 
Anh/Chị sẽ chọn cái nào?  
a/ 1 triệu VND tiền mặt. 
b/ 50% cơ hội để thắng 5 triệu VND.  
c/ 30% cơ hội để thắng 10 triệu VND.  
d/ 5% cơ hội để thắng 100 triệu VND. 
 
36/ Anh/Chị vừa hoàn thành tiết kiệm cho một kỳ nghỉ "một lần trong đời" nhưng Anh/Chị chưa thực hiện. Ba 
tuần trước khi Anh/Chị định rời đi, Anh/Chị mất việc. Anh/Chị sẽ: 
a) Hủy bỏ kỳ nghỉ này. 
b) Tham gia một kỳ nghỉ vừa phải (rẻ) hơn nhiều kỳ nghỉ này. 
c) Vẫn theo đúng tiến độ, bởi vì Anh/Chị cần thời gian để chuẩn bị tìm việc. 
d) Kéo dài kỳ nghỉ của Anh/Chị, bởi vì đây có thể là cơ hội đi nghỉ của Anh/Chị. 
 
37/ Nếu Anh/Chị bất ngờ nhận được 200 triệu VND để đầu tư, Anh/Chị sẽ làm gì? 
a) Gửi tiền vào tài khoản ngân hàng. 
b) Đầu tư trái phiếu.  
c) Đầu tư cổ phiếu. 
 
38/ Xét về kinh nghiệm, mức độ thoải mái của Anh/Chị khi đầu tư vào cổ phiếu như thế nào? 
a) Hoàn toàn không thoải mái. 
b) Hơi thoải mái. 
c) Rất thoải mái. 
 
39/ Khi Anh/Chị nghĩ về từ "rủi ro",  những từ nào sau đây xuất hiện trong tâm trí của Anh/Chị đầu tiên? 
a) Mất tiền 
b) Không chắc chắn 
c) Cơ hội 
d) Rất hào hứng. 
 
40/ Các chuyên gia đồng ý rằng trái phiếu chính phủ tương đối an toàn hơn tất cả các tài sản khác, hiện nay 
Anh/Chi đang sở hữu trái phiếu này, Anh/Chị sẽ làm gì? 
a) Giữ các trái phiếu này. 
b) Bán các trái phiếu này, dùng một nửa số tiền đã bán để đầu tư thị trường tiền tệ, và một nửa số tiền còn lại 
đầu tư vào các loại tài sản khác. 
c) Bán các trái phiếu này và dùng tất cả số tiền thu được để đầu tư các loại tài sản khác. 
d) Bán trái phiếu, dùng tất cả số tiền thu được để đầu tư các loại tài sản khác trên, và mượn thêm tiền để mua 
thêm.  
 
41/ Dựa vào kết quả đầu tư: tốt nhất (thu được) và xấu nhất (mất/lỗ) của 4 lựa chọn đầu tư dưới đây, Anh/Chị sẽ 
thích trường hợp nào hơn? 
a /Trường hợp tốt nhất: thu được (+) 200 triệu VND;  Trường hợp xấu nhất: mất (-) 0VND . 
b) Trường hợp tốt nhất: + 800 triệu VND; Trường hợp xấu nhất: - 200 triệu VND. 
c) Trường hợp tốt nhất: + 2,600 triệu VND; Trường hợp xấu nhất: - 800 triệu VND. 




42/ Ngoài những gì Anh/Chị đang sở hữu, Anh/Chị được tặng thêm 1,000,000,000 VND. Bây giờ Anh/Chị được 
yêu cầu chọn giữa: 
a) Lợi nhuận chắc chắn là 500,000,000 VND. 
b) Có 50% cơ hội kiếm được 1,000,000,000 VND và 50% cơ hội không đạt được gì. 
 
43/ Anh/Chị được yêu cầu chọn giữa: 
a) Chắc chắn bị mất 500,000,000 VND. 
b) Có 50% cơ hội bị mất 1,000,000,000 VND và 50% cơ hội không mất gì cả. 
 
44/ Giả sử một người họ hàng để lại cho Anh/Chị một khoản thừa kế là 1 tỉ VND, quy định trong bản di chúc rằng 
Anh/Chị đầu tư TẤT CẢ số tiền vào MỘT trong các lựa chọn sau đây. Anh/Chị sẽ chọn cái nào? 
a) Tài khoản tiết kiệm hoặc quỹ tương trợ trên thị trường tiền tệ 
b) Quỹ tương trợ mà nó sở hữu cổ phiếu và trái phiếu 
c) Danh mục 15 cổ phiếu phổ thông 
d) Hàng hóa như vàng, bạc, và dầu. 
 
45/ Nếu Anh/Chị phải đầu tư 20 tỉ VND, những lựa chọn đầu tư nào sau đây mà Anh/Chị cảm thấy hấp dẫn 
nhất? 
a/ 60% đầu tư với rủi ro thấp, 30% đầu tư với rủi ro trung bình, 10% đầu tư với rủi ro cao. 
b/ 30% đầu tư với rủi ro thấp, 40% đầu tư với rủi ro trung bình, 30% đầu tư với rủi ro cao. 
 
46/ Người bạn và người hàng xóm đáng tin cậy của Anh/Chị, một nhà địa chất có kinh nghiệm, đang tập hợp một 
nhóm các nhà đầu tư để đầu tư vào một công ty liên doanh thăm dò khai thác vàng. Công ty liên doanh này có thể 
trả 50 đến 100 lần số tiền đã đầu tư nếu thành công. Nếu thất bại, toàn bộ đầu tư bị mất. Bạn của Anh/Chị ước 
tính cơ hội thành công chỉ là 20%. Nếu Anh/Chị có 1 tỹ VND, Anh/Chị sẽ đầu tư bao nhiều:  
a) Không đầu tư; 
b) Đầu tư 10% - < 30%; 
c) Đầu tư 30% - <60%; 
d) Đầu tư >60%. 
 
47/ Nghĩ về các mối liên hệ trong quá trình đầu tư cổ phiếu, mức độ tin tưởng của Anh/Chị vào người môi giới 
chứng khoán? (1: Hoàn toàn không tin tưởng, 2: Không tin tưởng, 3: Trung lập, 4: Tin tưởng, 5: Hoàn toàn tin 
tưởng). 
1 2 3 4 5 0: Tôi không có người môi giới 
48/ Mức độ tin tưởng của Anh/Chị vào trang điện tử về thông tin tài chính như cafef.vn, vietstock, 
cophieu68.com, ... 
1 2  3   4    5 
49/ Mức độ tin tưởng của Anh/Chị vào các công ty chứng khoán? 
1 2            3   4    5 
50/ Mức độ tin tưởng của Anh/Chị vào các công ty niêm yết mà Anh/Chị đang đầu tư? 
1           2   3   4    5 
51/ Mức độ tin tưởng của Anh/Chị vào sự tư vấn của bạn bè hoặc người thân đang làm ở các công ty chứng 
khoán? 
1           2   3   4    5 0: không có người nào như vậy   
52/ Mức độ tin tưởng của Anh/Chị vào thị trường chứng khoán mà Anh/Chị đang giao dịch? 





THÔNG TIN CÁ NHÂN: 
1/ Giới tính:    □ Nam  □ Nữ   □ Không xác định 
 
2/ Tuổi của Anh/Chị:   
□1. dưới 25  
□2. 25 – 35 
□3. 36 – 45 
□4. 46-55 
□5. trên 55 
3/ Tình trạng hôn nhân:   
□1. Độc thân  
□2. Kết hôn  
□3. Ly dị      
□4. Góa 
 
4/ Anh/Chị có bao nhiêu con?  
□ 0  □ 1   □ 2  □ 3  □ 4 trở lên 
 
5/ Anh/Chị sống ở đâu? 
□1. Quận: …………………, TP Hồ Chí Minh. 
□2. Quận: …………………, Hà Nội 
□3. Quận: …………………, Đà Nẵng.  
□4. Đồng Bằng Sông Cửu Long 
□5. Khác: 
 
6/ Anh/Chị có tổng cộng bao nhiêu bất động sản (nhà và đất)?   
□ 0  □ 1   □ 2  □ 3  □ 4 trở lên 
 
7/ Trình độ học vấn:  
□1. Trung học cơ sở hoặc thấp hơn 
□2. Trung học phổ thông 
□3. Đại học/Cao đẳng 
□4. Thạc sĩ hoặc hơn   
 
8/ Thu nhập (VND) bình quân mỗi tháng từ công việc chính?  
□ 0 
□ 1 đến dưới 10 triệu  
□ 10 triệu  đến 50 triệu  
□ trên 50 triệu đến 100 triệu 
□ trên 100 triệu   
 
9/ Ngoài thu nhập chính, thu nhập khác (ví dụ: thu nhập cho thuê, đầu tư, kinh doanh, …) của Anh/Chị mỗi 
tháng? 
□ 0 
□ 1 đến dưới 10 triệu  
□ 10 triệu  đến 50 triệu  
□ trên 50 triệu đến 100 triệu 
□ trên 100 triệu   
 
10/ Anh/Chị có phải là (hoặc đã từng là) lao động chính trong gia đình? 
    □ Đúng  □ Không 
 
11/ Vai trò của Anh/Chị trong các quyết định tài chính? 
□1. Tôi là người ra quyết định tài chính chính. 
□2. Tôi thường kết hợp với người khác đưa ra quyết định tài chính. 




12/ Lĩnh vực nghề nghiệp chính của Anh/Chị là gì? 
□1. Quản lý quỹ đầu tư 
□2. Người môi giới 
□3. Giám đốc / Giám đốc môi giới 
□4. Cố vấn tài chính 
□5. Nhân viên ngân hàng 
□6. Chủ doanh nghiệp 
□7. Giám đốc điều hành  
□8. Giám đốc tài chính / Kế toán trưởng 
□9. Chuyên viên đầu tư 
□10. Kế toán 
□11. Nhân viên hành chính  
□12. Nhân viên bán hàng / tiếp thị 
□13. Giáo viên / giảng viên 
□14. Khác: …… .. 
 
13/ Nghề nghiệp chính của Ba hoặc Mẹ của Anh Chị là?  
□1. Doanh nghiệp/Nhà đầu tư 
□2. Giáo viên / giảng viên 
□3. Nông nghiệp 
□4. Hưu trí 
□5. Khác: …… .. 
□6. Mất 
 
14/ Ba Mẹ hoặc anh chị em của Anh Chị có mua cổ phiếu không?   
    □ Có  □ Không 
15/ Kinh nghiệm làm việc:  
□ < 3 năm 
□ 3 đến  5 năm 
□ trên 5 đến  10 năm 
□ trên 10 đến 20 năm 
□ trên 20 năm 
 
16/ Anh/Chị có bao nhiêu năm kinh nghiệm đầu tư cổ phiếu? 
□ <3 năm 
□ 3 đến  5 năm 
□ trên 5 đến 10 năm 
□ trên 10 đến 20 năm 
□ trên 20 năm 
 
17/ Anh/Chị mua loại cổ phiếu (VND) nào nhiều nhất? 
□ Thấp hơn 10.000 đồng 
□ 10.000 đến 20.000 đồng 
□ Trên 20.000 đến 50.000 đồng 
□ Trên 50.000 đến 100.000 đồng 
□ Trên 100.000 đồng 
 
18/ Anh/Chị có bao nhiêu tài khoản giao dịch?  
□ 1  □ 2   □ 3  □4  □ từ 5 trở lên 
 
19/ Số lần giao dịch cổ phiếu của Anh/Chị? 
□ Ít nhất một lần một ngày 
□ 1 đến 6 lần/tuần 
□ 1 đến 3 lần/tháng  
□ 1 đến 2 lần/quý  
□ 1 đến 3 lần/năm  
□ Ít hơn một năm một lần 
20/ Tổng số tiền (vốn sở hữu) của Anh/Chị dùng để đầu tư cổ phiếu trong năm (VND) 
□ <200 triệu 
□ 200 triệu đến 500 triệu 
□ 501 triệu đến 1 tỷ 
□ trên 1 tỷ đến 3 tỷ 
□ trên 3 tỷ. 
Cảm ơn Anh/Chị rất nhiều 
226 
 
 
 
